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INTRODUCTION
"Fears of alien ideologies have frequently agitated the nation and
inspired legislation aimed at suppressing advocacy of those ideologies.
At such times the fog of public excitement obscures the ancient
landmarks set up in our Bill of Rights. Yet then, of all times, should this
Court adhere most closely to the course they mark. "'
"Some legal doctrines are more important as manifestations of attitude
than as guides to decision[s] in specific cases. n2
In times of national crisis, passion and fear often grip the country,
thereby causing oppressive actions toward allegedly threatening groups
or individuals. Such actions, while lamentable, are nevertheless
understandable, perhaps even predictable. Faced with a threat to the
nation, fear and prejudice generate demand for action. Congress and
executive officials respond, often to the detriment of civil liberties.3
When those actions are challenged in court, however, we expect judges
to respond differently. Judges are supposed to be above the political and
emotional fray, dispassionately resolving disputes regarding civil
liberties with reference only to the law and facts of the case.4
1. Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 453 (1950) (Black,
J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
2. Wallace Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis,
52 COLUM. L. REv. 313, 313 (1952).
3. See David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and
Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2565, 2590-92 (2003)
(recounting the history of congressional and executive responses to crises); Oren Gross,
Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112
YALE L.J. 1011, 1035-42 (2003) (noting that times of crisis cause people and
government representatives to support draconian action against suspected groups);
Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 Mo. L. REV. 903, 909-21 (2004)
(discussing public and government responses to perceived threats during World War I,
World War II, and the Cold War).
4. See, e.g., Gordon Bermant and Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges and
the Judicial Branch: Their Independence & Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REv. 835,
839 (1995) ("It is the essence of good judicial process that it is uncontaminated by
pressures for decision beyond those presented by the particular facts and the applicable
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History, however, tells another story. Time and again, courts,
including the Supreme Court, have deferred to questionable, if not
outright illegitimate, government actions taken in the name of national
security.5 Some observers view the courts' poor performance during
national security crises as a reason for judges to stay away from the
delicate task of balancing security and civil liberties.6  Far more
observers, however, argue that adequate protection of civil liberties
requires a more active role for the judiciary.7 Recently, the Supreme
Court apparently agreed, at least in principle. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,8
the Court affirmed that the Constitution "envisions a role" for judges
"when individual liberties are at stake," and rejected the notion that "a
state of war is. . . a blank check for the President when it comes to the
rights of the Nation's citizens." 9
The normative argument that courts ought to protect civil liberties
in times of crisis is an attractive one. It is one thing, however, for us to
say that courts should take a more active role in protecting civil
liberties. It is quite another to say that they the will. Judges are, after
all, human. They remain subject to the same passions, fears, and
prejudices that sweep the rest of the nation. While in the legal
paradigm, adherence to the law and its objective criteria is supposed to
law."); Tracey E. George, Court Fxing, 43 ARIz. L. REv. 9, 31-32 (2001) ("Legal
theory is derived from the idea that judges are neutral and reasoned arbiters who defer to
rules to guide their decisions.").
5. See Wells, supra note 3, at 903; Christina E. Wells, Discussing the First
Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1566, 1578-87 (2003) (reviewing ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone
eds., 2002)).
6. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 292-98 (2003);
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 205-06
(1998); Gross, supra note 3, at 1022-23; Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?:
Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. REv. 273, 307.
7. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN ThE UNITED STATES
(Athenum 1969) (1941); MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR (1990); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH
IN WARTIME (2004); Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Foreword: A
Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16
(2002); Cole, supra note 3; Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime,
116 U. PA. L. REv. 975 (1968); Joel B. Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and
the Vagaries of Constitutional Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perspective, 19
U. HAw. L. REv. 649 (1997); Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in
the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 456 (2002); Jules
Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1409-12
(1989); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J.
489 (1945); and Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due
Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HoFSrRA L. REV. 1605
(2004).
8. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
9. Id. at 2650.
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prevent fear and prejudice from infecting judicial resolution of issues,
even the Supreme Court's doctrine most protective of civil liberties has
proven no match for the infecting atmosphere associated with national
security crises.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the Cold War prosecutions of
Eugene Dennis and other leaders of the Communist Party USA
("CPUSA"). A "[t]rial of [i]deas"1° from the very beginning, the
defendants in Dennis v. United States were convicted of conspiring to
advocate the forcible overthrow of the government in violation of the
Smith Act." The evidence against them was weak, as there was no
proof that they agreed to overthrow or advocate overthrow of the
government. Rather, the defendants' trial proceeded on the theory that,
as leaders of the CPUSA, they taught Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which
allegedly involved forcible overthrow as a necessary aspect of a
communist revolution.'
2
The defendants appealed their convictions, claiming that the
convictions violated the First Amendment, 3 which was the reasonable
thing to do given the state of free speech doctrine at the time. In the
decade preceding Dennis, the Supreme Court scrutinized speech-based
prosecutions using a protective test that required a clear and present
danger of imminent and serious harm before speech could be punished. 14
Because the prosecution had presented no evidence of planned,
attempted, or advocated overthrow of the government, the defendants
had reason to hope for reversal of their convictions. Yet, both the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court upheld
them, applying a reinterpreted and much weaker version of the clear and
present danger test.15
Conventional wisdom roundly condemns Dennis, attributing the
result to a Cold War hysteria that gripped the country and infected the
10. See PETER L. STEINBERG, THE GREAT "RED MENACE": UNITED STATES
PROSECUTION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS, 1947-1952, at 157 (1984); see also HARRY
KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 193 (Jamie
Kalven ed., 1988) (characterizing the charges against the defendants as amounting to
"organizing a group to commit a speech crime").
11. 183 F.2d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 1950). For in-depth discussions of the trial,
see MICHAL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH AcT, THE
COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 35-116 (1977); and STEINBERG,
supra note 10, at 157-77.
12. See United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)
(setting forth the grand jury indictment).
13. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 495-96 (1951).
14. See KALVEN, JR., supra note 10, at 125-89; cases cited infra note 201.
15. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 213, 234, af4'd, 341 U.S. at 516-17 (plurality
opinion).
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judges' reasoning.' 6 As one scholar noted, "Dennis served mainly to
give the imprimatur of the Supreme Court to an assault upon freedom of
expression and association that was the essence of McCarthyism."17
Conventional wisdom, however, provides few answers regarding how to
guard against Dennis's failings in the future. We cannot simply assume
that judges armed with an understanding of past errors will act
courageously. In fact, psychological research suggests that, left to their
own devices in times of stress, people, including judges, tend to vastly
exaggerate and react against the threats posed by disfavored groups.
What we need, then, is a doctrine that can counteract the effects
of fear and prejudice that lead to such action, one that serves as a
"guide[ to decisions" rather than simply a "manifestation of attitude."
The clear and present danger test could not serve this function. With its
probabilistic roots and manipulable nature, the clear and present danger
test actually facilitated the psychological phenomena referred to above.
To the Court's credit, its rejection of that test in favor of the strictly
protective test in Brandenburg v. Ohio8 reflects a conscious attempt to
formulate a doctrine with more concrete criteria. Unfortunately, much
of the Court's modem doctrine, especially its reliance on strict and
intermediate scrutiny, suffers from many of the same flaws that disabled
the clear and present danger test, suggesting that it too may provide
ineffective protection for speech in current and future national security
crises.
Using Dennis as a case study, this Article explores the
psychological influences that may lead judges to succumb to fear and
prejudice in times of crisis and, consequently, to abdicate their judicial
role. With an understanding of these influences in hand, the Article
further suggests a possible approach to free speech doctrine that may
16. See, e.g., 341 U.S. at 581, 588 (Douglas, J., dissenting); ROBERT JUSTIN
GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO 1976, at 368
(rev. ed. 2001); MILTON R. KoNvrrz, EXPANDING LIBERTIES: FREEDOM'S GAINS IN
POSTWAR AMERICA 122 (1966); ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME
COURT AND RED MONDAY 51 (1999); STEINBERG, supra note 10, at ix-xiv; Michal R.
Belknap, Cold War in the Courtroom: The Foley Square Communist Trial, in AMERICAN
POLITICAL TRIALS 207, 208 (Michal R. Belknap ed., rev. & expanded ed. 1994); Jeffrey
M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom
of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1273, 1328 n.228
(1983); Morton J. Horwitz, Commentary, "Contracted" Biographies and Other
Obstacles to "Truth", 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 714, 715 (1995); Carl Landauer, Deliberating
Speed: Totalitarian Anxieties and Postwar Legal Thought, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171,
197-98 (2000); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 816 (1983).
17. Michal R. Belknap, Dennis v. United States: Great Case or Cold War
Relic?, 1993 J. SuP. CT. HIsT. 41, 55.
18. 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam) (allowing punishment of speech
only when it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action").
2005:115
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allow judges to avoid debacles such as Dennis. Part I describes the
history associated with anticommunist sentiment, and the resulting
paranoia that generally existed during the Dennis defendants' trial and
appeals. Part II discusses the Dennis decisions, examining both the
conduct of the trial and the free speech issue that was the focus of the
defendants' appeals. Part III discusses two possible psychological
phenomena relevant to the Dennis decisions. First, this Part reviews
psychological research regarding cognitive biases that can skew risk
estimations such as those involved in application of the clear and present
danger test. Second, this Part reviews research about prejudice,
discussing how the desire to take action against abhorrent groups can
result from faulty threat perception. Part III concludes with a discussion
of the potential influence of both psychological phenomena on
Americans' perceptions of the threat posed by the CPUSA. Part IV
examines those same phenomena in the context of the Dennis decisions,
arguing that the courts' applications of the clear and present danger test
are consistent with the operation of either or both of those phenomena.
Part V concludes with a discussion of the possible implications of these
findings. Specifically, it discusses the nature of the clear and present
danger test and how the Cold War image of the CPUSA inevitably
perverted its application. It also examines the Court's later attempts to
move away from that test, some of which reflect an intuitive
understanding of the earlier test's failings and others of which suffer
from similar failings. Finally, building on Brandenburg and
psychological notions of accountability, Part V briefly offers some
thoughts on possible changes to the Court's modem doctrine that may
allow judges to gauge more effectively potential infringements of the
right to expression during national security crises.
I. DENNIS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Dennis defendants were indicted under the Smith Act (also
known as the Alien Registration Act), which prohibited (1) advocacy of
violent overthrow of the government and (2) organizing a group
designed to teach or advocate violent overthrow of the government. 9
Adopted in 1940, the Smith Act was one of several legal tools resulting
from a rising tide of anticommunist hysteria in the 1930's.' Although
19. Section 2 of the Smith Act made criminally punishable the knowing or
willful advocacy of violent overthrow of the government, and also prohibited persons
from organizing as a group to teach or advocate the violent overthrow of the
government. Pub. L. No. 76-670, § 2, 54 Stat. 670, 671. Section 3 of the Smith Act
made it "unlawful for any person... to conspire to commit" any of the acts in section
2. Id. § 3, 54 Stat. at 671.
20. Although persecution and fear of communists in the United States started
much earlier than the 1930s, the anticommunist hysteria that infected the Dennis
120
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anticommunist sentiment abated somewhat during World War I,2 it
reappeared in full force in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the period in
which the Dennis defendants were tried. A particular view of domestic
communists emerged during these periods-one that cast them as
obedient and nearly super human soldiers in a vast and powerful
conspiracy directed by the Soviet Union. In order to give context to the
Smith Act prosecutions of the Dennis defendants, this Part discusses the
evolution and nature of anticommunist sentiment during these critical
periods.
A. Domestic Communists Pre-World War II
As the economic difficulties of the Great Depression caused many
to question capitalism, domestic communists gained ground in the
emerging labor movement, helping to unionize many heavy industries.'
Under the New Deal's expansion of government services, communists
also took government jobs that potentially allowed them to influence
official policy.23 The rise of the antifascist Popular Front in 1935,
during which the Soviet Union alone acted to oppose fascist expansion in
Europe, made communism even more attractive to Americans seeking to
right social injustice.'t Consequently,
By the late 1930s, a broad left-wing movement had grown up
around the Communist party. ... [It] encompassed dozens of
organizations that not only enabled the party to extend its
political influence far beyond the ranks of its own members but
also created an institutional basis for an entire way of life.'
proceedings had its most direct roots in the 1930s, and this Article limits its examination
to the years following 1930. For discussion of anticommunism prior to the 1930s, see
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 103-91; ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY OF
NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920 (1955); and William M. Wiecek, The Legal
Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Background of Dennis v. United States,
2001 Sup. CT. REV. 375.
21. Wiecek, supra note 20, at 403.
22. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 10-11; ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF
MCCARTHYISM 5 (1994).
23. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 11; EARL LATHAM, THE COMMUNIST
CONTROVERSY IN WASHINGTON: FROM THE NEw DEAL TO MCCARTHY 75-78 (1966).
24. RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN
PERSPECTIVE 12-13 (1990); HARVEY KLEHR, THE HEYDEY OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM:
THE DEPRESSION DECADE 170-71 (1984).
25. SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 5.
2005:115
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Membership in the CPUSA thus grew from 7000 in 1930 to 82,000 by
1938.26 Though "still small and marginal," the CPUSA "now had a real
role within the American polity., 27
As the CPUSA gained strength, however, it revived dormant fears
of communism. Much of this antipathy resulted from the
organization's obvious foreign influences.29 Such xenophobia was not
new-American antipathy to foreigners and foreign ideologies existed
for decades prior to the 1930s. 30  But, fascism's rise throughout
Europe-ironically, one of the very things that aided communism's
resurgence in the United States-also increased antipathy to foreign
influences, 31  a sentiment greatly exacerbated by the Nazi-Soviet
nonaggression pact in 1939.32 The CPUSA, with its close ties to the
USSR and its heavily immigrant-oriented membership, suffered the
effects of this general xenophobia. Many people began to view the rise
in communism as evidence of the fact that "outsiders. . . threatened the
nation from within."33  Others wrongly believed that communists'
increasing presence in government jobs evidenced a plan to infiltrate the
U.S. government. 34  As one contemporary observer noted, during the
1930s, "a general hysteria of fear gripp[ed] the Nation against
communism."3 5
Fear of communist influence resulted in a number of government
actions aimed at communists. Although CPUSA members rarely did
more than advocate communist doctrine, numerous states revived or
enacted sedition laws under which they prosecuted CPUSA members for
advocating violent overthrow of the government.36 State and local
26. See KLEHR, supra note 24, at 413 (discussing Communist Party USA
("CPUSA") recruitment in the late 1930s); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES:
MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 15 (1998).
27. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 15.
28. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 11; Wiecek, supra note 20, at 395-97.
29. KLEHR, supra note 24, at 381 (noting that "foreign-born" individuals
originally comprised the bulk of the CPUSA, although that situation began to change in
1929 as more American born individuals joined).
30. ROBERT GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE
SENATE 30 (1970); SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 9-10.
31. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 20.
32. KLEHR, supra note 24, at 386.
33. SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 9.
34. See FRIED, supra note 24, at 45; GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 31-32.
35. H.R. REP. No. 74-1869, at 6 (1935) (remarks of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
36. See Legislation, Federal Sedition Bills: Speech Restriction in Theory and
Practice, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918 n.5 (1935); Legislation, State Control of
Political Thought, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 390, 392-94 (1936). By the end of the 1930s,
there were sedition prosecutions in Ohio, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, California,
Kentucky, Oregon, Michigan, Utah, Iowa, Georgia, Washington, Illinois, and Virginia.
SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 66; see also BELKtNAP, supra note 11, at 11-12
122
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authorities also used pretextual charges to break up labor organization
picketing and other groups' peaceful activities.'7 States also embarked
upon aggressive campaigns to root out communist influences in
education. By 1936, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia had
adopted teacher loyalty oaths and several legislators were investigating
the corrosive influence of communism on children and young adults.3"
The federal government's anticommunist response grew more
slowly. Despite calls for legislative action as early as 1930, Congress,
preoccupied with the economic emergency of the 1930s, was initially
unreceptive to calls for action. 9 In the latter half of the 1930s,
however, Republican politicians began to brand their Democratic
opponents as communist sympathizers-claiming, for example, that
"[t]he Democratic party 'ha[d] been seized by alien and un-American
elements.'"' At the same time, a private anticommunist network grew
and solidified into a national force. A coalition of (mostly conservative)
businessmen, labor leaders, religious leaders, journalists, patriotic
organizations, and individual private citizens, this network worked
tirelessly to "eradicat[e] Communism from American life." 4' Such
persons became recognized as experts on the evils of communism,
(discussing sedition prosecutions that took place in those as well as other jurisdictions);
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 202-03 (same).
37. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 204-06, 217-33.
38. See ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE
UNIVERSITmES 68-71 (1986); see also FRIED, supra note 24, at 101-04.
39. In 1930, the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly voted to
establish a committee to investigate organizations and individuals who allegedly
advocated the violent overthrow of the government. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at
201. Although it had little evidence of wrongdoing by communists, the Fish Committee,
as it was called, recommended wholesale repression of communist activity and the
adoption of a peacetime sedition law. Id.; SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 66-67. The
Hoover Administration largely ignored those recommendations. GOLDSTEIN, supra note
16, at 201; SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 66-67. In 1934, Congress, this time via the
McCormack-Dickstein Committee, began another investigation of subversion, which
resulted in another proposal for a peacetime sedition law. See BELKNAP, supra note 11,
at 16-18; FRIED, supra note 24, at 46-47. Again, Congress-by that time dominated by
many New Deal liberals-ignored the committee's recommendations. See BELKNAP,
supra note 11, at 18-19; FRIE, supra note 24, at 46-47.
40. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS
OF UPHEAVAL 606 (5th prtg. 1960) (quoting Vice Presidential Candidate Frank Knox,
who also stated that "'[tlhe New Deal candidate... has been leading us toward
Moscow'"); id. at 619-20 (noting Republican allegations that Moscow had ordered
American communists to work for President Franklin Delano Roosevelt); id. at 625
("Roosevelt [is] 'the Kerensky of the American revolutionary movement.'") (quoting the
Republican National Committee).
41. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 42-43; see also Wiecek, supra note 20, at
396-98.
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enabling them to "dominate the national debate" and influence public
and congressional opinion.42
J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), also stepped up anticommunist activities. In August of 1936, he
convinced President Franklin Delano Roosevelt that communists were
attempting to take control of significant labor organizations and gain
influence through government jobs.43  President Roosevelt thus
authorized Hoover to develop "more systematic intelligence about
'subversive activities in the United States, particularly Fascism and
Communism.'"" By 1939, Hoover had thousands of informants in
private industry and had developed his "Custodial Detention List"-a
list of persons (mostly communist) who were to be detained as national
security threats during a time of war or national emergency.45 Although
Hoover's list and investigations remained secret at this stage,' they
provided an evidentiary foundation both for future anticommunist
sentiment and the Dennis prosecutions.
The rise of the private anticommunist network, Hoover's activities,
and Republican anticommunist rhetoric also coincided with economic
events which cast doubt on the benefits of communism. In 1937, a
severe economic recession caused many to question the principles
underlying the New Deal.47 A wave of sit-down strikes in the late 1930s
further alienated Americans from pro-labor economic policies,
especially given the association between unions and communists.48 By
1938, Congressman Martin Dies, sensing that anti-New Deal sentiment
among conservative lawmakers created an atmosphere ripe for
anticommunist action, called for the creation of a congressional
committee to investigate subversive and un-American propaganda.49
42. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 45.
43. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIvmES,
SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE AcTImES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755, at 393-94 (1976) (describing the 1936
meetings and communications between J. Edgar Hoover and President Roosevelt).
44. Id. at 394 (quoting an August 24, 1936 Hoover memorandum); see also
KENNETH O'REILLY, HOOVER AND THE UN-AMERICANS: THE FBI, HUAC, AND THE RED
MENACE 21-22 (1983); STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 10-11.
45. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 11.
46. Id.
47. FRIED, supra note 24, at 47; SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 90.
48. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 239; see also WALTER GOODMAN, THE
COMMrITEE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN
ACTrVIEs 51 (1st prtg. 1968).
49. FRIED, supra note 24, at 47-48; see also SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 12.
Congressman Martin Dies's focus on anticommunism was as much a political vehicle
with which to attack President Roosevelt's New Deal policies as it was an attack on the
threat of communism. See RICHARD M. FREELAND, THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE
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The Dies Committee (later to become the infamous House Un-
American Activities Committee ("HUAC")) was charged with
investigating
(1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American
propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion
within the United States of subversive and un-American
propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a
domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of
government as guaranteed by our Constitution.'
In the summer of 1938, the Dies Committee held hearings during which
legislators and witnesses slung allegations of communism at various
Democratic candidates, public officials, 5' and private organizations,
particularly at labor organizations such as the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO).' By the end of the hearings, 640 organizations,
483 newspapers, and 280 labor unions had been labeled as communist.5 3
Such allegations were utterly irresponsible. Witnesses made broad,
conclusory claims, most of which had no evidentiary support.' The
committee rarely allowed the accused to defend themselves in the
hearings.55 Many of the accusers went unquestioned because much of
the testimony was never directly presented to the committee and was
instead simply provided to the printer for inclusion in the hearings'
printed version.56 Nevertheless, the allegations gained much media
attention, thus spurring Dies and others to make even further
allegations, which gained more media attention in a sort of self-
ORIGINS OF MCCARTHYISM: FOREIGN PoLIcy, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND INTERNAL
SEcuRrrY 1946-1948, at 118-19 (1972); SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 90-91.
50. 83 CONG. REC. 7568 (1938).
51. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 242.
52. GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 32. Although the House Un-American
Activities Committee ("HUAC") was supposed to investigate all subversive propaganda,
including Nazi propaganda, Dies turned it into an examination of communist activities.
BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 21.
53. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 21.
54. For example, a single witness identified 280 labor officials as communists,
although he supported very few of such allegations with evidence. See D.A. Saunders,
The Dies Committee: First Phase, 3 PuB. Op. Q. 223, 228 (1939). Furthermore,
committee members rarely tried to obtain support for such accusations, instead often
feeding testimony to witnesses. Id. at 236; see also GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 32.
55. See Saunders, supra note 54, at 235 ("[Olf the hundreds or perhaps
thousands of persons who were accused of being 'Communists' or (infrequently)
'Nazis' ... with a single possible exception not one of the accused has been called to
the stand.").
56. Id. at 237-38.
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reinforcing loop.' Furthermore, because the Dies Committee's
opponents were loath to speak out for fear of being branded as
subversives themselves,58 the public information generated by the 1938
hearings was remarkably one-sided.
Such one-sidedness had a significant impact on public opinion. By
December of 1938, a Gallup poll revealed that seventy-four percent of
Americans familiar with the Dies Committee's activities favored
continued investigations.59 The announcement of the Nazi-Soviet
nonaggression pact in August of 1939 and the outbreak of war in Europe
further solidified fears of subversive groups perceived to be spreading
totalitarian ideology worldwide. By 1939, polls showed that "many
respondents--even [forty] percent of CIO members, whose unions the
Communists had helped build-favored 'drastic measures' against
Communists. "60
By 1939, Congress also suffered overwhelmingly from
anticommunist sentiment.6' Inundated with proposals aimed at stemming
un-American activities,62  Congress enacted three important laws: 63 the
Hatch Act, which prohibited communists and other subversives
advocating overthrow of the government from holding government
employment;" the Voorhis Act, which required groups with foreign
affiliations or who advocated overthrow of the government to register
with the federal government; 6 and the Smith Act, 66 which criminalized
57. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 243; GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 30-
31. Although many people claimed innocence, newspapers, focusing on the
sensationalist aspects of the hearings, relegated such information to their back pages.
GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 31.
58. See SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 91.
59. 1 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at
128 (1972).
60. FRIED, supra note 24, at 60.
61. As one contemporary commentator noted, "if you brought in the Ten
Commandments today and asked for their repeal and attached to that request [a law
aimed at aliens and un-American sentiment], you could get it." 84 CONG. REc. 10,370
(1939) (statement of Rep. Thomas F. Ford).
62. See CHAFEE JR., supra note 7, at 442.
63. During this period, Congress also reauthorized the Espionage Act of 1917,
the statute used to repress political protest during World War I. See ch. 72, 54 Stat. 79.
For a discussion of the Espionage Act, see sources cited supra note 20.
64. Pub. L. No. 76-252, ch. 410, § 9, 53 Stat. 1147, 1148-49.
65. Pub. L. No. 76-870, ch. 897, § 2, 54 Stat. 1201, 1202-03.
66. 54 Stat. 670. The Smith Act was a conglomeration of several proposals
aimed at communists. See BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 22-27; CHAFEE JR., supra note
7, at 440-42 & 440 n. 1. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Smith Act, see
Brief for Petitioners at 59-70, Dennis (No. 336), reprinted in 47 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
163, 244-55 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK
BRIEFS].
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advocacy of overthrow of the government 7 and allowed deportation68
and registration 9 of aliens within the United States. Although one might
have expected outcry over the nation's first peacetime sedition law
(especially given the country's woeful history with respect to such laws
during wartime),70 there was actually little vocal opposition to the Smith
Act-even most newspapers ignored its passage.7 1  Most newspapers
"regard[ed] the Smith bill as a routine expression of prevailing public
opinion. ,71
B. Post-World War II: Domestic Communism as a National Security
Issue
Although domestic communists suffered significant repression as
the 1930s moved into the 1940s, 73 World War H, and the alliance
between the USSR and the United States brought them a brief reprieve.74
Nevertheless, much of the anticommunist network remained in place,73
and beginning in 1945, the federal anticommunist crusade enjoyed a
full-blown revival that was aided in large part by world events. After
the United States and the Soviet Union failed to reach an amicable
postwar settlement at Yalta, most American policymakers began to view
the Soviet Union as a hostile power that threatened the stability of the
United States. 76  A series of Soviet-related espionage incidents in the
United States and Canada contributed to this view.77  Additional
67. § 2, 54 Stat. at 671.
68. Id. §§ 20-23, 54 Stat. at 671-73.
69. Id. §§ 30-31, 54 Stat. at 673-74.
70. See sources cited supra note 20.
71. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 23; CHAFEE JR., supra note 7, at 442-43.
72. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 23.
73. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 239-84.
74. Wiecek, supra note 20, at 403.
75. For example, state and local officials continued to harass and pursue
communists. Id. at 403-04. Hoover covertly continued his investigations. FRIED,
supra note 24, at 56; GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 132. Dies continued to expose
government employees with communist leanings. FRIED, supra note 24, at 56;
GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 131-32. And red-baiting, though ineffective, flourished in
the 1944 federal election campaigns. FRIED, supra note 24, at 56-58.
76. SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 16-17.
77. In February of 1945, government agents discovered over one thousand
classified documents in the offices of the Amerasia, a left-wing magazine run by an
individual with ties to the CPUSA. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 21-22; see also
FRIED, supra note 24, at 60-61; GRIFFITH, supra note 30, at 34-38. In 1946, the
Canadian Royal Commission issued a report on Soviet espionage activities within the
Canadian government. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 22. Around that same time,
Elizabeth Bentley voluntarily disclosed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) her
experience with Soviet espionage, including several names of government officials who
were involved. See CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 340-
44 (1991). Her testimony was featured prominently in the HUAC hearings of the late
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international crises involving communists-the Soviet-backed coup in
Czechoslovakia in 1948, the 1949 fall of China to Mao Zedong, the
Soviet detonation of an atom bomb in that same year, and the advent of
the Korean War in 1950-solidified Americans' fear of Soviet
aggression.78
As these events unfolded, President Harry S. Truman became
convinced that the Soviet Union was bent on expansion and threatened
Western civilization. 9 As a result, he adopted and publicly campaigned
in favor of a policy designed to contain the Soviet Union's influence.'
President Truman's view of the Soviet Union eventually came to
dominate American culture so that by the end of the 1940s, Americans
felt a "sense of imminent apocalypse."8"
President Truman's campaign against the Soviet Union also
contributed to a new view of the CPUSA as a more insidious threat.
Although he never apparently believed that domestic communists posed
much of a threat to national security,' President Truman deliberately
equated Soviet imperialism and communism in order to gain support for
his containment policy. 83 As a result, he fueled the image of domestic
communists as part of the Soviet Union's overall world strategy of
dominance. Consequently, with the advent of the Cold War,
"anticommunism moved to the ideological center of American
politics.... [It] transform[ed] domestic communism from a matter of
political opinion to one of national security." 0
Various other groups and individuals also demonized domestic
communists. Republicans raised the threat of domestic communists, and
the Democrats' alleged alliance with them, during the 1946 midterm
1940s. See id. By 1945, the government was actively investigating Whittaker
Chambers's allegations that Alger Hiss, a U.S. State Department official, was a secret
communist. Id. at 344-49. The Hiss investigation involved many appearances before
HUAC and other congressional committees, and ultimately resulted in his 1949 trial on
perjury charges. See id. at 360-66. In that same year, Judith Coplon, a U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) official, was tried and convicted for sharing sensitive
information with Soviet intelligence, although FBI misconduct resulted in reversal of the
convictions on appeal. See id. at 367-73; Wiecek, supra note 20, at 416. A series of
highly publicized arrests apparently linked to Soviet espionage occurred in 1950,
including those of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 321.
78. See Christina E. Wells, Of Communists and Anti-Abortion Protestors: The
Consequences of Falling into the Theoretical Abyss, 33 GA. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1998);
see also Wiecek, supra note 20, at 416-17.
79. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 158.
80. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 41-42; SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 157-59;
STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 8-9. For a more in-depth discussion of the origins of the
Truman Doctrine, see FREELAND, supra note 49, at 70-114.
81. See Wiecek, supra note 20, at 416.
82. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at xii.
83. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 42.
84. SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 16.
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elections.' The private anticommunist network renewed arguments that
domestic communists threatened the American way of life.6 The
Knights of Columbus argued, for example, that communism threatened
morality and family values.87 In 1946, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
issued a much-publicized report claiming that communists "had made
substantial inroads into nongovernmental groups, especially labor
unions,"' as well as governmental agencies, including the U.S. State
Department. 89  Some government officials argued that domestic
communists were attempting to seize control of labor' and that domestic
communists "'unquestionably would sabotage this country's effort in
resisting Russia.""
Hoover was especially instrumental in shaping and politicizing this
emerging view of domestic communists. Like the Catholic Church, he
too reiterated the danger that communism, as a "moral foe to
Christianity," posed to American values.' Primarily, however, Hoover
focused on the diabolic nature of the communists themselves. They
were, in his estimation, utterly loyal to the Soviet Union: "'every
American Communist is potentially an espionage agent of the Soviet
Government, requiring only the direct instruction of a Soviet superior to
make the potentiality a reality.' '9  The communists were also
85. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 295-96; STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 20-
21.
86. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 295; SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 45.
See generally THE SPECTER: ORIGINAL ESSAYS ON THE COLD WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF
MCCARTHYISM (Robert Griffith & Athan Theoharis eds., 1974) [hereinafter THE
SPECTER].
87. CHRISTOPHER J. KAUFFMAN, FAITH & FRATERNALISM: THE HISTORY OF THE
KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS 1882-1982, at 360-68 (1982); STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, THE
CULTURE OF THE COLD WAR 77-100 (1996).
88. PHILIP M. STERN, THE OPPENHEIMER CASE: SEcURITY ON TRIAL 95 (1969).
89. Peter H. Irons, American Business and the Origins of McCarthyism: The
Cold War Crusade of the United States Chamber of Commerce, in THE SPECTER, supra
note 86, at 72, 78-89.
90. Hoover argued that the CPUSA would "'be a menace to [the] U.S. if [it]
can seize labor control [and] this they are gradually doing.'" SCHRECKER, supra note
26, at 184 (quoting a 1944 Hoover memorandum). President Harry S. Truman's
advisors agreed with this assessment. Presidential aide Clark Clifford wrote in a report
that the CPUSA was trying "'to capture the labor movement'" and "'cripple the
industrial potential of the United States by calling strikes at those times and places which
would be advantageous to the Soviet Union.'" Id. (quoting a 1946 Clifford
memorandum). A wave of sit-down strikes in 1946 further lent credence to the claims
that communists were trying to disrupt the United States' security and economy. See
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 289-90; Wiecek, supra note 20, at 411-12.
91. Id. (quoting an FBI Washington field office report).
92. RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER: THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR
HOOVER 311 (1987).
93. CLARK CLIFFORD, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT: A MEMOIR 177 (1991)
(quoting a 1946 report written by Hoover to President Truman); see also SCHRECKER,
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exceedingly clever, enabling them not only to hide in plain view,' but to
manipulate innocent Americans to do their bidding. 95  Hoover's
testimony before HUAC in 1947 aptly illustrates his view:
The Communist, once he is fully trained and
indoctrinated [by the Soviet Union], realizes that he can create
his order in the United States only by "bloody revolution."
[Cleverly, however, the] American progress which
all good citizens seek, such as old-age security, houses for
veterans, child assistance, and a host of others is being adopted
as window dressing by the Communists to conceal their true
aims and entrap gullible followers....
The numerical strength of the party's enrolled
membership is insignificant. But it is well known that there
are many actual members who because of their position are not
carried on party rolls.
. . . [R]ather than the size of the Communist Party, the
way to weigh its true importance is by testing its influence, its
ability to infiltrate.
The size of the party is relatively unimportant because of
the enthusiasm and iron-clad discipline under which they
operate .96
In light of this alleged internal threat, Hoover and other
anticommunists saw exposure as the only solution. In 1946, the FBI
reinvigorated its investigations of the CPUSA on the theory that "each
member ... was to be considered a possible saboteur and espionage
supra note 26, at 133 (quoting Hoover as commenting that "'Communist
members... body and soul, are the property of the party'").
94. The "they are everywhere" sentiment was especially prevalent among
Hoover and his supporters. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 141. One government
official, for example, claimed in a speech to New York businessmen that communists
were "'everywhere ... in factories, offices, butcher stores, on street corners, in private
businesses.'" Id.
95. Id. at 142.
96. SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 114-15 (third omission in original) (quoting
from an excerpt of Hoover's March 26, 1947 testimony before HUAC).
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HeinOnline  -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 130 2005
2005:115 Constitutional Decision-Making 131
agent. " 97 The FBI further began a massive "educational" campaign to
inform Americans about the dangers of domestic communism, feeding
clandestine information to reporters and private anticommunist groups
who reported it to the general public.98 Hoover also traveled throughout
the country giving speeches imbued with "religious fervor," warning
that "communists were infiltrating every aspect of life in the United
States. "99
Perhaps most importantly, Hoover collaborated with HUAC, which
in 1947 held rejuvenated hearings to "'ferret out'" communists and
communist sympathizers who threatened the "'American way of
life. '"" Over the next decade, HUAC and other congressional
committees' °' heard thousands of allegations of communist activities
against various groups and organizations, the source of which was
usually FBI files."°  So influential was the FBI's relationship with
HUAC that one scholar characterized the hearings' purpose as
"publicizing information in FBI files."0 3  This publication came not
simply through media coverage of the hearings, but also through the
issuance of regular indices of "communist sympathizers," 4 which
operated as blacklists resulting in job loss and societal shunning for
97. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 12-13.
98. FRIED, supra note 24, at 85; SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 23.
99. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at x.
100. GRIFFrrH, supra note 30, at 38 (quoting Speaker of the House Joseph W.
Martin, Jr.); see also ROBERT K. CARR, THE HOUSE COMMITrEE ON UN-AMERICAN
AcTIvmEs: 1945-1950, at 37-38 (1952).
These highly publicized hearings included inquiries into a wide range of activities,
including the Hiss and Elizabeth Bentley espionage incidents, see GOODMAN, supra note
48, at 244-67, the influence of communists in Hollywood, and communist infiltration of
labor unions and the American education system, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 344-
46; GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 297-309, 325-32.
101. Aside from HUAC, Senator Joseph McCarthy's congressional
investigations are most widely remembered, but other committees also investigated
communists during this period. On McCarthy's activities, see DAVID CAUTE, THE
GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER (1978);
and FRIED, supra note 24. On the operation of various congressional investigations, see
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 343-44.
102. CARR, supra note 100, at 168-69; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 345, 376.
103. CARR, supra note 100, at 169. HUAC's various chairmen publicly
declared that its major purpose was the "'exposure of un-American individuals and their
un-American activities.'" Id. at 280 n. 14 (quoting 93 CONG. REC. A4277 (1947)
(statement of Rep. J. Parnell Thomas)); see also FRANK J. DONNER, THE UN-AMERCANS
63-64 (1961).
104. See CAUTE, supra note 101, at 102-03 (1978) (noting that HUAC provided
information to employers regarding approximately 60,000 people between 1949 and
1959); SCHRECKER, supra note 38, at 126-307 (discussing HUAC information used by
colleges and universities).
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those listed.1 5 As in the earlier HUAC hearings, the fear of "exposure"
as a communist sympathizer silenced many who disagreed with the
congressional investigations. 6
Formal legal tools were also part of this process of public exposure.
In 1947, President Truman issued Executive Order 9835, establishing
boards to investigate all existing and prospective employees for potential
disloyalty."° President Truman's order expanded grounds for potential
disloyalty beyond criminal acts to include such things as membership or
sympathy with a subversive organization.108 In addition, the use of such
oaths spread to state and local governments and private industry.' 9
Such programs became so widespread that one scholar estimated that at
least one in five members of the total labor force was subject to them."0
In conjunction with these boards, the U.S. Attorney General,
guided by Hoover, published a list of "subversive" organizations which,
like the loyalty board inquiries themselves, reached far beyond
dangerous organizations. The list's highly publicized release in
December of 1947 alerted the public to the presence of dangerous
organizations within the United States." 2 As with the HUAC hearings,
the loyalty hearings damaged the lives of thousands of people and
eventually silenced critics who feared being named as communist
sympathizers." 3
105. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 345, 376; SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at
359-68.
106. See SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 368; Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets,
and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 22 (1991).
107. Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627 (1943-1948).
108. Id. at 630; see also GENTRY, supra note 77, at 355-56.
109. See RALPH S. BROWN, JR., LOYALTY AND SEcuRrrY: EMPLOYMENT TESTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 92-163 (1958).
110. Id. at 181.
111. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 29-30; see also GENTRY, supra note 77, at
356.
112. See STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 29-30.
113. See BROWN, supra note 109, at 181-92; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 298-
305, 374-83. Although most of those called before the boards were cleared of
disloyalty, Lloyd K. Garrison, Some Observations on the Loyalty-Security Program,
Speech at the Third National Conference of Law Reviews (Apr. 1, 1955), in 23 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 4 (1955), the hearings nevertheless took their toll. Even if not fired or
jailed, those called before loyalty boards suffered severe economic and emotional
hardships:
[O]nce an employee has been through one of these ordeals, even though he
comes out with flying colors and is restored to his job, that man is deeply
damaged for a long, long time to come, perhaps forever. They are gun-shy,
they are timid, they've been scarred and humiliated; their neighbors and
even some of their friends have looked upon them with a question mark.
Id.; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 376-77 (discussing societal shunning,
physical attacks, and humiliation accompanying allegations of disloyalty).
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Eventually, the process of public exposure culminated in the
passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950,114 which provided for the
registration and possible detention of communist and "communist front"
organizations and their members, and expanded the government's
authority to deport subversive aliens."' Symbolically, the fact that
Congress felt the need to provide such drastic remedies, coupled with an
increase in deportations,"' must have reinforced in the minds of the
public that domestic communists posed a serious threat to the country.
Section 2 of the Internal Security Act, for example, stated:
The Communist movement in the United States is an
organization numbering thousands of adherents, rigidly and
ruthlessly disciplined. Awaiting and seeking to advance a
moment when ... overthrow of the Government of the United
States by force and violence may seem possible of
achievement, it seeks converts far and wide by an extensive
system of schooling and indoctrination.... The Communist
organization in the United States, pursuing its stated
objectives, the recent successes of Communist methods in
other countries, and the nature and control of the world
Communist movement itself, present a clear and present
danger to the security of the United States and to the existence
of free American institutions .... 7
C. The Popular Image of Domestic Communists: Myth and Reality
Worldwide events and the anticommunist campaign took their toll
upon the CPUSA during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the period in
which the Dennis defendants were tried. Polls taken in 1946 revealed
that 57% of Americans believed "there were a great many" communists
in the United States," 8 and 48% of those polled believed that domestic
communists were loyal to the Soviet Union rather than to the United
States." 9  Polls in 1947 and 1948 revealed similar resultsJ °  In
114. Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987.
115. Id. §§ 7-8, 22, 64 Stat. at 993-95, 1006-10. For discussions of the
McCarran Act and its history, see Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Freedom and Internal
Security, 64 HARV. L. REv. 383 (1951). Despite some opposition, the McCarran Act
overwhelmingly passed. GRIFFTH, supra note 30, at 117-22.
116. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 331-32.
117. § 2(15), 64 Stat. at 987-89.
118. PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1946, at 132 (Hadley Cantril ed., 1951).
119. The Quarter's Polls, 10 PuB. OPINION Q. 602, 608 (1946).
120. 1 GALLUP, supra note 59, at 639-40 (stating that 619% of respondents
believed that CPUSA members were loyal to the Soviet Union, while only 18% believed
they were loyal to the United States, and that 61% favored legal prohibition of CPUSA,
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addition, almost half of those responding to a 1948 survey believed that
the CPUSA was rapidly gaining strength and already controlled many
industries and unions; a few even believed that the CPUSA was almost
strong enough to dominate the United States.12' Forty-four percent of
the respondents to a 1950 poll believed communists to be a significant
danger to the country, a figure that rose to 81% by 1954.'2 A 1947 poll
indicated that 72% of respondents believed that communists wanted to
eradicate Christianity." A 1948 poll reflected that roughly 60% of the
respondents believed that "steps should be taken right away to outlaw
the Communist Party in this country."'b' Increasingly, the vast majority
of Americans polled favored placing the following restrictions on
communists: registration requirements, restrictions on employment in
government and educational jobs, and their right to speak freely."z
while 26% opposed such a prohibition); The Quarter's Polls, 12 PUB. OPINION Q. 146,
150 (1948) (stating that in December of 1947, 59% of those polled believed that
communists were loyal to the Soviet Union rather than to the United States, while 19%
believed communists were loyal to the United States); The Quarter's Polls, 12 PuB.
OPINION Q. 530, 537 (1948) [hereinafter Third 1948 Quarter's Polls] (stating that in
May of 1948, 65% of those polled believed that communists were loyal to the Soviet
Union rather than to the United States, while 16% believed communists were loyal to the
United States).
121. The Quarter's Polls, 12 PuB. OPINION Q. 348, 350-51 (1948) (stating that
35% believed that the CPUSA was getting stronger and controlled many industries and
unions, with an additional 10% believing that the CPUSA was almost able to dominate
the United States).
122. NAT'L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., NORC SURVEY # 1950-0294: ATrITUDES
TOWARD JEWS AND COMMUNISM (1950) (reporting results of a poll showing that 44% of
those surveyed believed American communists were a "[g]reat danger" to the country,
and 35 % of those surveyed believed that there was "[s]ome but not too much" danger to
the country), available at http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/Catalog40/
StartQuery.html (on file with author); SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM,
CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A CROSS-SECTION OF THE NATION SPEAKS ITS MIND
75-76 (1955) (reporting a 1954 survey showing that 81% of respondents felt domestic
communists posed at least "[siome danger" to the country).
123. The Quarter's Polls, 11 PUB. OPINION Q. 639, 643 (1947).
124. The Quarter's Polls, 13 PuB. OPINION Q. 154, 156 (1949).
125. 2 GALLUP, supra note 59, at 808 (stating that 83% of those polled in 1949
favored a requirement that communists register with the DOJ); id. at 853 (stating that
73% of those polled in 1949 believed that active communists should not be allowed to
teach in colleges and universities, and 72% believed that universities should require
loyalty oaths of teachers); The Quarter's Polls, supra note 123, at 642 (reporting the
results of a 1947 poll revealing that 64% of respondents believed communists should be
prevented from holding public office or executive positions in labor unions); Third 1948
Quarter's Polls, supra note 120, at 537 (stating that in a 1948 poll, 77% of respondents
favored a law requiring communists to register with the DOJ); The Quarter's Polls, 12
PUB. OPINION Q. 754, 756 (1948) (stating that 57% of those surveyed in a 1948 poll
believed that communists should not be allowed to speak on the radio); The Quarter's
Polls, 13 PUB. OPINION Q. 537, 540 (1949) (stating that 83% of respondents to a 1949
poll favored a registration requirement for communists); id. (stating that 87% of
respondents believed that communists should be removed from defense industry jobs);
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As these surveys show, many Americans adopted the view of the
CPUSA propagated by anticommunist forces, eventually coming to
believe that domestic communists constituted a vast, uniform network of
soldiers willing to commit sabotage or espionage on behalf of the Soviet
Union. This image of the CPUSA was largely inaccurate, not because it
was utterly false, but because it was grossly exaggerated and based on
broad generalizations rather than actual evidence of individual or group
wrongdoing.
Although violence was common in the Soviet Union, CPUSA
members were involved in few, if any, such incidents in the United
States,' 2 and there was certainly no evidence of such tactics l'z CPUSA
members were also active in labor unions and some strike movements,
but there was no evidence that they engaged in politically inspired
strikes designed to interfere with the economy or national security."
Finally, the CPUSA's involvement with espionage was far more
complex than the image projected by the anticommunists.
As many as 300 members and leaders of the CPUSA did spy on
behalf of the Soviet Union, 29 but that figure means that the vast majority
The Quarter's Polls, 13 PuB. OPINION Q. 709, 712 (1949) [hereinafter Fourth 1949
Quarter's Polls] (stating that 73% of respondents to a 1949 poll believed that college and
university teachers should not be allowed to continue teaching if they belonged to the
CPUSA); The Quarter's Polls, 14 PUB. OPINION Q. 174, 175-76 (1950) (reporting the
results of a 1949 poll showing that 68% believed the Communist party should be
forbidden, and 77 % favored a registration requirement for communists).
126. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 138.
127. MAURICE ISSERMAN, WHICH SIDE WERE YOU ON?: THE AMERICAN
COMMUNIST PARTY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 94 (1982).
128. See SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 184-85; see also ISSERMAN, supra note
127, at 93.
129. Maurice Isserman & Ellen Schrecker, "Papers of a Dangerous Tendency":
From Major Andre's Boot to the VENONA Files, in COLD WAR TRIUMPHALUSM: THE
MISUSE OF HISTORY AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUNISM 149, 154 (Ellen Schrecker ed.,
2004). In the 1990s, the U.S. and Russian governments allowed public access to
previously secret documents. JOHN EARL HAYNES & HARVEY KLEHR, VENONA:
DECODING SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA 1-7 (1999). Those documents included
CPUSA files in the Soviets' possession, KGB foreign intelligence files, and highly
classified communications intercepted by the U.S. Army's Signal Intelligence Service
but kept secret even from other government officials for national security reasons. Id. at
1-2; Allen Weinstein, Introduction to ALLEN WEINSTEIN & ALEXANDER VASSILIEV, THE
HAUNTED WOOD: SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA-THE STALIN ERA (1999). The most
thorough examinations of these documents include HAYNES & KLEHR, supra; HARVEY
KLEHR ET AL., THE SECRET WORLD OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM (1995); and WEINSTEIN &
VASSILIEV, supra. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr estimate that as many as 349
citizens and resident aliens, many of them CPUSA members, or "fellow travelers,"
committed or were associated with espionage on behalf of the Soviets, including Earl
Browder and Eugene Dennis, both leaders of the CPUSA. HAYNES & KLEHR, supra,
app. A at 339, 344, 346; see also Isserman & Schrecker, supra, at 154. Other
historians more conservatively estimate the number of CPUSA-affiliated spies to be "at
least a hundred." Isserman & Schrecker, supra, at 154. Although these historians
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 135 2005
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
of CPUSA members-49,700 of the then-50,000 strong organization-
did not.'3° Furthermore, many of those spying on behalf of the Soviet
Union viewed themselves as acting in American interests rather than
traitors. Much espionage, for example, was committed during or
immediately prior to World War II by CPUSA spies who apparently
believed they were helping the Allied cause.1 31 It is also not clear, as
some historians recently claimed, that "any American Communist would
have been proud to be chosen to spy for the Soviet Union." 32 Many of
those who spied for the Soviet Union were kept in the dark regarding
the final destination of stolen information due to fear that they would
refuse to cooperate. 3 3  Consequently, although some CPUSA members
were involved with espionage, one can hardly extrapolate their activities
to the entire group.
Furthermore, there was little evidence available at the time
regarding those CPUSA members who did spy for the Soviet Union."M
Instead, anticommunists such as the FBI based their beliefs on
differ regarding the import of these newly revealed documents, they agree that in the
1930s and 1940s, the "top leaders of the [CPUSA] ... were well aware of these
[espionage] activities and actually helped to recruit agents and coordinate their efforts."
Id. at 152.
130. Isserman & Schrecker, supra note 129, at 159; see also HAYNES & KLEHR,
supra note 129, at 333.
131. See SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 181-82. As one government insider
noted, "[m]ost members of the American Communist Party had joined out of misplaced
idealism or naivetd. Although their views were misguided and served Moscow's
political interests, only a small number ever consciously acted against their own
government, and even fewer would ever have accepted 'direct instruction of a Soviet
superior.'" CLIFFORD, supra note 93, at 177 (quoting the Clifford-Elsey report); see
also Isserman & Schrecker, supra note 129, at 167 (noting that CPUSA spies managed
to "persuade themselves that their actions were harmless, or even beneficial for
American interests, properly understood").
132. HERBERT ROMERSTEIN & ERIc BREINDEL, THE VENONA SECRETS: EXPOSING
SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND AMERICA'S TRAITORS 11 (2000); see also KLEHR Er AL., supra
note 129, at 324 ("[S]ome rank-and-file members [of the CPUSA] were willing to serve
the USSR by spying on their own country. There but for the grace of not being asked
went other American Communists.").
133. Isserman & Schrecker, supra note 129, at 159, 166-67. According to
Maurice Isserman and Ellen Schrecker, American handlers of CPUSA spies "struggled
constantly to isolate their KGB superiors from their Washington operatives, fearing that
direct contact with the Russians would alert their more skittish sources that their
materials were going to Soviet intelligence agencies instead of party headquarters in
New York." Id. at 166.
134. Prior to the recent release of previously secret documents by the Soviet
government and U.S. intelligence agencies-documents to which most government
officials did not have access-historians had concluded from available evidence that the
CPUSA was largely uninvolved in such activity. See, e.g., CAUTE, supra note 101, at
54; HARVEY KLEHR & JOHN EARL HAYNES, THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT:
STORMING HEAVEN ITSELF 108 (1992).
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"hunches." As two notable historians of American communism
described:
The FBI understood that the Soviet Union, in alliance
with the American Communist party, was mounting a major
espionage attack on the United States. But although the bureau
grasped the broad outlines of the espionage offensive, its
knowledge of specific operations was spotty and its
understanding of Soviet intelligence practices limited. Though
convinced that espionage was taking place, in most cases the
FBI did not feel it had sufficient evidence to bring successful
criminal prosecutions.I"5
The fact that the FBI's intuition was correct in some individual cases
hardly justifies its relentless branding of an entire organization as
traitorous based upon little or no evidence, especially given that such
activities ceased soon after World War II.136
Despite the lack of evidence supporting anticommunist charges,
Americans' beliefs about the CPUSA nevertheless persisted, in large
part because of anticommunists' continuous, vivid portrayals of CPUSA
members as secretive disciples loyal to Joseph Stalin's every
command.' 37 By characterizing the CPUSA as a secretive, monolithic
unit of automatons, widespread evidence of group wrongdoing was
unnecessary. Even the most individualized of CPUSA actions-for
example, espionage by a particular member-was imputed to the group.
The same was true of atrocities committed by the Soviet government (of
which there were many). If CPUSA members were rigidly loyal to
Stalin, then, ipso facto, they must also have been willing to commit
violence to further Soviet policies in the United States. In essence, the
public saw the CPUSA as a conspiracy between domestic communists
and the Soviet Union.'
135. HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 129, at 46 (emphasis added).
136. COMM'N ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOV'T SECRECY, SECRECY:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S.
Doc. No. 105-2, at A-37 (1997). The Commission on Protecting and Reducing
Government Secrecy reported:
[B]y the onset of the Cold War the Soviet attack in the area of
espionage and subversion had been blunted and turned back.... By the
close of the 1940s, Communism was a defeated ideology in the United
States, with its influence in steep and steady decline, and the KGB reduced
to recruiting thieves as spies.
Id.
137. SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 17.
138. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 135 (noting Americans' belief that the
CPUSA "belong[ed] to a worldwide conspiracy"). One state analog to HUAC, for
example, argued in a report on communists in public education:
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CPUSA practices contributed to this conspiracy theory. The
organization operated in a "highly authoritarian manner" with a
"Bolshevik-style command structure" allowing for little debate; its
leaders were often rigid and uncompromising.139  Furthermore,
"American communists invested the Soviet Union with special qualities
born of its status as the first socialist state in the world." 1'" Because of
their romantic vision of it, party members viewed "[a]ny deviation from
support of the Soviet Union... [as] treachery.""' These aspects of the
party thus lent credence to claims that its members were mindlessly
loyal to the Soviet Union.
Here too, however, CPUSA practices reveal a more complex
picture of the organization than the anticommunist portrayal. Most
CPUSA members did not view themselves as Stalin's disciples, but,
rather as radicals for social change. 142 CPUSA members often combined
Stalinist and American ethics, seeing "themselves as vindicating the
ideals of Jefferson and Lincoln as much as those of Marx and Lenin. ,143
Even CPUSA leaders, those most likely to adhere closely to the Stalinist
party line, were more complicated than typically portrayed. Earl
Browder, the leader of the CPUSA prior to 1945,'" tried to reconcile
American ideals with Soviet-inspired dogma, believing that communists
would eventually join the mainstream of American life to effect
cooperative change.1 45 Browder's successor, William Z. Foster, who
was substantially more dogmatic, similarly "had within him an
indigenous, authentically American radical streak that made him
something greater than the automaton of conservative stereotype."'
"The Communist Party is not a political party as that term has historically
been understood in this country. It is a political conspiracy aimed both at the
social structure and the political framework of this nation.... The very
acceptance of Communist Party membership is, in and of itself, an overt act
incompatible with the public service."
ISSERMAN, supra note 127, at 69 (quoting a 1941 report by the Rapp-Coudert Committee
to the New York legislature).
139. SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 20-21.
140. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 67.
141. Id.
142. SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 17-18.
143. Wiecek, supra note 20, at 409; see also ISSERMAN, supra note 127, at 8.
144. HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 129, app. A at 344.
145. See STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 62-63.
146. Wiecek, supra note 20, at 409. Historian Edward Johanningsmeir argues,
for example, that William Z. Foster's communism was influenced by his early years as a
labor radical, and that "Foster fought for years after he became a Communist to
establish an 'exceptionalist' perspective for American Communism." EDWARD P.
JOHANNINGSMEIER, FORGING AMERICAN COMMUNISM: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM Z. FOSTER
4-5 (1994). Historian James Barrett, on the other hand, attributes more of Foster's
actions and beliefs to Soviet direction, although he too notes that Foster's beliefs were a
product of both his "own political experience and instinct and his adherence to Marxism-
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Unfortunately, other CPUSA practices, particularly its
secretiveness and waffling on political issues, also worked against it.
The party engaged in many furtive practices, including the use of
underground networks, forged passports, and false names.147
Furthermore, many CPUSA members hid or lied about their affiliation
with the organization. 4 ' Much of this secrecy was a result of earlier
and ongoing repression that made it risky for the CPUSA and its
members to engage openly in political and other activities. 49
Nevertheless, it contributed to the CPUSA's conspiratorial image, as it
allowed anticommunists to portray CPUSA members as "pretending to
be ordinary liberals or concerned citizens so that they could worm
themselves into other organizations and take them over." 50
The CPUSA also "flip-flopped" on various social and political
issues as a result of changes in Soviet policy. Thus, when the Soviet
leadership vowed to fight the spread of fascism, the CPUSA embraced
the Popular Front.' When the Soviet leadership entered into the
disastrous Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact, seemingly disavowing its
past opposition to fascism, the CPUSA followed suit. 52
Anticommunists used these rapid ideological changes as evidence of the
CPUSA's total control by the Soviet Union. Such a picture was not
completely accurate. While the CPUSA took much direction from the
Soviet Union, some local organizations enjoyed a great deal of
autonomy. 53  Furthermore, substantial disagreements regarding the
CPUSA's direction often lay underneath the surface of what appeared to
be a united, public front," suggesting that the image of party members
as mindlessly loyal automatons was greatly exaggerated.
Unfortunately, the 1945 reconstitution of the CPUSA solidified the
popular image of domestic communists as utterly loyal to the Soviet
Union. Prior to that date, then-CPUSA leader Browder developed an
American version of communism that envisioned working within the
democratic system to establish progressive policies and make capitalism
Leninism." JAMES R. BARRETt, WILLIAM Z. FOSTER AND THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN
RADICALISM 8 (1999).
147. HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 129, at 57-92; SCHRECKER, supra note 26,
at 23-26, 139-41.
148. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 25.
149. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 16, at 370-71; Isserman & Schrecker, supra
note 129, at 163-64.
150. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 140-41.
151. See KLEHR, supra note 24, at 170-85; SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 14.
152. See ISSERMAN, supra note 127, at 32-37; KLEHR, supra note 24, at 386-
400.
153. ISSERMAN, supra note 127, at 9, 13; SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 22.
154. For example, after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact, there was
substantial disagreement among CPUSA members regarding how to respond to World
War 1I. See ISSERMAN, supra note 127, at 40-43, 73.
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work for more Americans. 5 ' Browder's policy, though deviating from
pure Marxist-Leninist principles, appeared consistent with then-existing
Soviet foreign policy and was widely accepted by domestic communists
who formed a new group-the Communist Political Association."5 6 As
Soviet foreign policy became increasingly hostile to its former allies
after World War II, Soviet leaders directed the CPUSA to adhere more
closely to Marxist-Leninist ideology. 57  American communists
complied, isolating Browder and replacing him with a more
ideologically acceptable leader, Foster.' Such immediate and unified
action reinforced beliefs that the Soviet Union controlled the CPUSA
and eventually served as a linchpin in the case against the Dennis
defendants.' 59
Even this loyalty, however, was more complex than it appears on
the surface. At the time of Browder's apparently unanimous ouster,
there was substantial debate regarding the CPUSA's direction, with
many leaders expressing concern over abandonment of Browder's
philosophy."6 The installation of Foster and his new colleagues further
did not completely unify CPUSA ideology-leaders disagreed regarding
how hard of a line to take, with Foster representing the Soviet hard-line
and Eugene Dennis, the new general secretary, representing the
"center" (and "apparent[ly] majority") view. 6' Furthermore, rank-and-
file members used the CPUSA's new direction and Browder's ouster as
occasions to criticize publicly the CPUSA's rigid governing structure
and hostility toward internal debate.' 62 This picture hardly suggests a
group whose members or leaders were automatons willing to accept
thoughtlessly every Soviet directive. CPUSA members were generally
obedient, but they were not robots answering only to one master.
Ultimately, there existed a disconnection between the true state and
the popular image of the CPUSA. That popular image, though having
roots in the actions and words of domestic communists, was essentially a
powerful, political creation-the result of machinations by various
government and private anticommunist crusaders. Although some of
155. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 62-63.
156. ISSERMAN, supra note 127, at 190-92; STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 63.
Although the policy was widely accepted, dissension among the ranks still existed.
ISSERMAN, supra note 127, at 192-99.
157. See ISSERMAN, supra note 127, at 216-21.
158. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 64-66.
159. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
160. ISSERMAN, supra note 127, at 221-23; STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 65-66.
One historian posits that Browder was largely responsible for his own downfall by
refusing to listen to any criticism or defend his convictions. See ISSERMAN, supra note
127, at 226-29. In other words, Browder's ouster was not the result of Soviet demands,
but rather, of his unwillingness to play politics.
161. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 68-69.
162. See ISSERMAN, supra note 127, at 230-33.
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these crusaders believed in the dangers of communism generally, and
possibly even that the CPUSA was dangerous, many were under no
illusion that the CPUSA posed any real threat to the United States.' 63
Nevertheless, the image they purveyed became embedded in the national
psyche, and by the time of the Dennis trial, "Americans at every level
of society genuinely believed that Communism endangered the
nation." 64
II. DENNIS V. UNTED STATES
The Dennis trial and appeals occurred in the midst of the sentiments
described above, timing that had a significant impact on the
proceedings. At each level, the popular image of domestic communists
played a role in the conduct of trial, coloring such things as the evidence
admitted to the tests used to determine the constitutionality of the
defendants' convictions.
A. The Trial
The Smith Act indictment of the CPUSA leaders" was some time
in the maldng. It began as early as 1940 with the Smith Act's passage,
but accelerated in 1946 when the FBI and U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) began preparing a case against the defendants. Using information
gathered over a ten-year period regarding the CPUSA's activities within
the United States, the FBI ultimately produced an 1850 page brief (with
846 exhibits) recounting the CPUSA's activities."' 6 This brief was "the
most complete summary of the activities and aims of American
163. For example, President Truman, who authorized the loyalty boards and
used the specter of domestic communism to further his foreign policy agenda, never
really believed the CPUSA posed a threat to national security. BELKNAP, supra note 11,
at 41-45. President Truman's attorney general, Tom Clark, who initially prosecuted the
Dennis defendants, "also considered the party a minimal threat to national security."
Belknap, supra note 16, at 210. Similarly, anticommunist liberal Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
wrote that "it is hard to argue that the CPUSA in peacetime presents much of a threat to
American security.... Does anyone seriously believe that even the Communist Party is
absurd enough to contemplate a violent revolution in the United States?" ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE VITAL CENTER: THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM 129 (DaCapo Press,
Inc. 1988) (1949). Finally, Dies, although anticommunist, was far more interested in
using a fear of communism to advance an anti-New Deal political agenda. See supra
note 49.
164. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 154.
165. In addition to Dennis, the other defendants were Foster, John B.
Williamson, Jacob Stachel, Robert G. Thompson, Benjamin J. Davis, Jr., Henry
Winston, John Gates, Irving Potash, Gilbert Green, Carl Winter, and Gus Hall. See
Foster, 9 F.R.D. at 374. For health reasons, Foster was never tried.
166. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 46.
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communism ever assembled."1 67  Based upon the its contents, Dennis
and the other leaders of the CPUSA were indicted on July 20, 194816
for
conspir[ing] with each other... [from 1945 to 19481 to
organize as the [CPUSA] a society, group, and assembly of
persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction
of the Government of the United States by force and violence,
and knowingly and willfully. . . advocat[ing] and teach[ing]
the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the
Government of the United States by force and violence.169
Notably, the defendants were not indicted for conspiring to
overthrow the government or for advocating overthrow of the
government, both of which were also crimes under the Smith Act.
Despite the FBI's voluminous research, government officials knew there
was little or no evidence that CPUSA members advocated force or
violence. In fact, one of the attorneys responsible for drafting the
indictments against the defendants advised that "'a reading of this [FBI]
report makes one realize that the Government will be faced with a
difficult task in seeking to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.., that the
Communist Party advocates revolution by violence.'"' 7 Hoover also
openly acknowledged that building a Smith Act case against the CPUSA
defendants was "'going to be a tough case at its best.'" '71
Lacking sufficient evidence of advocacy of violent overthrow of the
U.S. government, prosecutors charged the defendants with conspiracy to
advocate violent overthrow. 7 2 A conspiracy indictment, the government
apparently reasoned, made proof that each defendant planned or
advocated overthrow of the government unnecessary; instead, the
government need only prove that they knowingly agreed to advocate
such an event at some point in the future. The fact that the defendants
never discussed using force or violence against the United States still
posed problems for a conspiracy indictment.' The government thus
167. Id.
168. See Foster, 9 F.R.D. at 379.
169. Id. at 374-75.
170. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 108 (quoting a George F. Kneip
memorandum entitled "The Communist Party of the United States of America").
171. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 192 (quoting a Hoover memorandum to D.
Milton Ladd).
172. Foster, 9 F.R.D. at 374-75.
173. According to the petitioners' brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
government introduced into evidence one statement by a defendant regarding the
possible need of violence, and no current CPUSA literature advocating violence. Brief
for Petitioners, supra note 66, at 6-7 & 6 n.3, reprinted in 47 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
142
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shifted its focus to the group, arguing by virtue of its adherence to
Marxist-Leninist principles that the CPUSA was itself a conspiracy to
advocate overthrow of the government.
According to the government, the defendants:
[Birought about meetings in New York City in June and July
of 1945 of the National Committee and the National Board and
the National Convention of the Communist Political
Association, in order to dissolve that Association and to
organize in its stead the [CPUSA].... [I]t was a part of the
conspiracy that these defendants would assume leadership of
the [CPUSA] ... that the defendants would organize clubs,
district and state units of their party ... that they would
recruit new members of their party; and that they, the
defendants, would publish books, magazines, and newspapers;
that they would organize schools and classes, in all of which it
was planned that there would be taught and advocated the
Marxist-Leninist principles ....
... [Such principles include the notions:]
(1) that Socialism cannot be established by peaceful
evolution but, on the contrary can be established only by
violent revolution; by smashing the machinery of government,
and setting up in its stead ... a dictatorship of the proletariat.
(2) That this smashing of the machinery of government and
setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat can be
accomplished only by the violent and forceful seizure of power
by the proletariat under the leadership of the Communist
Party. 174
By focusing on the CPUSA's organization and ideology and the
defendants' roles within the CPUSA, the government's conspiracy
theory operated much like the anticommunist campaign, viewing the
CPUSA not as individuals, but as part of a monolithic unit.
note 66, at 191-92 & 191 n.3. The government did not contest this statement. It had,
however, introduced evidence that random CPUSA members, who were not the
defendants, had discussed violence. Id. at 11-12, reprinted in 47 LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 66, at 196-97.
174. SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 174-75 (excerpt of the prosecutor's opening
statement); see also Dennis, 183 F.2d at 206; Louis B. Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines"
and the "Clear and Present Danger" Rule (pt. 1), 38 VA. L. REV. 143, 178-81 (1952).
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The government supported its conspiracy theory with Marxist-
Leninist literature, interpretive testimony from witnesses, and evidence
regarding the organizational structure and activities of the CPUSA.
During the trial, the prosecution introduced a "small mountain of
literary evidence"'175-including Karl Marx and Frederich Engels' The
Communist Manifesto, Vladimir Lenin's The State and Revolution,
Joseph Stalin's Foundations of Leninism, and the Program of the
Communist International" 6-ostensibly proving that Marxism-Leninism
embraced the necessary establishment of a forcible proletariat
dictatorship."7 This evidence, however, was quite dated, much of it
written decades before the defendants' alleged conspiracy." Thus, the
prosecution needed witnesses to "'testify that such literature [was] not
mere rhetoric but rather that it completely expresse[d] the present-day
objectives of the Communist Party.'""
The government's key witness was Louis Budenz, a former CPUSA
member who had become a prominent anticommunist lecturer.S° Asked
to interpret a statement in the CPUSA's newly reconstituted 1945
constitution that the organization "bas[ed] itself upon the principles of
scientific socialism, Marxism-Leninism," Budenz stated:
"This sentence, as is historically meant throughout the
Communist movement, is that the Communist Party bases
itself upon . . . the theory and practice of so-called scientific
socialism as appears in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin
and Stalin, therefore as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin, who
have specifically interpreted scientific socialism to mean that
socialism can only be attained by the violent shattering of the
capitalist state, and the setting up of a dictatorship of the
proletariat by force and violence in the place of that state. In
the United States this would mean that the [CPUSA] is
basically committed to the overthrow of the Government of the
175. Belknap, supra note 16, at 217.
176. For a description of this evidence, see Brief for the United States at 117-
41, Dennis (No. 336), reprinted in 47 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 66, at 459, 586-
610.
177. Boudin, supra note 174, at 179-80.
178. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 84.
179. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 195 (quoting an unidentified prosecutorial
aide).
180. Id. at 83-86; see also Belknap, supra note 16, at 216. Louis Budenz was
one of several witnesses called by the government, most of whom were FBI informants.
BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 83-90. While those witnesses added little to the
government's case, id. at 86-90, historians agree that Budenz's testimony dramatically
affected the trial, see, e.g., SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 197; STEINBERG, supra note
10, at 167.
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United States as set up by the Constitution of the United
States. "'8
Although the defense attorneys objected to this interpretation as merely
that of one man, the trial judge, believing Budenz's testimony to be the
"common understanding of Communists concerning the meaning of the
sentence," allowed it."s The trial judge further refused to allow the
defendants to testify regarding their interpretation of Marxist-Leninist
principles,"8 3  which were less insidious than the government's
portrayal. '
While Budenz's testimony arguably linked Marxist-Leninist tenets
and inevitable revolution (and this was very arguable),' 1  the
government's case faced another hurdle. The CPUSA's constitution
contained an explicit platform calling for expulsion of members who
advocated violence,' .' which flatly contradicted Budenz's interpretation
of the CPUSA's beliefs. Budenz responded that the CPUSA engaged in
doublespeak. According to his testimony, "'portions of [the CPUSA's]
constitution which are in conflict with Marxism-Leninism are null in
effect. They are merely window dressing asserted for protective
purposes, the Aesopian language of V.I. Lenin.'""s In essence, Budenz
claimed that one could dismiss the CPUSA's prohibition of violence as
an attempt to mislead the public about the organization's true aims. 88
181. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 84-85 (quoting Budenz's testimony); see also
Brief for the United States, supra note 176, at 25-26, reprinted in 47 LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 66, at 494-95.
182. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 84.
183. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit at 40-47, Dennis (No. 336) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari],
reprinted in 47 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 66, at 3, 47-54.
184. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 66, at 7-24, reprinted in 47 LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 66, at 192-209.
185. Both the defendants and objective observers argued that the prosecution had
taken these quotations out of context. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 198; Belknap,
supra note 16, at 219-20; Boudin, supra note 174, at 181-86.
186. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 66, at 25, reprinted in 47 LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 66, at 210 (describing the CPUSA constitution's provisions); see also
SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 194; STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 162-63.
187. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 163 (quoting Budenz's March 29, 1949
testimony); see also BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 85-86. The phrase "Aesopian
language" refers to Vladimir I. Lenin's earlier statement that "in order to avoid Tsarist
censorship, he had to make political observations 'with extreme caution by hints in that
Aesopian language-in that cursed Aesopian language to which Czarism compelled all
revolutionaries to have recourse whenever they took up their pens to write a "legal"
work.'" SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 194.
188. Budenz's testimony largely tracked the FBI's strategy. In compiling its
brief, the FBI was "particularly troubled by the fact that the prospective defendants not
only did not call for the overthrow of the American government by force and violence,
but also explicitly denied that they wanted to do so. Even worse were the inconvenient
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Although there was no concrete evidence that the CPUSA used Aesopian
language, 89 Budenz's claim became a central aspect of the case against
the defendants.
From an evidentiary standpoint, Budenz's testimony dealt a near-
death blow to the CPUSA's defense. Although the prosecution never
established a single, concrete incident in which any of the defendants
agreed to teach or advocate the use of violence against the U.S.
government, his statements drew the necessary links. As one
commentator noted, "[b]y equating the Communist party's creed with
the violent overthrow of the government and then defining anything
tending to contradict this characterization as, for that reason alone, a lie,
Budenz had not only settled the crucial issue in the case but also
rendered any real defense impossible."1
The defendants, however, had one final argument. Relying on the
First Amendment, the defendants argued that the Smith Act was
unconstitutional because it allowed the government to try them for their
beliefs.19" ' Judge Harold Medina, who presided over the trial, had
similar concerns. In his jury instructions, Judge Medina began by
noting that freedom of speech is
[a]mong the most vital and precious liberties which we
Americans enjoy by virtue of our Constitution .... We
must be careful to preserve these rights unimpaired in
all their vigor.
passages in the party's constitution that specifically abjured revolutionary
violence . . ." SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 194. The FBI thus turned to the
"Aesopian" language argument to bolster its case against the defendants. Id. at 194-95.
189. During its investigation, the FBI asked its field offices "to investigate the
party's use of the term. From Boston, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco,
and elsewhere, the responses were all the same. Informants were 'not aware of the
existence of the Aesopian language'...." Id. at 194-95.
190. Belknap, supra note 16, at 216.
191. See United States v. Foster, 80 F. Supp. 479, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). The
trial judge denied the defendants' motion for a directed verdict, which claimed that the
prosecution had shown no "clear and present danger" of harm as required by First
Amendment doctrine. See Nathaniel L. Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the Clear-
and-Present-Danger Test, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1167, 1167-68 (1950). In a pretrial
motion to dismiss the indictments, which the judge also denied, the defendants made a
similar argument. See Foster, 80 F. Supp. at 483-85. The constitutional argument is
discussed more fully below. See infra Parts II.B-C.
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•.. [I]t is not the abstract doctrine of overthrowing
or destroying organized government by unlawful means
which is denounced by [the Smith Act] ..... 92
Rather, Judge Medina instructed that the defendants violated the Smith
Act only if they intended to accomplish particular action by using
language that was "reasonably and ordinarily calculated" to incite
people:
You must be satisfied from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendants had an intent to cause the overthrow
or destruction of the Government of the United States by force
and violence, and that it was with this intent and for the
purpose of furthering that objective that they conspired both
(1) to organize the [CPUSA] as a group or society [that]
teach[es] and advocate[s] the overthrow or destruction of the
Government of the United States by force and violence and (2)
to teach and advocate the duty and necessity of overthrowing
or destroying the Government of the United States by force
and violence. And you must further find that it was the intent
of the defendants to achieve this goal... as speedily as
circumstances would permit it to be achieved.193
While Judge Medina avoided the constitutional problem of trying
the defendants for their beliefs, he did so only by turning the conspiracy
charge from one involving advocacy of overthrow into one involving
attempted overthrow of the government." 9 The defendants, however,
were not indicted for conspiring to overthrow the government.
Moreover, if there was no evidence that the defendants agreed to
advocate overthrow of the government, there was certainly no evidence
that they had actually planned one. Thus, Judge Medina's
transformation of the conspiracy charge itself lacked solid foundation.
In order to solve this problem, Judge Medina relied on a different
evidentiary foundation-the clandestine operations of the CPUSA.
Throughout the trial, the prosecution portrayed the CPUSA in
much the same way as the anticommunists-that is, as an autocratic
organization that trained rigidly disciplined members completely loyal to
192. Foster, 9 F.R.D. at 389-91.
193. Id. at 391.
194. See Louis B. Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines" and the "Clear and Present
Danger" Rule (pt. 2), 38 VA. L. REv. 315, 324-25 (1952); Nathanson, supra note 191,
at 1172.
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the Soviet Union. 95 The government believed that its portrayal gave the
CPUSA a conspiratorial cast, transforming it from an organization
merely discussing overthrow as an abstract doctrine to an organization
actually taking steps toward such overthrow.' 6 Judge Medina relied on
a similar reading of the evidence, instructing the jury that, while it could
not infer intent to incite "from the open and aboveboard teaching of a
course on the principles and implications of Communism," it was "to
weigh with scrupulous care the testimony concerning secret schools,
false names, devious ways, general falsification and so on, all alleged to
be in the setting of a huge and well-disciplined organization, spreading
to practically every State of the Union and all principal cities, and
industries."" 9  The popular image of the CPUSA thus became an
integral aspect of its alleged guilt.
This was the state of affairs as the jury began to deliberate. A trial
that began with an indictment for conspiring to organize as a group
advocating violent overthrow of the government concluded as a trial
about something very different-the defendants' alleged conspiracy to
overthrow the government. What little documentary evidence there was
related entirely to advocacy of overthrow rather than conspiracy of
actual overthrow, and that evidence did little more than reflect
communist ideology. Nevertheless, combined with allegations of
CPUSA secrecy and jury instructions designed to fill in the blanks, the
literary evidence proved quite compelling. The jury reached a guilty
verdict in under eight hours, and on October 20, 1949, Judge Medina
sentenced the defendants to three to five years in jail and $10,000 each
in fines. 98
B. Appeal to the Second Circuit
The defendants immediately appealed their convictions to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the prosecution
violated their right to free expression' 99 under the Supreme Court
doctrine that the government could criminally punish speech only if
there existed "a clear and present danger that [it] will bring about the
195. See Brief for the United States, supra note 176, at 37-61, reprinted in 47
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 66, at 506-30.
196. STEINBERG, supra note 10, at 165-66; see also BELlNAP, supra note 11, at
109.
197. Foster, 9 F.R.D. at 391. Judge Harold Medina refused to allow
introduction of much of the defendants' evidence explaining its organization and
clandestine behavior. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 183, at 44-46,
reprinted in 47 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 66, at 51-53.
198. Belknap, supra note 16, at 221.
199. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 205-07. The defendants also raised issues with
respect to jury selection and the admissibility of certain evidence. Id. at 215-34.
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substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."" In the years
leading up to Dennis, the Supreme Court had applied that test quite
stringently, requiring that "the substantive evil. . . be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be
punished.""' According to the defendants, because the evidence
showed only that the CPUSA adhered to certain beliefs, the government
could never satisfy this strict version of the test.2 2  Moreover, they
argued, Judge Medina's construction of the Smith Act violated the clear
and present danger test because it read the doctrine's "imminence"
requirement out of existence, instead replacing it with a requirement that
harm occur "as speedily as circumstances would permit."2 3
The Second Circuit nevertheless upheld the defendants'
convictions, holding that they did not violate the First Amendment.
Judge Learned Hand, author of the majority opinion, agreed that the
clear and present danger test was appropriate for judging the
constitutionality of the defendants' convictions.' After a thorough
review of earlier cases, he also acknowledged that current versions of
the test made "immediacy of the 'substantive evil' a condition" of
punishment. 5 He concluded, however, that the imminence requirement
reflected a belief that "a substantial intervening period between the
utterance and its realization may check its effect and change its
importance"-that is, nonimminent harm was often less probable
because the opportunity for counterdebate might stop it.206 In some
200. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
201. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); see also Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 663 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583,
589-90 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940).
202. See BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 125.
203. See Dennis, 183 F.2d at 215.
204. Id. at 212-13, 234. This was initially a small, if temporary and ultimately
empty, victory for the defendants. Beginning with its opposition to the defendants'
earlier motion for a directed verdict at trial, the government maintained that the Court
should apply the doctrine in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), rather than the
clear and present danger test. Nathanson, supra note 191, at 1167-68. In Gitlow, the
Court held that the clear and present danger test was inapplicable to statutes that directly
targeted speech, as opposed to acts, and instead ruled that deference to a legislative
finding of danger was appropriate. 268 U.S. at 670-72. Because the Smith Act targeted
speech advocating overthrow of the government, the Gitlow doctrine, though generally
thought to have fallen out of favor, arguably applied. At trial, Judge Medina may have
believed that Gitlow was controlling, although he never actually said so when denying
the defendants' motion for a directed verdict. Nathanson, supra note 191, at 1167-68.
Judge Harry Chase, who concurred in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit's opinion, also argued that the more deferential Gitlow doctrine should have been
applied. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 237 (Chase, J., concurring).
205. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 208.
206. Id. at 212.
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cases, however, the probability of an event was unrelated to its
imminence. Thus, Judge Hand refined the test to ask "whether the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifie[d] such
invasion of free speech as [was] necessary to avoid the danger."2
According to Judge Hand, he had "purposely substituted 'improbability'
for 'remoteness' .... Given the same probability, it would be wholly
irrational to condone future evils which we should prevent if they were
immediate."20
8
Judge Hand then explained why the evidence against the defendants
satisfied his version of the test. That evidence, he argued, established
that the defendants advocated Marxism-Leninism, which had as a central
tenet the "temporary... but inescapable" use of violence to overthrow
existing regimes."° Indeed, the evidence on this point was so clear that
a "jury could scarcely have found otherwise."21 In a tortured passage
discussing the nature of the CPUSA, Judge Hand continued:
The [CPUSA] ... is a highly articulated, well contrived, far
spread organization, numbering thousands of adherents, rigidly
and ruthlessly disciplined .... It seeks converts far and wide
by an extensive system of schooling, demanding of all an
inflexible doctrinal orthodoxy. The violent capture of all
existing governments is one article of the creed of [its] faith,
which abjures the possibility of success by lawful means. That
article... is a part of the homiletics for novitiates,
although ... it is covered by an innocent terminology,
designed to prevent its disclosure.... The advocacy of
violence may, or may not, fail; but in neither case can there be
any "right" to use it. Revolutions are often "right," but a
"right of revolution" is a contradiction in terms, for a society
which acknowledged it, could not stop at tolerating
conspiracies to overthrow it, but must include their
execution.... When does the conspiracy become a "present
danger"? The jury has found that the conspirators will strike
as soon as success seems possible, and obviously, no one in
his senses would strike sooner.211
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 206.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 212-13. During oral argument, Judge Learned Hand similarly seems
to have pursued the notion that the defendants were essentially guilty of a conspiracy to
overthrow the government. See BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 125.
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Judge Hand thus concluded that the evil of attempted overthrow, if not
imminent, was probable. World conditions bolstered his argument:
We need not say that even so thoroughly planned and so
extensive a confederation would be a "present danger" at all
times and in all circumstances; the question is how imminent:
that is, how probable of execution-it was in the summer of
1948, when the indictment was found. We must not close our
eyes to our position in the world at that time. By far the most
powerful of all the European nations had been a convert to
Communism for over thirty years; its leaders were the most
devoted and potent proponents of the faith .... Moreover in
most of West Europe there were important political
Communist factions, always agitating to increase their power;
and the defendants were acting in close concert with the
movement .... Any border fray, any diplomatic incident, any
difference in construction of the modus vivendi-such as the
Berlin blockade ... might prove a spark in the tinder-box, and
lead to war. 2
Given these facts, he could not "understand how one could ask for a
more probable danger, unless we must wait till the actual eve of
hostilities. "2
1
In upholding the defendants' convictions, Judge Hand engaged in a
sleight of hand similar to Judge Medina's. Recognizing that mere
advocacy of an idea could not be punished consistent with the
Constitution, Judge Hand transformed the CPUSA's activities from
advocacy of political ideology into those of a sinister, secretive, and
widespread organization biding its time before attempting an inevitable,
violent revolution. 24 He accomplished this transformation by focusing
on the CPUSA's character and by taking judicial notice of world events
that were unrelated to the CPUSA.15
With the harm characterized as such, Judge Hand could far more
easily justify his dramatic departure from the existing formulation of the
clear and present danger test, and, Judge Hand's characterization
notwithstanding, a dramatic departure it was.2 6 In earlier decisions,
212. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 213.
213. Id.
214. See Dennis, 183 F.2d at 206-07, 212-13. For similar characterizations,
see Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REv. 193, 217-18 (1952); and Frances D. Wormuth, Learned Legerdemain: A Grave
but Implausible Hand, 6 W. POL. Q. 543, 549 (1953).
215. See Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212-13.
216. Scholars almost universally agree regarding this fact. See, e.g., KALVEN,
JR., supra note 10, at 190-91; Chester James Antieau, Dennis v. United States-
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imminence was part of the assessment of the probability of harm. That
is, imminence and probability were integrally related, with the
imminence of harm being very good evidence that it was probable and
unlikely to be affected by counterspeech.217 The Supreme Court had
arrived at the imminence requirement as a result of earlier, heavily
criticized decisions allowing punishment of speech based upon minimal
evidence of possible, future harm.218 By focusing on probability not as a
function of imminence, but as a function of the CPUSA's character,
Judge Hand both gutted the clear and present danger test and provided
the Second Circuit with an easy, but circular, justification for upholding
the defendants' convictions.
C. The Supreme Court Weighs In
Having lost in the Second Circuit, the defendants' last hope lay
with the Supreme Court. The defendants' appeal again relied on free
speech arguments. The petitioners had some reason to hope for success
in the Supreme Court. In Schneiderman v. United States, decided eight
years earlier, the Court struck down the government's attempt to strip a
CPUSA leader of citizenship because of the organization's alleged
dedication to violent overthrow of the United States.2"9 According to the
Court, the evidence-much of which was identical to the literature
presented in Dennis-could lead one to conclude "that the [CPUSA] in
Precedent, Principle or Perversion?, 5 VAND. L. REV. 141, 142-43 (1952); Boudin,
supra note 194, at 329; Robert McCloskey, Free Speech, Sedition and the Constitution,
45 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 662, 668 (1951); Rostow, supra note 214, at 219; Note; Clear
and Present Danger Re-Examined, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 98, 104-05 (1951); Note, Post-
Dennis Prosecutions Under the Smith Act, 31 IND. L.J. 104, 116 (1955).
217. See Chester James Antieau, "Clear and Present Danger"-Its Meaning and
Significance, 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 603, 603-07 (1950); Antieau, supra note 216, at
144-45; McCloskey, supra note 216, at 667-68.
218. As originally applied, the Court used the clear and present danger test to
uphold convictions based on little more than political criticism. See Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 619-24 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214-15
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1919); Schenck, 249 U.S. at
51-53. During this period, the test's primary proponents, Justices Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Louis Brandeis, nevertheless argued that it was stringent, requiring both a
substantive evil and a danger of imminent harm before speech could be punished. See
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow,
268 U.S. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627-28 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). In the decade preceding Dennis, the Supreme Court accepted the Holmes-
Brandeis version of the test. See supra note 201. For discussions tracing the meaning
and evolution of the clear and present danger test, see Chester James Antieau, The Rule
of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability, 48 MICH. L. Rv. 811, 811-16
(1950); Boudin, supra note 174, at 154-77; Mendelson, supra note 2, at 314-28; and
Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom of Advocacy
in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1, 31-36 (1991).
219. 320 U.S. at 158-59.
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1927 desired to achieve its purpose by peaceful and democratic means,
and as a theoretical matter justified the use of force and violence only as
a method of preventing an attempted forcible counter-overthrow once
the Party had obtained control in a peaceful manner."' The
government thus had not demonstrated a clear and present danger of
harm justifying denaturalization."' "There is a material difference," the
Court wrote, "between agitation and exhortation calling for present
violent action which creates a clear and present danger of public
disorder or other substantive evil, and mere doctrinal justification or
prediction of the use of force under hypothetical conditions at some
indefinite future time. " '" Both the Court's interpretation of the clear
and present danger test and its characterization of the CPUSA's
teachings favored the Dennis defendants.
Unfortunately, a year before Dennis, the Court issued a less
favorable opinion regarding communists. In American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act's
requirement that union officers file oaths certifying that they did not
belong to an organization advocating violent overthrow of the
government. 23 The Douds Court indicated that the CPUSA's alleged
involvement in political strikes supported the oath requirement,
specifically relying on a vision of the CPUSA similar to the popular
image:
Substantial amounts of evidence were presented to various
committees of Congress... that Communist leaders of labor
unions had in the past and would continue in the future to
subordinate legitimate trade union objectives to obstructive
strikes when dictated by Party leaders, often in support of the
policies of a foreign government.'
Because the Douds Court relied on the commerce clause,' the decision
was not controlling authority in Dennis. Nevertheless, its less favorable
view of the CPUSA ultimately triumphed, as the Dennis Court upheld,
in a six to two vote, the constitutionality of the Smith Act. 26
Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson authored the plurality opinion on
behalf of himself and Justices Stanley Reed, Harold Burton, and
Sherman Minton. 7 Chief Justice Vinson rejected the defendants' facial
220. Id. at 157.
221. Id. at 157-58.
222. Id. at 157.
223. 339 U.S. at 415.
224. Id. at 388.
225. See id. at 406.
226. 341 U.S. at 516-17.
227. Id. at 495.
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attack on the statute, concluding that the Smith Act punished only speech
advocating overthrow of the government, and not discussion of the
merits of Marxism-Leninism. 22 He acknowledged, however, that the
statute's application might violate the First Amendment if the targeted
speech did not present a clear and present danger of harm.229 The
essential question in the case thus centered around the meaning and
application of that phrase.
Like Judge Hand, Chief Justice Vinson reviewed previous clear and
present danger cases.m Acknowledging that many of those cases
rejected the government's attempt to punish speech, he nevertheless
distinguished them as involving qualitatively different harm than that
posed by the CPUSA and far less evidence of danger.231 According to
Chief Justice Vinson, Dennis involved "[ojverthrow of the Government
by force and violence [which] is certainly a substantial enough interest
for the Government to limit speech .... [F]or if a society cannot protect
its very structure from armed internal attack, it must follow that no
subordinate value can be protected." 2 2  Given the enormity of this
potential harm, the Chief Justice argued that a rigid application of the
clear and present danger test would "paralyze our Government in the
face of impending threat by encasing it in a semantic straitjacket." 233
Chief Justice Vinson thus adopted Judge Hand's version of the test-that
is, asking "'whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its
improbability,"' justified a restriction of speech.2 4
228. Id. at 501-02.
229. Id. at 505.
230. Id. at 503-08.
231. See id. at 508-09.
232. Id. at 509.
233. Id. at 508. As Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson further noted, the clear and
present danger test could not possibly mean that
before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If Government
is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its
members and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the
leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is required.
Id. at 509.
234. Id. at 510. Chief Justice Vinson's adoption of that version of the test was
not a total surprise. In Douds, he also described the clear and present danger test as
flexible:
[I]t was never the intention of this Court to lay down an absolutist test
measured in terms of danger to the Nation. When the effect of a statute or
ordinance upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms is relatively small
and the public interest to be protected is substantial, it is obvious that a rigid
test requiring a showing of imminent danger to the security of the Nation is
an absurdity.
339 U.S. at 397.
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Applying this test, Chief Justice Vinson found that the gravity of
the evil justified the government's actions.235 He further found that the
harm of attempted overthrow, though not imminent, was probable:
[The Communist Party is a highly disciplined organization,
adept at infiltration into strategic positions, use of aliases, and
double-meaning language... is rigidly controlled... unlike
other political parties, tolerate[s] no dissension from the policy
laid down by the guiding forces, but ... the approved
program is slavishly followed by the members of the
Party ... [and] the literature of the Party and the statements
and activities of its leaders.., advocate, and the general goal
of the Party was, during the period in question, to achieve a
successful overthrow of the existing order by force or
violence.
... The formation... of such a highly organized
conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call
when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the time had come
for action, coupled with the inflammable nature of world
conditions, similar uprisings in other countries, and the touch-
and-go nature of our relations with countries with whom
petitioners were in the very least ideologically attuned,
convince us that [the petitioners'] convictions were
justified.... 236
Ultimately, Chief Justice Vinson, like Judges Hand and Medina, relied
heavily on the popular image of the CPUSA to transform what was
235. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510.
236. Id. at 498, 510-11. Chief Justice Vinson did not review the evidence
supporting his argument that the clear and present danger test was satisfied because he
interpreted the limited grant of certiorari as "remov[ing] from our consideration any
question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's determination that
petitioners are guilty of the offense charged." Id. at 497. Rather than consider the
evidentiary issues that so dominated the lower courts' attention, the plurality instead took
as a given the findings of the court of appeals, which Chief Justice Vinson concluded
"amply supports.. . that petitioners, the leaders of the Communist Party in this
country, were unwilling to work within our framework of democracy, but intended to
initiate a violent revolution whenever the propitious occasion appeared." Id. Several
scholars criticized this limited interpretation of the grant of certiorari, noting that the
issue of whether advocacy posed a clear and present danger depended heavily upon the
evidence regarding the defendants' conduct, not simply an analysis of the legal test. See
Antieau, supra note 216, at 143; Boudin, supra note 194, at 332; Louis L. Jaffe, The
Supreme Court, 1950 Term-Foreward, 65 HARV. L. REv. 107, 111 (1951).
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essentially an ideological belief into a conspiracy to overthrow the
government.
Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred in the result. Arguing that the
clear and present danger test required the Court to engage in a difficult
balancing process for which it was ill-equipped, Justice Frankfurter
concluded that the justices should defer to Congress's determination
regarding the danger posed by the CPUSA's beliefs. 237 That Congress
had a reasonable basis for adopting the Smith Act was obvious to Justice
Frankfurter:
We may take judicial notice that the Communist doctrines
which these defendants have conspired to advocate are in the
ascendancy in powerful nations who cannot be acquitted of
unfriendliness to the institutions of this country. We may
[also] take account of evidence brought forward at this trial
and elsewhere, much of which has long been common
knowledge. In sum, it would amply justify a legislature in
concluding that recruitment of additional members for the
Party would create a substantial danger to national security.
In 1947... at least 60,000 members were enrolled in
the Party.... mhe membership was organized in small units,
linked by an intricate chain of command, and protected by
elaborate precautions designed to prevent disclosure of
individual identity. There are no reliable data tracing acts of
sabotage or espionage directly to these defendants. But a
Canadian Royal Commission appointed in 1946 to investigate
espionage reported that it was "overwhelmingly established"
that "the Communist movement was the principal base within
which the espionage network was recruited." The most
notorious spy in recent history was led into the service of the
Soviet Union through Communist indoctrination. Evidence
supports the conclusion that members of the Party seek and
occupy positions of importance in political and labor
organizations."
Justice Robert H. Jackson also concurred in the result, although his
reasoning differed from both Chief Justice Vinson and Justice
Frankfurter. According to Justice Jackson, the clear and present danger
test applied in cases in which the defendants openly advocated the use of
237. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 525-27 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance
of the judgment).
238. Id. at 547-48 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of the judgment)
(footnotes omitted).
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force or violence.2 9 The CPUSA, however, operated by a "strategy of
stealth [which] preclude[d] premature or uncoordinated outbursts of
violence, except, of course, when the blame will be placed on shoulders
other than their own.... Force or violence, as they would resort to it,
may never be necessary, because infiltration and deception may be
enough."' Application of the clear and present danger test in these
circumstances held the government "captive in a judge-made verbal
trap,"" and should have been discarded.
Justices Hugo L. Black and William 0. Douglas dissented, with
both accusing their colleagues of falling prey to passion and fear.'2
Justice Black's opinion was relatively brief, noting primarily that the
affirmance of the convictions required repudiation of the clear and
present danger test, a move he believed inconsistent with the First
Amendment. 213 Justice Douglas was far more scathing, attacking the
plurality and concurring justices for obfuscating the real issues. 2" "This
case," he wrote, "was argued as if [seditious conduct] were the
facts.... That is easy and it has popular appeal, for the activities of
Communists in plotting and scheming against the free world are
common knowledge. But the fact is that no such evidence was
introduced at the trial." 2 5
The present record, he continued, showed nothing more than that
the CPUSA members "organize[d] people to teach and themselves
[taught] the Marxist-Leninist doctrine contained chiefly in four
books."' Without more, these teachings did not present a clear and
present danger to the United States, notwithstanding the plurality's
reliance on world conditions and the popular image of the CPUSA.2'
"We might as well say," he scoffed, "that the speech of petitioners is
outlawed because Soviet Russia and her Red Army are a threat to world
peace." 248 Because there was no evidence that the CPUSA as an entity
posed an internal threat-indeed, the evidence showed exactly the
239. See id. at 568-70 (Jackson, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 564-65 (Jackson, J., concurring). As with Chief Justice Vinson,
Justice Robert H. Jackson's concurring opinion in Douds presaged his Dennis
conclusions. See Douds, 339 U.S. at 424 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ('Congress could rationally conclude that, behind its political party facade, the
Communist Party is a conspiratorial and revolutionary junta, organized to reach ends
and to use methods which are incompatible with our constitutional system.").
241. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 568 (Jackson, J., concurring).
242. See id. at 581 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 589-90 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
243. Id. at 579-80 (Black, J., dissenting).
244. See id. at 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
245. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 582 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
247. See id. at 587-88 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
248. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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opposite-Justice Douglas argued that the convictions violated the First
Amendment.249
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THREAT PERCEPTION
Dennis occurred during a period of extreme intolerance-that is, an
"[un]willingness to 'put up with' those things that one rejects"'-
toward the CPUSA, which profoundly and negatively affected the legal
proceedings. Accordingly, most observers characterize Dennis as a
cautionary tale about the effects of such intolerance on presumably
dispassionate tribunals."' If we wish more effectively to insulate judges
from such influences, however, we must attempt to understand (1) the
mechanisms by which intolerance against the CPUSA came about, and
(2) whether those mechanisms operated within the courts.
Political scientists conclude that intolerance is primarily a function
of threat perception. 2 The more threatening a group appears to be, the
more likely we are to be intolerant of it. 3 During the period in which
the Dennis legal proceedings occurred, Americans considered domestic
communists to be a significant threat and, consequently, either
engineered, demanded, or supported politically repressive acts such as
the Dennis prosecutions. This intolerance was not irrational, but it was
based upon greatly exaggerated views of the CPUSA's dangerousness.
There are two ways in which Americans' perceptions of the
CPUSA's dangerousness might have become exaggerated.' First,
Americans could have exaggerated the threat after a process of risk
assessment-that is, assessment of the nature and probability of certain
events (in this case, overthrow of the U.S. government). 5  Much
249. Id. at 587-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
250. John L. Sullivan et al., An Alternative Conceptualization of Political
Tolerance: Illusory Increases 1950s-1970s, 73 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 781, 784 (1979); see
also JOHN L. SULLIVAN ET AL., POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 52
(1982) [hereinafter POLITICAL TOLERANCE].
251. See supra note 16.
252. POLITICAL TOLERANCE, supra note 250, at 251 ("The factors most strongly
and consistently related to tolerance are perceptions of threat from target groups and two
psychological constructs, self-esteem and dogmatism.").
253. Id.; John Mueller, Trends in Political Tolerance, 52 PUB. OPINION Q. 1,
16-17 (1988); see also Donald R. Kinder, Opinion and Action in the Realm of Politics,
in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 778, 790 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1998).
254. Political scientists have identified two routes to political tolerance
judgments: "people either can respond to the group (e.g., 'I do not like communists') or
to the possible consequences of the act (e.g., 'if communists hold a public rally, they
may incite a riot')." James H. Kuklinski et al., The Cognitive and Affective Bases of
Political Tolerance Judgments, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1, 4 (1991).
255. See, e.g., Klaus Knorr, Threat Perception, in HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF
NATIONAL SECUlrrY PROBLEMS 78, 79 (Klaus Knorr ed., 1976) ("Perception of actual or
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research shows that psychological biases can cause individuals to
overestimate the likelihood of a particular event. 2 6 Such biases could
have affected individuals considering the dangers posed by domestic
communists. Second, Americans could have focused not on a particular
event but on the threatening nature of the CPUSA as a group. In that
scenario, Americans' perceptions that the CPUSA threatened their
values may have caused prejudice and hostility leading to intolerance.'
This Part will discuss these psychological phenomena and their potential
role in the anticommunist hysteria surrounding the Dennis decision.
A. The Psychology of Threat Perception
1. THREAT PERCEPTION AND RISK ASSESSMENT
258
Accurate assessment of risk requires a complex balancing of the
nature of the risk, the probability of its occurrence, and the implications
of acting or failing to act. While people engage in risk assessment all of
the time, 9 this complex balancing is time consuming. Thus, people use
heuristics (that is, mental shortcuts based upon past experience) to make
judgments about whether events will occur.2 ° While these shortcuts are
generally useful and reasonably accurate ways to assess risk, they can
also lead to "biases," which lead people to overestimate the likelihood
of a particular risk."'
potential threats involves the estimate of probabilities about whether the anticipated harm
will materialize.").
256. See, e.g., id. at 85.
257. GEORGE E. MARCUS ET AL., WITH MALICE TOWARD SOME: How PEOPLE
MAKE CIVIL LIBERTIES JUDGMENTS 102, 113 (1995); POLmCAL TOLERANCE, supra note
250, at 186-94; see also Dennis Chong, How People Think, Reason, and Feel About
Rights and Liberties, 37 AM. J. POL. SCi. 867, 889 (1993).
258. Portions of Part IIE.A are adapted from Wells, supra note 3, at 921-29.
259. See Paul Slovic et al., Decision Processes, Rationality and Adjustment to
Natural Hazards [hereinafter Slovic et al., Decision Processes], in PAUL SLOVWC, THE
PERCEPTION OF RISK 1, 9 (Ragnar E. Lofstedt ed., 2000) [hereinafter PERCEPTION OF
RISK] (noting the "importance of probabilistic reasoning to decision-making in general").
Even the simplest of tasks often involves risk assessment. For example, the
determination of whether to take an umbrella to work depends upon one's assessment of
the likelihood that it will rain that day.
260. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY].
261. Id.; see also Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of
Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 769 (1990). Many
of these biases can also lead to underestimation of the probability of certain risks. See
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 260, at 3. This Article focuses on the overestimation
of risk because of the circumstances in which risk assessment took place.
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The most relevant of these heuristics for purposes of threat
perception is the availability heuristic. The term "availability" refers to
individuals' tendency to assess "the probability of an event by the ease
with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind." 2 When
examples come to mind quickly, people tend to assume that there "must
be a lot of them."263 Conversely, when examples do not come to mind
easily, people tend to assume there are few of them. Thus, the easier it
is to bring something to mind, the more "available" it is, and the more
available an incident is, the more likely one is to overestimate its
occurrence.
An event's "salience" is a significant factor regarding its
availability, and possibly one of the biggest aspects of skewed risk
assessment. 2"6 Many things can make an event salient. An event that is
very familiar to an individual-for example, due to personal
experience-is more available to her than if she simply heard or read
news reports about it. 65 While one who has personally experienced an
event will find it more salient than one who has simply heard or read
news reports about it, intense media coverage can also make an event
salient. 266 This is especially true if an event is vivid, such as an airplane
crash, as opposed to mundane, such as a traffic accident. 267 Recent
events also tend to be more salient. '
Finally, events are also more available to an individual as they
become more imaginable.69 That is, people are more likely to
262. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 260, at 11; see also Slovic et al.,
Decision Processes, supra note 259, at 13.
263. Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and
Interaction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 260, at 190, 191-92.
264. See id. at 192 ("Salience biases refer to the fact that colorful, dynamic, or
other distinctive stimuli disproportionately engage attention and accordingly
disproportionately affect judgments.").
265. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 260, at 11. For example, if a person has
several family members who have suffered from cancer, she will likely predict that
cancer occurs more frequently than if she has no family members with cancer. Although
the actual incidence of cancer does not change, the individual's familiarity with the
disease leads her to overestimate its likelihood of occurrence.
266. See MAx BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 14
(4th ed. 1998) ("The availability of instances in the media frequently biases our
perception of the frequency of events.").
267. See Tversky & Kalmeman, supra note 260, at 11.
268. For example, after an earthquake, "the proportion of people carrying
earthquake insurance rises sharply-but it declines steadily from that point, as vivid
memories recede." Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 64 (2002); see also Slovic et al., Decision Processes, supra
note 259, at 14 (noting that, "in making forecasts of future flood potential, individuals
'are strongly conditioned by their immediate past and limit their extrapolation to
simplified constructs, seeing the future as a mirror of that past'") (quoted source
omitted).
269. See Slovic et al., Decision Processes, supra note 259, at 12-13.
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overestimate the occurrence of an event the easier it is to conceive of,
which can have special ramifications for events with potentially
catastrophic but unlikely occurrences.'7 According to Professors Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky:
The risk involved in an adventurous expedition.. . is
evaluated by imagining contingencies with which the
expedition is not equipped to cope. If many such difficulties
are vividly portrayed, the expedition can be made to appear
exceedingly dangerous, although the ease with which disasters
are imagined need not reflect their actual likelihood.27
In sum, an event is more available to an individual if she has previously
personally experienced it, or if it is highly imaginable or is the subject
of widespread and intense media coverage. Although the probability of
that event's occurrence might be low, individuals may nevertheless
overestimate its likelihood.
The perception that a threatened event is calamitous may also skew
probability assessments and, consequently, result in misperception of the
alleged threats. The magnitudes of threatened harms vary drastically,
ranging from minor to significant to catastrophic. How do people
discriminate between such potentially harmful events? Although risk
means different things to different people, Professor Paul Slovic has
developed a taxonomy regarding risk attitudes that spans the population,
making it possible to gauge societal assessments of the comparative
magnitude of certain harms.272  According to Slovic, individuals
perceive risks as more serious the more dreaded and unknown they
are.273 A risk is considered to be "dreaded" if people perceive that: (1)
it is potentially catastrophic or fatal, (2) it is involuntary, and (3) they
lack control over it. 4  A risk is "unknown" if it is (1) new, (2)
unobservable, (3) lacking in immediacy, and (4) not understood.275 A
270. See id. at 13.
271. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 260, at 13.
272. Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk, in PERCETON OF RISK, supra note
259, at 220.
273. Id. at 226; see also Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding
Perceived Risk, in PERCEPnON OF RISK, supra note 259, at 137, 141.
274. See Slovic, supra note 272, at 225; Slovic et al., supra note 273, at 141;
see also HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK 111 (1996) (discussing the
"controllability" of risk as a factor in its acceptability); Timur Kuran & Cass R.
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 708-09
(1999) ("In addition to controllability, ordinary people pay special attention to risks that
are potentially catastrophic, likely to affect future generations, inequitably distributed, or
involuntarily incurred.").
275. See Slovic, supra note 272, at 225-26; Slovic et al., supra note 273, at
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terrorist attack, for example, involves a "dreaded" risk because it is
potentially catastrophic, we lack control over terrorists, and we do not
voluntarily become terrorist victims. Such an attack might also
represent an "unknown" risk if it involved chemical weapons. The
average person lacks knowledge of such weapons, their effects aren't
immediately observable, and the possibility of their use outside of war is
reasonably new to us.
Slovic's taxonomy has significant implications for risk assessment.
As risks become increasingly dreaded and unknown, people demand that
regulators do something about them regardless of the probability of their
occurrence, the costs of avoiding the risk, and the benefits of declining
to avoid the risk.276 Other research shows that, when intense emotion
such as fear is involved, individuals tend to overestimate the likelihood
of an event's occurrence2' or ignore the probability that an event will
occur, and instead focus on the possible harm from the outcome.278 As a
result of these findings, we know the perceived magnitude of the
threatened harm can affect our assessment of its probability and our
desire for preventive action. When individuals perceive the possibility
of a highly dreaded or unknown event occurring, they may overestimate
the likelihood of this event or ignore the low likelihood of the event and
demand action to prevent it.
Two additional psychological phenomena are relevant to
understanding skewed risk assessment. The "confirmation trap" bias
may exacerbate already skewed assessments. When people make
tentative decisions, they tend to seek confirmatory evidence to the
exclusion of disconfirming evidence when finalizing that decision. 9 If
one is predisposed to believe that a risk is likely to occur, she will often
seek out confirmatory evidence that solidifies her assessment. Falling
into this trap can significantly skew risk assessment due to failure to
consider relevant contradictory evidence suggesting that the risk is less
probable than believed. The "overconfidence" bias may similarly
exacerbate skewed risk assessment. Researchers have noted that
276. Slovic et al., supra note 273, at 152; see also MARGOLIS, supra note 274,
at 171-72; Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1027, 1028-29 (1990).
277. Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. 146, 146-47 (2001).
278. George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267,
276-78 (2001); see also Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses,
and Electric Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 188
(2001).
279. BAZERMAN, supra note 266, at 35. See generally Dieter Frey, Recent
Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 41 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986). For example, when hiring an
employee who seems highly desirable, employers may seek out evidence confirming that
employee's competence while never asking questions about possible problems.
162
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"people tend to be overconfident of their judgments, particularly when
accurate judgments are difficult to make."' Such overconfidence is a
"particularly potent [problem] when individuals possess some
expertise."2 ' Thus, the overconfidence bias may have particular
ramifications for policymakers responding to perceived crises,
exacerbating problems resulting from already skewed assessments or
failure to attend to countervailing evidence. 2u
2. THREAT PERCEPTION AND INTERGROUP CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF
STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE
Intolerance may also be a result of prejudice, defined here as:
"a prejudgment or a preconception reached before the
relevant information has been collected or examined and
therefore based on inadequate or even imaginary
evidence . . . [that] involves an attitude for or against [a
person or object and] a readiness to express in action the
judgments and feelings which we experience, to behave
in a manner which reflects our acceptance or rejection
of others." 3
Prejudice frequently results from faulty threat perception regarding a
particular group. This form of threat perception differs from that
involved with risk assessment because, rather than focus on the
probability or catastrophic nature of an event, it centers on the nature of
the group itself.
According to psychological research, "[t]he fundamental
prerequisite for prejudice... is the division of human society into
280. ScoTT PLous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 219
(1993). Research shows that subjects estimating that they were between 65% and 70%
confident in the correctness of their answers to a survey were actually correct only about
50% of the time. Sarah Lichtenstein & Baruch Fischhoff, Do Those Whzo Know More
Also Know More About How Much They Know?, 20 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 159, 164-65 (1977); see also PLous, supra, at 219.
281. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism,
97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1165, 1172-73 (2003); see also Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The
Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITvE PSYCHOL.
411, 412 (1992).
282. See Rachlinski, supra note 281, at 1173, 1196.
283. HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 131 (1981) (quoted source omitted); see also RUPERT BROWN,
PREJUDICE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 8 (1995) (defining prejudice as "the holding of
derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect, or the
display of hostile or discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group on account of
their membership of that group") (emphasis omitted).
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groups or social categories."' Professor Gordon Allport noted as early
as 1954 that we categorize objects in order to simplify our existence. 21 5
While such categories are often based on rational assessments of
category objects, he further concluded that categorization is subject to
generalizations that "oversimplify" our experience, leading to irrational
beliefs about categorized objects.' Categorization thus produces an
"us" and "them" mentality that Allport believed was a necessary
precursor to prejudice.' Professor Henri Tajfel and his colleagues
subsequently found that the simple act of categorization significantly
affected intergroup relations: "the mere perception of belonging to two
distinct groups. . . [was] sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination
favoring the in-group" as opposed to the out-group. 8 Several cognitive
processes resulting from categorization apparently lead to this in-group
bias.
First, members enhance the differences among their groups,
coming to believe that their in-group was far different from the out-
group.' Second, even if categorization occurs randomly, group
members assume that members of their own group are similar to
themselves and that members of the out-group are similar to each
284. John Duckitt, Prejudice and Intergroup Hostility, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 559, 559 (David 0. Sears et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY]. Psychologists originally conceived of prejudice as an
individual personality trait, arguing that prejudiced persons had "personalities
render[ing] them susceptible to those racist or fascist ideas prevalent in a society at a
given time." BROWN, supra note 283, at 19. T.W. Adorno and his colleagues posited
the most famous of these approaches, claiming that prejudiced persons suffered from
"authoritarian personality syndrome." T.W. ADORNO Er AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN
PERSONALITY (1950). While a relationship between prejudice and individual personality
is still accepted, recent thinking conceives prejudice as being not so much an individual
phenomenon, but an intergroup phenomenon. For a discussion of the possible
relationship between individual and intergroup explanations of prejudice, see Duckitt,
supra, at 589-92.
285. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 20-21 (25th
Anniversary ed. 1979) (1954). Such categories, Professor Gordon Allport claimed, are
"an accessible cluster of associated ideas which as a whole has the property of guiding
daily adjustments." Id. at 171; see also David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier,
Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of the Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 127, 128-29 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner
eds., 1986) ("[W]e categorize individuals into groups as a means of reducing the amount
of information we must contend with. .. ")
286. See ALLPORT, supra note 285, at 27.
287. See id. at 175-76.
288. Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33, 38 (William G. Austin & Stephen
Worchel eds., 1979); see also Henri Tajfel, Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations,
33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 21 (1982) [hereinafter Tajfel, Intergroup Relations].
289. Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 1. Soc. ISSUES, Autumn 1969,
at 79, 81-83 (1969). For a general discussion of psychologists' work in this area, see
JOHN DUCKITr, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 59, 81-84 (1992).
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other. 29°  Third, the out-group is perceived to be especially
homogeneous. 29' Fourth, in-group members rate out-group members
"as more extreme on various psychological characteristics than members
of the ingroup."29  Fifth, in-group members tend to have "favorable
expectations" of the in-group and "unfavorable expectations" of the out-
group, which leads to memory biases allowing in-group members more
readily to retrieve negative information about the out-group.293 Finally,
researchers found that in-group members attribute positive behaviors of
other in-group members to internal factors, such as the nature or essence
of the person (that is, she's very smart) while attributing similar
behavior of out-group members to external, situational factors (that is,
he's lucky to have found a job he is good at).2' Attributions are
switched for negative behaviors, with negative out-group behaviors
attributed to internal dispositional factors and similar in-group behaviors
attributed to situational factors.295
These cognitive processes can lead the in-group to hold negative
stereotypes about out-groups-that is, "generalized expectancies about
categories or groups that bias the perception of and behavior to
individual members of those groups. "2 As we enhance differences
between ourselves and other groups, we increasingly believe that out-
group members are "all alike." We further tend to view the
psychological characteristics of this monolithic unit as far more extreme
than our own, a situation exacerbated by (1) the relative ease with which
we remember negative aspects of out-group behavior and (2) our
tendency to attribute those negative behaviors to the very essence of out-
group members' being rather than other factors.
290. Vernon L. Allen & David A. Wilder, Group Categorization and
Attribution of Belief Similarity, 10 SMALL GROUP BEHAV. 73, 79 (1979); Tajfel,
Intergroup Relations, supra note 288, at 23; David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a
Group: Effects on Attributions of Causality and Beliefs, 41 Soc. PSYCHOL. 13, 21
(1978).
291. Edward E. Jones et al., Perceived Variability of Personal Characteristics in
In-Groups and Out-Groups: The Role of Knowledge and Evaluation, 7 PERSONALrrY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 523, 527 (1981); Patricia W. Linville et al., Stereotyping and
Perceived Distributions of Social Characteristics: An Application to Ingroup-Outgroup
Perception, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 285, at 165, 167.
292. Hamilton & Trolier, supra note 285, at 131.
293. Id. at 132.
294. See, e.g., Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending
Allport's Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 461
(1979).
295. Id.
296. Duckitt, supra note 284, at 562; see also Tajfel, Intergroup Relations,
supra note 288, at 3 (defining stereotype as the "over-simplified mental image
of ... some category of person, institution or event which is shared, in essential
features, by large numbers of people") (internal quotations omitted).
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Research shows that substantial discrimination favoring the in-
group results from categorization and stereotypes. 29' Such
discrimination does not, however, necessarily amount to hostility toward
or derogation of an out-group-the core aspect of prejudice.298
Categorization and negative stereotypes resulting in prejudice require
other conditions to be present. Specifically, "intergroup threat, or at
least the perception of intergroup threat, is a powerful determinant of
intergroup prejudice and hostility. "299
Researchers have identified multiple, potential causes of perceived
threat resulting in prejudice toward out-group members. First,
according to social identity theory, prejudice may result from perceived
threats to in-group member's social identity-that is, those aspects of an
"individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to which
he perceives himself as belonging."' People generally seek to maintain
a positive social identity." When perceived threats to social identity
become significant enough, they result in in-group hostility toward the
out-group.' For example, belief that an out-group has disparaged an
in-group's status or accomplishments has aroused prejudice and hostile
feelings in the in-group." Other research shows that affronts to
national pride, prestige, and status of identified groups can also arouse
hostility.
Second, symbolic threats-that is, threats that "arise from
intergroup differences in basic values, norms, and beliefs that seem to
undermine or challenge a group's worldview"-may trigger prejudice. 5
According to terror management theory, humans develop a "cultural
anxiety buffer" to protect themselves from the anxiety or terror
associated with knowledge of their own mortality. 3°6 "The conception of
297. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
298. In-group bias could simply result in favorable treatment of the in-group.
For a discussion of the difference between in-group bias and out-group hostility, see
Marilynn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 253, at 554, 559.
299. Duckitt, supra note 284, at 585.
300. Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup
Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 16 (Stephen Worchel &
William G. Austin eds., 2d ed. 1986).
301. Id.; see also BROWN, supra note 283, at 170; DUCKrIT, supra note 289, at
84.
302. See BROWN, supra note 283, at 174-76.
303. See id.
304. Duckitt, supra note 284, at 586; Leonie Huddy, Group Identity and
Political Cohesion, in POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 284, at 511, 531-32.
305. Duckitt, supra note 284, at 585.
306. Sheldon Solomon et al., A Terror Management Theory of Social Behavior:
The Psychological Functions of Self-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews, in 24 ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 93, 101 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1991).
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reality espoused by [a] given culture"( and supported by various
cultural rituals and social interactions," this buffer protects against
anxiety by providing a context in which people perceive themselves as
"valuable participant[s] in a meaningful world."' Because each
individual's cultural anxiety buffer is fragile,31° people tend to respond
negatively to those who threaten their cultural worldview.3 ' This is
especially true when a person's worldview is threatened by others who
violate cultural norms, people who hold discrepant ideas, and people
who are dissimilar." 2 Other research confirms that dissimilarity in
beliefs, values, and culture may cause prejudice toward out-groups. 3
Ultimately, one's perception that a group poses a threat to her
values or way of life can result in substantial hostility and discrimination
against that group. The threat posed by such a group need not be real.
In fact, such perceptions may be vastly exaggerated as a result of
cognitive mechanisms similar to those that give rise to negative
stereotypes. Psychologists Joel Cooper and Russell Fazio found that,
under conditions of group conflict, "people invent the most outrageous
logic to convince themselves of the evil inherent in the out-group
member."" 4 Such faulty logic apparently occurs through a series of
attribution errors that bias an otherwise rational process of threat
perception. Specifically, the more that an out-group's behavior
interferes with an in-group member's values, the more likely an in-
group member is to assume that the out-group member intends to
interfere with the in-group's goals (as opposed to simply promoting the
307. Abram Rosenblatt et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory: L The
Effects of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural
Values, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 681, 681 (1989).
308. Jeff Greenberg et al., Evidence for Terror Management Theory II: The
Effects of Mortality Salience on Reactions to Those Who Threaten or Bolster the Cultural
Worldview, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 308, 309 (1990).
309. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 307, at 681.
310. Id. at 688; Solomon et al., supra note 306, at 105.
311. Rosenblatt et al., supra note 307, at 682, 688.
312. See Greenberg et al., supra note 308, at 313-17; Rosenblatt et al., supra
note 308, at 682-89; Solomon et al., supra note 306, at 125-33.
313. DUCKrrr, supra note 289, at 77-81. See generally MARILYNN B. BREWER
& DONALD T. CAMPBELL, ETHNOCENTRISM AND INTERGROUP ATTITUDES: EAST AFRICAN
EVIDENCE (1976); ROBERT A. LEVINE & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, ETHNOCENTRISM:
THEORIES OF CONFLICT, ETHNIC ATrITuDES, AND GROUP BEHAVIOR (1972); Milton
Rokeach et al., Two Kinds of Prejudice or One?, in MILTON ROKEACH, THE OPEN AND
CLOSED MIND: INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE NATURE OF BELIEF SYSTEMS AND PERSONALITY
SYSTEMS 132 (1960).
314. Joel Cooper & Russell H. Fazio, The Formation and Persistence of
Attitudes that Support Intergroup Conflict, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS,
supra note 288, at 183, 184.
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out-group's goals).3 1 This attribution of intent to injure the in-group
thus results in
an evaluation of out-group members that is more negative than
a dispassionate inference process would predict and one that is
held with an extreme degree of certainty. A simplistic
correspondent inference about the evil nature of the out-group
members is made. Negatively valued dispositions are ascribed
to the members of the goal-discordant group, and negative
attitudes toward them are formed.1 6
In this sense, the perception of a group as threatening may take on some
of the characteristics of Slovic's "dreaded" risks, with individuals
coming to rate the group's threat to their way of life as potentially
dreaded and unknown.
3. THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL DYNAMICS
Threat perception does not occur in a vacuum. Personal, historical,
and political factors may influence it." 7 Additionally, threat perception
is as much a social as it is an individual phenomenon. As Professors
Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein explain: "people consult each other;
they learn from each other; they influence one another's values; they
defer to each other; they share sources of public information; they try to
mold each other's beliefs and values; and their social interactions shape
their knowledge, perceptions, and interpretations. 31 Any discussion of
the psychological biases associated with threat perception thus must
account for potential social influences upon decision-making. Such
influences, generally termed "availability cascades," take two forms-
informational and reputational.
Because it is costly to gather information, many perceptions are
arrived at via indirect information from others." 9 Thus, "[m]ost of us
think and fear what we do because of what we think other people think
and fear."' For example, if one person in a group believes strongly
that an event will occur or that a particular group is noxious, that belief
315. Id. at 186.
316. Id.
317. See, e.g., Tajfel, Intergroup Relations, supra note 288, at 22 (noting that
our impressions of others "are generated in their social and historical contexts and then
transmitted to individual members of groups and widely shared through a variety of
channels of social influence").
318. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 274, at 710.
319. Id. at 717.
320. Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1119, 1132-33
(2002) (reviewing PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 259).
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may influence others in the group who are less sure or who simply trust
that individual's judgment. This phenomenon, known as an
"informational cascade," may significantly skew threat perception on a
large scale. If the initial source has overestimated the probability of an
event due to its availability or because the event is highly dreaded, the
exaggerated belief can cascade through society becoming widespread
and self-reinforcing. 2' Similarly, an individual's strongly held belief
that a group threatens her values may trickle down to others who trust
her judgment, especially if it is highly publicized.
Social dynamics can influence threat perception in another way.
Most people care about the ways others view them." Such concern for
what others think may affect an individual's beliefs with respect to the
likelihood of a particular risk or noxiousness of a particular group. For
example, an individual member of a social group may not believe in the
dangerousness of another group, but because other members do, the
individual expresses a view consistent with the group out of concern for
her reputation.' This phenomenon, called a "reputational cascade,"
can affect public threat perception by pressuring individuals to
reconsider their public expression of views based upon what they
consider to be "the dominant view within ... society."32 As with
informational cascades, such events can become self-reinforcing. As
individuals self-censor the expression of inconsistent viewpoints, society
may come to hold the dominant view even more strongly.
Informational and reputational cascades need not occur in any
particular situation. Rather, they often occur because an individual or
group instigates them. Such persons, whom Kuran and Sunstein deem
"[alvailability entrepreneurs," often have a political or ideological stake
in policy control3 and are adept at attracting media coverage and
understanding issues around which their intended audience might
rally. 3' Availability entrepreneurs thus attempt "to shape ... pressures
in order to mold public discourse and control the policy selection
process."3 Once availability entrepreneurs have triggered cascades,
321. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 274, at 685; see also Roger E.
Kasperson, The Social Amplification of Risk. A Conceptual Framework, in PERCEPTION
OF RISK, supra note 259, at 232.
322. Sunstein, supra note 320, at 1133.
323. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 274, at 727-29.
324. Id. at 729.
325. Id. at 727; see also Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation
Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 627 (1998).
326. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 274, at 713, 733-35.
327. Id. at 727; see also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages,
Change and the Politics of Ideas: Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 Wis. L. REv.
71, 76 (noting with respect to public policy agenda-setting, that "'groups, individuals,
and government agencies deliberately and consciously design portrayals so as to promote
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the media often exacerbates them by focusing on dramatic stories likely
to attract attention-for example, stories involving vivid or compelling
threats3"-and reporting them with little or no investigation of their
basis in fact.329
Informational and reputational cascades can occur on a variety of
levels-personal, institutional, local, state, and national. Thus, a
cascade may cause a particular fear to grip the nation or it may be
localized within a group of people, such as a community or
organization. Furthermore, when such cascades occur, they necessarily
result in commensurate "unavailability cascade[s] that progressively
freeal public discourse of voices out of tune with the evolving chorus,"
making it "increasingly difficult for people with stated or unstated
reservations about the developing public consensus to retain their
misgivings."" 3  Such cascades are often closely related to the
phenomenon psychologists call "pluralistic ignorance," where
individuals incorrectly perceive that the attitudes of others are different
from their own, causing them to alter their behavior or stated beliefs to
more closely approximate the erroneously perceived norm.33" '
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND POLICY
The psychological findings above have significant implications for
law and policy regarding particular groups. To the extent that
individuals perceive a group as threatening due to ostensible risks
associated with it, we know that substantial errors in risk assessment
occur in particular circumstances. Individuals are generally likely to
overestimate the probability of an event's occurrence if it is especially
familiar or salient. The potentially catastrophic nature of the threat can
further exacerbate the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of an
event. Social influences often reinforce this skewed risk assessment
through the phenomena of informational and reputational cascades,
their favored course of action'") (quoting DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND
POLITICAL REASON 106 (1988)).
328. See, e.g., Neal R. Feigenson & Daniel S. Bailis, Air Bag Safety: Media
Coverage, Popular Conceptions, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 444,
447 (2001) (discussing research on media "melodramatiz[ationJ" of accident reporting);
Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, News Media Reporting on Civil
Litigation and Its Influence on Civil Justice Decision Making, 27 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
5, 9-10 (2003) (discussing research on media bias for reporting news that "capture[s]
news consumers' attention").
329. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 274, at 735-36.
330. Id. at 730 (emphasis omitted).
331. See Dale T. Miller & Deborah A. Prentice, Collective Errors and Errors
About the Collective, 20 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 541, 541, 547 (1994).
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which can cause widespread, though erroneous, beliefs regarding the
likelihood of an event.
As people come to be excessively "fearful of statistically small
risks," they demand that the government act to prevent that risk
regardless of the costs of regulation and potential harm caused by
regulating the risk.332 Government regulators are likely to respond
positively to these demands. "Public officials, no less than ordinary
people, are prone to use the availability heuristic," and thus skewed risk
assessment.333 Furthermore, reputational pressures often operate on
government officials, especially elected ones, who tend to respond to
small probability risks with legislative and regulatory measures. 3"
Finally, to the extent that judges and juries engage in risk assessment
during their deliberations, they too may overestimate the probability of
threatened harms.33 Much research shows that juries use heuristics that
may result in biased risk assessments.336 Judges, too, are subject to
these same biases.337 Thus, at all stages of regulation, actors may
overreact to certain risks, allowing significant, but potentially
unwarranted, regulation of them. When the alleged risk arises from the
exercise of one's expressive rights, excessive regulation can, quite
obviously, lead to unreasonable suppression of speech.
While hostile and prejudicial attitudes toward a group can also
cascade through society, whether those beliefs necessarily translate into
discriminatory laws and policy is unclear.338 However, research shows
that, when societies or groups of people historically have engaged in
discriminatory behavior, "a relationship with prejudice appears to have
emerged fairly consistently. " "' Because this Article is an historical
study of established behavior toward the CPUSA, it assumes a link
between beliefs about that group and behavior toward them.
Research by political scientists and political psychologists,
especially in the area of civil liberties, supports this assumption. Studies
show that "[t]he majority tends to react strongly against abhorrent
332. See MARGOLIS, supra note 274, at 174-75; Slovic et al., supra note 273, at
152; Sunstein, supra note 320, at 1127.
333. Sunstein, supra note 320, at 1127; see also Kuran & Sunstein, supra note
274, at 691-703.
334. See Sunstein, supra note 320, at 1127.
335. See id.
336. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
777, 780-81 & nn. 12-16 (2001) (citing individual studies). See generally Robert J.
MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046 (1989);
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and
Implications for Reform, 50 BuFF. L. REv. 103 (2002); Neil Vidmar, The Performance
of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 849 (1998).
337. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 336, at 781-82.
338. See DucKrrr, supra note 289, at 30-39 (surveying various studies).
339. Id. at 31.
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outgroups whenever they challenge the fundamental consensus of the
American pluralist system.' Much of the way this reaction occurs is
consistent with notions of prejudice discussed above. Specifically,
people tend to respond negatively to groups they perceive as threatening
and noxious because they have violated cultural norms." As the
majority comes to fear such groups, their tolerance of them decreases." 2
Even political elites, such as legislators, executive officials, and judges,
show increased intolerance when they perceive a group to "pose[ a
serious threat to democracy itself." 343 Further, the more a person
intensely dislikes a noxious group, the more likely they are to take
action against them." Such actions can include, and historically have
included, derogation of their civil rights. 5
B. Grounding History in Psychology
Available evidence suggests that Americans' intolerance of the
CPUSA may have resulted from the psychological phenomena described
above. It is unclear which phenomenon led to such intolerance. In fact,
both could have operated simultaneously, possibly reinforcing one
another. For example, an individual's dislike of a group may "condition
the probabilities that they place on a possible consequence: 'I dislike
communists; therefore, there is a strong likelihood that their actions will
lead to something undesirable.'"' Although a relationship between the
two phenomena is quite likely, for ease of reference, this Part discusses
each one separately.
1. THREAT PERCEPTION AND RISK ASSESSMENT
Americans' belief that the CPUSA posed a real and substantial
threat to national security could have resulted from the operation of the
340. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 257, at 7.
341. Id. at 60.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 122.
344. Id. at 199.
345. See id. at 8; see also Donald R. Kinder & David 0. Sears, Prejudice and
Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 414, 429 (1981) (discussing a study of racial attitudes, which found "that
the white public's political response to racial issues [was] based on moral and symbolic
challenges to the racial status quo in society generally").
346. Kuklinski et al., supra note 254, at 5. As noted above, the CPUSA's
potential threat to American values, which the social identity and terror management
theories posit as leading to prejudicial attitudes, could have also functioned as a
"dreaded" threat in Professor Paul Slovic's risk taxonomy, leading Americans to
overestimate the likelihood that CPUSA members engaged in illegal activities. See
supra notes 305-16 and accompanying text.
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heuristics and biases discussed above. During the relevant period, the
popular image of the CPUSA was highly available. Thanks to the
actions of availability entrepreneurs such as Dies, Hoover, and later,
McCarthy, there was widespread, negative publicity regarding the
organization's hostile intent and threatening nature. 7 Such men painted
lurid images of potential traitors, the vivid nature of which must have
stayed with the public, especially given the media coverage of various
congressional hearings and government officials' speeches."S
Media coverage of the Dennis trial similarly reinforced this
negative image, as evidenced by President Truman's widely publicized
description of the defendants as traitors.' 9  Combined with publicity
about other contemporaneous events, such as espionage allegations
regarding communists within the United States and Canada and reports
of communist aggression and violence, the popular image of the CPUSA
would have been particularly potent.35°  Attempts to personalize the
threat by characterizing one's neighbors or friends as potential spies and
saboteurs-the "they are everywhere" mentality-would have further
increased the popular image's salience.35 ' Accordingly, the availability
heuristic could have resulted in overestimation of the likelihood that the
CPUSA was planning to overthrow the government.
The popular image of the CPUSA also supports the conclusion that
Americans saw the organization as an agent of a potentially calamitous
event-that is, a dreaded and unknown risk under Slovic's taxonomy.
Specifically, by the time of the Dennis trial, Americans viewed the
CPUSA as conspiring with Russia to overthrow the U.S. government
and create a "'Soviet of the United States.'" 3 2 Americans thus
perceived themselves to be fighting for the very existence of their
country and maintenance of their way of life. One government official
expressed this sentiment, noting that communism is "'a far greater threat
to our existence than any other threat,'" and "if the United States 'does
not successfully cope with the Communist threat, then it need not worry
about any other threat to the internal security of this nation, because it is
not impossible that there will be no nation.' "3 3 Another claimed that
347. See supra notes 42, 57, and 97-106 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 57, 98, and 104 and accompanying text.
349. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 183, at 14, reprinted in 47
LANDMARK BRIEFs, supra note 66, at 21. Clark made similar statements in an August
1949 article published in Look magazine. Id.
350. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
352. SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 114 (quoting from an excerpt of Hoover's
March 26, 1947 testimony before HUAC).
353. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 48 (quoting a former FBI official).
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each domestic communist "'carrie[d] in himself the germ of death for
our society.'""54
Such a threat ranks high on Slovic's scale of "dreaded" threats,
which include those that are catastrophic, involuntary, and outside of an
individual's control. 355 Americans would have perceived loss of their
way of life as catastrophic given that it involves curtailed freedom and
enforced cultural regimes antithetical to most Americans. Such a threat
is also involuntary and beyond individual control. During this period,
Americans perceived themselves to be defending against Soviet and ergo
CPUSA aggression.356 That fact alone suggests that the threat was
involuntary-people rarely defend themselves against voluntary
threats.35 7 Furthermore, the perception that CPUSA members were the
secretive agents of a foreign country emphasized Americans' lack of
control over the threat. Legislation, such as the Smith Act and Internal
Security Act, which claimed that the "world Communist movement" had
"devised clever and ruthless espionage and sabotage tactics" that evaded
existing law and necessitated new legislation, reinforced that
perception.358
Loss of America's democratic way of life similarly qualifies as an
"unknown" risk-that is, one that is new, unobservable, not having
immediate effects, and not easily understood. 359  The perceived threat
posed by the CPUSA was somewhat new: following a period of
increased toleration of domestic communists during the United States'
World War II alliance with the Soviet Union,36 Americans' hostility
toward them again increased. One can also characterize the perceived
threat posed by domestic communists as latent and unobservable. The
characterization of the CPUSA as consisting of secretive agents of a
foreign country fits well within the classification of an unobservable
threat. Furthermore, because they were allegedly to act when the time
was appropriate, the threat was latent and liable to occur unexpectedly.
Finally, Americans would have had difficulty understanding the threat
posed by domestic groups because they were, by definition, "un-
American. "36' That few people ever knew "an admitted Communist"
354. Id. at 144 (quoting U.S. Attorney General James McGrath).
355. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
356. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 155.
357. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
358. § 2, 64 Stat. at 987-89; see also 54 Stat. 670.
359. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
360. See Wiecek, supra note 20, at 403.
361. For example, the committee primarily responsible for investigating
communism was known as the House Un-American Activities Committee. Frank
Donner noted that terms like "un-American" were a product of Americans' "early
search for positive communal values and self-definition with which to confront
Bolshevism." FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS
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also emphasized their mysteriousness.362 In light of the perceived
magnitude of the threat according to Slovic's threat taxonomy,
Americans' demands for action against domestic groups is unsurprising.
The egocentric and confirmation trap biases may have also
exacerbated Americans' already skewed risk assessment. Those
individuals and organizations acting as availability entrepreneurs often
had little concrete evidence to support their claims. Even the Dennis
proceedings, which were based on "the most complete summary of the
activities and aims of American communism ever assembled,"
363
revealed little evidence of concrete, illegal activities. Nevertheless,
anticommunists "understood" -that such activities were afoot.' The
willingness to act on such hunches is consistent with the overconfidence
bias. Furthermore, anticommunists often turned evidence potentially
contradicting their claims to their advantage, suggesting that the
confirmation trap bias might have operated. 365  Hoover, for example,
faced with the fact that the ranks of domestic communists were rapidly
dwindling, claimed that their size was misleading, as there existed many
more "secret" Communist Party members. 3' Even as late as 1958,
when the CPUSA was decimated, the chairman of HUAC claimed that it
was "'a greater menace than ever before. It has long since divested
itself of unreliable elements. Those who remain are the hard-core
disciplined agents of the Kremlin on American soil.' "
367
2. THREAT PERCEPTION, INTERGROUP CONFLICT, AND PREJUDICE
There is also evidence to support the conclusion that prejudice
resulting from intergroup conflict produced widespread intolerance of
OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 15 n.t (Vintage Books 1981) (1980).
Thus, the CPUSA was by definition "un-American" and incapable of being understood
by Americans.
362. In his seminal survey on communism, Samuel Stouffer found that only 3%
of those surveyed knew an "admitted communist." STOUFFER, supra note 122, at 175.
He concluded that this lack of familiarity created a sense of "mystery about the secret
ways of Communists which ... sharpen[ed] the audience interest in news or tales about
them and also ... free[d] the imagination to see dangers without limit." Id.
363. See supra note 166-68 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
365. The confirmation trap and overconfidence biases are closely related in that
"overconfidence derives in part from the tendency to neglect contradicting evidence."
Asher Koriat et al., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 113 (1980). It is thus no surprise that anticommunists such
as Hoover, a man totally convinced that his view was correct, neglected contradictory
evidence.
366. SCHRECKER, supra note 22, at 114-20 (quoting from an excerpt of
Hoover's March 26, 1947 testimony before HUAC).
367. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 144 (quoting HUAC chairman Francis
Walters).
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domestic communists. Certainly, the prerequisite of categorization
existed. The fact that communists adhered to a political philosophy
quite different from that of most Americans probably sufficed to
facilitate such categorization. The anticommunist campaign further
solidified an "us versus them" mentality, as evidenced by its use of the
"un-American" label to describe communism and its adherents.
Communists were not just different, they were the opposite of normal
Americans.
With that categorization in place, one can surmise that cognitive
mechanisms facilitated negative stereotypes about the CPUSA. The
vision of communists as un-American suggests enhancement of group
differences consistent with the formation of stereotypes. Indeed, some
portrayals of domestic communists created an even wider gulf,
suggesting that they were more than simply different; rather, they were
inhuman.368 Thus, some people referred to communism as a disease that
could potentially kill American society,369 while others described
communists as "almost a separate species of mankind." 370 In an effort
to push communists further from "normal humans," many also tried to
link communism to homosexuality."
The widely held belief that communists were loyal automatons
serving the Soviet Union is further consistent with individuals'
tendencies to see out-group members as especially homogeneous.
Robots, which are not imbued with the freedom of thought bestowed
upon humans, are all alike. The perception of mindless loyalty also
suggests that Americans ranked communists as more extreme on various
psychological characteristics than themselves. While Americans viewed
their own loyalty to the United States as patriotic, they perceived
communists' loyalty to the Soviet Union as verging on the psychotic.
McCarthy, for example, spoke for many when he claimed that
"'practically every active Communist is twisted mentally or physically
in some way.' " 3  Polls taken during the 1940s further show that the
majority of respondents believed that the CPUSA was composed of
"[m]ostly bad or misguided people. " 3  People also apparently
attributed negative behaviors of CPUSA members to dispositional rather
368. See Wiecek, supra note 20, at 428-29.
369. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 144.
370. Hubert Kay, The Career of Gerhart Eisler as a Comintern Agent, LIFE,
Feb. 17, 1947, at 99, 99.
371. SABIN, supra note 16, at 58.
372. DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE: THE WORLD OF JOE
MCCARTHY 113 (1983) (quoting McCarthy).
373. PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1946, supra note 118, at 130; see also NAT'L
OPINION RESEARCH CTR., supra note 122 (showing that 38% of those responding to a
poll believed that people were communists because they were frustrated, dissatisfied, or
unhappy).
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than situational factors. For example, they attributed the CPUSA's
secretive actions to the group's conspiratorial nature rather than to the
operation of government repression.374
It is unsurprising, then, that Americans would readily have been
able to retrieve and rely upon a wholly negative image of the CPUSA
despite the positive works of the party.375 The perceived threat to
society's values posed by the CPUSA could easily have turned this
negative stereotype into hostility and prejudice. Americans could have
perceived the CPUSA as a threat to their social identity, resulting from
communists' disparagement of America's status and accomplishments.
After all, far from taking pride in American capitalism and ingenuity,
many aspects of communism derided them. Similarly, domestic
communists' who admitted loyalty to the Soviet Union could have been
seen as an affront to national pride, especially in light of the hostility
between the two countries during much of the relevant period.
Americans also apparently viewed the CPUSA as posing a symbolic
threat-that is, a threat to Americans' basic values and beliefs. The fact
that many saw communists as "un-American" suggests that people were
hostile because of differences in the groups' cultural and political values.
Contemporary surveys support this conclusion. Some polls reflect a
widespread belief that communists wanted to destroy valuable American
institutions, like the Christian religion.376 Others reveal that Americans
tended to suspect others of communism because they violated social
norms. Thus, they attributed their suspicion to such things as:
"[He] [w]ould not attend church and talked against God...."
"[He] [d]idn't believe in the Bible and talked about war."
He was not like us."
"He brought a lot of foreign-looking people into his home."
"He's against almost everything done in the United
States .... "
374. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
375. In addition to their fight against fascism, see supra note 24, domestic
communists were active in civil rights movements, SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 389-
90.
376. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 75 (noting that the CPUSA's "materialism
and hostility to organized religion antagonized God-fearing citizens of every faith"); The
Quarter's Polls, supra note 123, at 643 (showing results of a poll indicating that 72% of
the respondents believed that communists wanted to eradicate Christianity); see also
Fourth 1949 Quarter's Polls, supra note 125, at 712 (showing that 77% of respondents
believed that an individual could not simultaneously be a good Christian and a good
CPUSA member).
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... [He] [w]anted to be a leader but not interested in
money."
". He was always playing Russian music," or "He used to
have the lights burning at two o'clock in the morning. ""
Such bases for suspicions of communism suggest that the perceived
threat posed by domestic communists stemmed, at least in part, from
their different cultural characteristics and political beliefs.
Given the clash between American culture and communist values,
Americans easily could have come to believe that domestic communists
did not simply differ from them but that they intended to interfere with
the American way of life, thus magnifying the threat beyond anything
supported by evidence. Such a belief would have provided the
foundation for many Americans' support of repression against the
organization.
3. SOCIAL INFLUENCES AND ANTICOMMUNISM
While many Americans perceived domestic communists to be a
threat, most had little concrete interaction with them,3 71 suggesting that
Americans came to hold their beliefs as a result of indirect influences-
that is, via social cascades. Powerful availability entrepreneurs plied an
anticommunist message during this period, which some scholars credit
with triggering intolerance toward communists:
[Miuch of what happened during the McCarthy era was the
result of a concerted campaign by a loosely structured, but
surprisingly self-conscious, network of political activists who
had been working for years to drive Communism out of
American life. With the onset of the Cold War, these
professional anti-Communists were able to sell their program
to the nation's governing elites, who then put it into practice.
Though most ordinary people supported what was going on,
McCarthyism was primarily a top-down phenomenon.3 79
377. STOUFFER, supra note 122, at 176-78, 185 (quoting various members of
the general public who believed that they "knew somebody who acted suspiciously
enough to make them think he might be" a communist).
378. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
379. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at xiii; see also James L. Gibson, Political
Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare, 82 AM. POL. SC.
REv. 511, 519 (1988) (noting that political elites were "the driving force in the
repression of Communists").
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As a result of these anticommunist activities, availability entrepreneurs
triggered both informational and reputational cascades.
One can see many aspects of an informational cascade in the events
leading up to the Dennis trial. The anticommunist educational campaign
and widespread media coverage of world events surely made salient the
negative images of the CPUSA, thus priming an informational cascade.
Not only would such images have been vivid and easily retrieved, the
source of information-highly placed, seemingly reliable government
officials, such as the U.S. President, U.S. Attorney General, the
director of the FBI, or well-known legislators-would have made these
negative images difficult to ignore. Leading anticommunist Hoover
aptly illustrates this fact. During the anticommunist crusade, the public
held him in extremely high esteem, to the extent of seeking his advice
on a variety of topics from child rearing to clothing styles.38
Pronouncements from a man with such a reputation were well received.
The negative images issuing from HUAC and other legislative sources
also likely influenced public opinion as such sources were generally
viewed favorably.3"'
Reputational cascades were also important during this period. The
legislative hearings, loyalty boards, and public lists of subversive
organizations that were part of the "exposure" of the evils of
communism created an intense pressure for national conformity during
the Cold War. The slightest perception that an individual sympathized
with domestic communists could result in loss of employment and
societal shunning," causing people to remain silent even if they
disagreed with the popular image of the CPUSA bandied about by
others.
Research conducted on university professors and federal employees
in the early 1950s, for example, found that many took specific
"precautions," including dropping membership subscriptions in
organizations listed as subversive, censoring themselves in conversations
on political topics, and refusing to sign petitions on political issues, in
order to avoid any activity "that might conceivably arouse anyone's
380. DONNER, supra note 361, at 80-81. Similarly, during the Dennis
proceedings, another important availability entrepreneur, McCarthy, was exceedingly
popular. Wells, supra note 78, at 16 n.76.
381. 2 GALLUP, supra note 59, at 787 (showing the results of a January 1949
poll showing that 41% of those that knew of HUAC thought that the committee should
continue its activities); id. at 924 (showing the results of a July 1950 poll showing that
41% of respondents agreed or qualifiedly agreed with McCarthy's claims that
communists were in the U.S. State Department).
382. See supra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
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suspicion and thus lead to charges and an investigation."383 Employers
sometimes advised employees to avoid questionable activities. Thus, a
U.S. Navy document counseled:
A number of our citizens unwittingly expose themselves
to unfavorable or suspicious appraisal which they can and
should avoid. This may take the form of an indiscreet remark;
an unwise selection of friends or associates; membership in an
organization whose true objectives are concealed behind a
popular and innocuous title; attendance at and participation in
the meetings and functions of such organizations even though
not an official member; or numerous other clever means
designed to attract support under false colors or serving to
impress an individual with his own importance.
It is advisable to study and seek wise and mature counsel
prior to association with persons or organizations of any
political or civic nature, no matter what their apparent motives
may be, in order to determine the true motives and purposes of
the organization....
* [We should] so conduct ourselves [so] that there
cannot be the least concern on the part of our associates as to
our adherence to the principles of this government, or as to
our reliability . . . This counsel is prompted by the
Commanding Officer's sincere interest in the continued well-
being of all employees of the activity.3"
Given the breadth of the loyalty programs and other tools of exposure,
this pressure to conform due to reputational concerns cascaded through
society, ultimately resulting in what Justice Douglas called a "[b]lack
[s]ilence of [flear," driving individuals "in all walks of life either to
silence or to the folds of the orthodox."385 Such reputational pressures
apparently fueled a self-reinforcing cascade that drowned out dissenting
voices and reinforced the popular image.
383. Marie Jahoda & Stuart W. Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of
Thought: An Explanatory Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security Programs, 61
YALE L.J. 295, 307-08, 318 (1952).
384. BROWN, supra note 109, at 191 n.8 (first and third omissions in original)
(quoting the U.S. Navy's "Suggested Counsel to Employees").
385. William 0. Douglas, The Black Silence of Fear, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan.
13, 1952, at 7, 38.
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IV. THREAT PERCEPTION IN THE DENNIS COURTS
Given the popular image of domestic communists and its effect on
Americans' threat perception, one could logically assume that it
similarly biased the legal proceedings. Jurors, after all, represent a
cross-section of society. Furthermore, despite the paradigm of judges as
neutral arbiters unaffected by outside influences, most people agree that
judges are not immune to social, political, reputational, or other
forces.3 86 Judicial proceedings, however, have a life of their own, with
evidentiary and other rules that can render the jury's and judge's
perceptions substantially different from the public's perception.
Although the popular image's pervasiveness is clearly relevant to
Dennis, one needs more than the simple assumption that it affected the
Dennis legal proceedings. This Part examines those proceedings and
concludes that they were affected by skewed threat perception.
A. The Trial Court
The Dennis jurors were initially responsible for the defendants'
convictions. Because jury deliberations are secret, there is little direct
evidence regarding their reasoning in reaching those conclusions. There
are, however, other, more indirect, indicators of such reasoning. First,
the evidence and arguments presented at trial (especially the
prosecution's) reveal the picture presented to the jury. That picture was
consistent with the popular image of domestic communists and likely
affected the jury. Second, Judge Medina's response to the defendants,
as evidenced by his conduct of the trial and later remarks about it,
suggest that he too was affected by the popular image of domestic
386. Jerome Frank noted decades ago that judicial decisions were subject to
many influences other than legal theory and doctrine. Jerome Frank, Are Judges
Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the Assumption that Judges Behave
Like Human Beings, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 40 (1931). More recently, scholars have
posited that judges are affected by such things as religion, political party affiliation,
ideology, or various psychological phenomena. For a sampling of this voluminous
literature, see generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE
(1998); C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS (1996); LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: IS
PSYCHOLOGY RELEVANT? (1999); Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal
Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251
(1997); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme
Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1437, 1492 (2001); Harry T. Edwards, The
Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003);
George, supra note 4; Guthrie et al., supra note 336; Theodore W. Ruger et al., The
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to
Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004); Gregory
C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998).
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communists. His decisions, while no substitute for those of the jurors',
likely affected them. His comments and evidentiary rulings contributed
to the jurors' view of the defendants, and would have been especially
influential coming from a person of such authority. In effect, Judge
Medina's ability to control the trial made him an availability
entrepreneur.
1. RISK ASSESSMENT
The most obvious evidence of skewed risk assessment at the trial
level begins with Judge Medina's characterization of the defendants'
alleged illegal conduct. Although the defendants were charged with
conspiracy to advocate overthrow of the government, Judge Medina's
jury charge transformed the indictment into a conspiracy to overthrow
the government, instructing the jurors that they could find the defendants
guilty if it was their "intent... to achieve ... the overthrow or
destruction of the Government of the United States by force and
violence as speedily as circumstances would permit it to be achieved."387
Judge Medina's characterization of the harm as a conspiracy to
overthrow rather than a conspiracy to advocate overthrow raised the
stakes enormously, essentially casting it as a "dreaded" threat similar to
the popular image of domestic communists.
Consistent with Slovic's research, Judge Medina's portrayal of the
CPUSA as a dreaded threat apparently led to a willingness to ignore or
overestimate the likelihood of such an event. There was no proof that
the CPUSA was planning to overthrow the government, which should
have posed a problem under the existing clear and present danger
doctrine. By reading the doctrine as requiring only a showing that the
defendants intended to carry out their plan "as speedily as circumstances
would permit it to be achieved," 3" however, Judge Medina's instruction
gutted the probability aspect of the clear and present danger test,
allowing the magnitude of the potential harm to be the deciding factor
and easing the path to conviction.
As the primary legal guidepost, Judge Medina's jury instruction
would have had an enormous influence on the jurors. His admonition
that their fact-finding role required them to apply the law as he
characterized it would have solidified that influence389 as would have his
instruction to the jurors that, as a matter of law, the defendants posed a
"sufficient danger of a substantive evil" to counter a First Amendment
387. Foster, 9 F.R.D. at 390-91.
388. Id. at 391.
389. See id. at 374 ("On these legal matters you must take the law as I give it to
you; you are not at liberty to do otherwise.").
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defense if the jurors found that the defendants violated the Smith Act.'9°
By defining the alleged harm prohibited by the Smith Act as potentially
catastrophic (per se catastrophic assuming the Smith Act was violated)
and emphasizing that no other interpretation of the statute was
appropriate, Judge Medina's instructions alone could have facilitated the
jurors' willingness to find the defendants guilty.
The evidence adduced at trial also would have facilitated the jurors'
desire to take action against the CPUSA. Although there was no
evidence that the CPUSA advocated or planned to overthrow the
government, the prosecution ensured that the popular image of the
CPUSA was a constant factor during the trial. Thus, the government
introduced evidence of Soviet worldwide aggression, argued that the
reconstitution of the CPUSA evidenced Soviet control of the CPUSA,
claimed the party's secretiveness and alleged use of Aesopian language
proved its conspiratorial nature, and argued that domestic communists'
presence in labor organizations showed they planned to use disruptive
political strikes to facilitate its goals.39 Although none of this evidence
showed an intent or plan to overthrow the government, it emphasized an
image of communists as loyal, devious disciples of a hostile, aggressive
enemy. Prosecutors effectively ensured that the popular image of the
domestic communists remained highly available to jurors, possibly
skewing their perception of the alleged threat of overthrow.
Other aspects of the trial also would have made the popular image
of domestic communists easily retrievable. On cross-examination, the
prosecution demanded that the defendants' witnesses, most of them
fellow communists, reveal the names of other alleged communists,'
92
much as HUAC and other committees did at the time. Knowing that the
witnesses would refuse to participate in such an inquisition, the
prosecution's tactics reinforced the image of communists as secretive
and devious-that is, part of a larger conspiracy.393  Although this
evidence was irrelevant to the prosecutor's case, Judge Medina allowed
most of the prosecution's questions.' 94
Judge Medina was not as generous with the defendants. Many of
his evidentiary rulings prevented the defendants from putting on
evidence opposing the prosecution's case, which allowed the
prosecution's portrayal of the defendants to dominate the trial.395 Such
one-sidedness would have affected jurors prone to overconfidence of
confirmation trap biases, solidifying in their mind the correctness of the
390. See id. at 392.
391. See supra Part II.A.
392. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 101.
393. Id. at 101-02.
394. Id.
395. See supra notes 183, 197.
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prosecution's version. Furthermore, Judge Medina made no secret of
his belief that the defendants' actions were little more than propaganda
techniques rather than legitimate defense efforts. Although true in many
cases, his public and often combative comments regarding the
defendants' disruptive tactics contrasted sharply with his willingness to
tolerate similar disruptive tactics (for example, demands for names of
other communists) by the prosecution.39  It would have required
Herculean efforts to ignore the judge's actions.
Judge Medina's characterization of the party's claims in his jury
instruction may have also facilitated the jurors' reliance on the popular
image. In summarizing the prosecution's case, he noted:
The prosecution claims that the defendants conspired
together and- with others to organize as the [CPUSA, a group]
of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow or
destruction of the Government of the United States by force
and violence and to teach and advocate the duty and necessity
of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United
States by force and violence; that defendants as part and parcel
of the conspiracy sought to mask their purposes by pretending
that they were fighting always and solely for democracy and
the interests and welfare of the workers and to bring about
salutary reforms and even socialism as a goal to be reached in
the nebulous future, all by straightforward, peaceful and
strictly lawful means, whereas in truth and in fact they
resorted to many clandestine and fraudulent devices in teaching
those subject to their influence secretly to prepare for the
coming of some crisis, such as a deep depression or a war with
the Soviet Union, to spring into action when the word of
command was given, to paralyze power houses, the
transportation system and the vast industrial machine at the
heart of our economic system and in the resultant chaos and
confusion to bring about, by violent and unlawful means, the
overthrow or destruction of the Government and the
establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The prosecution simply could not have asked for a more vivid,
compelling portrayal of its case. To be sure, Judge Medina also
396. See BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 86, 94, 101. Judge Hand noted that Judge
Medina's comments regarding the defendants included language "short of requisite
judicial gravity," but he ruled that Judge Medina's comments did not deprive the
defendants of an adequate opportunity to prepare their case. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 225.
397. Foster, 9 F.R.D. at 381-82.
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summarized the defendants' case at great length.39 But, this summary
involved more mundane pictures because it focused on the defendants'
attempts to counter claims about Marxist-Leninist theory and
characterizations of their political activity.3  Such a summary, no
matter how well-intentioned, could not compete with the compelling
description of the prosecution's case. Similarly, Judge Medina's
instruction that the jurors consider "testimony concerning secret schools,
false names, devious ways, general falsification and so on" in order to
determine whether the CPUSA was a conspiracy' practically invited
the jurors to adopt the popular image of the CPUSA. The instruction
would have been especially influential as the judge had refused to allow
the defendants to present evidence providing a different explanation of
their secretive practices."'
2. PREJUDICE
Evidence also exists to suggest that prejudice may have propelled
the verdict against the Dennis defendants. As with the general public,
there apparently existed an "us versus them" mentality throughout the
trial. The indictment itself could have created the requisite
categorization. Charging the defendants with conspiring to advocate the
overthrow of the government would have divided the defendants and the
judge-jurors into different camps-loyal versus allegedly disloyal
Americans. The prosecution's reliance on the popular image throughout
the trial could have strengthened perception of those differences and
facilitated negative stereotypes much as it did in the general populace,
eventually resulting in prejudice and a desire to take action against the
CPUSA.
The defendants' behavior likely also contributed to such prejudice.
Throughout the trial, the defendants' attorneys engaged in obstructive
tactics designed to delay the trial and pressure the judge to dismiss the
indictment. These factors included foot-dragging on juror selection,
numerous objections to the prosecution's evidence and legal arguments,
caustic pronouncements that the defendants were the victims of a
political witch hunt, and attempts to spout the Communist Party line
during trial.43 Such tactics involved them in "bitter battles" with the
398. Id. at 383-86.
399. See id.
400. Id. at 391.
401. See supra note 197.
402. BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 69-73, 78; see also SCHRECKER, supra note
26, at 196.
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judge that not only alienated many of their allies, 0 3 but likely the jurors
as well. As one historian noted:
Unable to free themselves from the party's sectarian
vocabulary, [the defendants] came across as wooden,
doctrinaire ideologues instead of as the victims of government
repression that they also were. Worse yet, the decision to use
the courtroom as a bully pulpit for preaching Marxism to the
American people played into the prosecution's hands. The
defendants inadvertently collaborated with the [DOJ's] strategy
of making the case a test of the legitimacy of the [CPUSA's]
policies .... '
Not only would the defendants' image as "wooden doctrinaire
ideologues" have facilitated negative stereotypes by making them seem
inhuman, all alike, and verging on the mentally ill, their preaching of
communist theory would have generated hostility because it reminded
the jurors of the vast differences between themselves and the defendants.
Given these facts and the conspiracy charge, one can easily imagine
how the jurors might have viewed the defendants as a threat to their
values and way of life. Certainly, neutral observers of the trial came to
such conclusions. Many newspapers interpreted the trial proceedings as
establishing that the CPUSA was a threat to American democracy. The
Los Angeles Times, for example, described the verdict as finding "that
the Communist Party is a criminal conspiracy against the United States,
run from Moscow."" 5 The Washington Post described the CPUSA as
"a tightly organized and conspiratorial agency, drawing its inspiration
and a large measure of its strength from the Soviet Union."' The New
York Times described the defendants as "secretly teaching and
advocating, on secret orders from Moscow, overthrow of the United
States Government and destruction of American democracy by force and
violence."' Reader's Digest printed an article proclaiming that the
"'unchangeable intention'" of the CPUSA "'is to destroy, by force and
violence, everything we hold dear. Let every American remember
this.' ,,408
Judge Medina's actions exacerbated any tendency to view the
defendants with hostility. His frequent clashes with the defense
403. See BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 67, 69.
404. SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 197.
405. Communism Is a Conspiracy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1949, at 4.
406. Guilty of Conspiracy, WASH. POST, OCt. 16, 1949, at 4B.
407. Russell Porter, 11 Communists Convicted of Plot; Medina to Sentence
Them Friday; 6 of Counsel Jailed in Contempt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1949, at 1.
408. SABIN, supra note 16, at 53 (quoting the August 1950 edition of Reader's
Digest).
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attorneys sorely tried his patience, resulting in numerous remarks that
indicated his growing hostility toward them. As one observer noted,
Judge Medina accused the defendants' attorneys of making "false and
unreliable" statements and "repeatedly declared that [the defendants'
attorneys] were acting in concerted agreement in an attempt to create
confusion, provoke incidents and break down his health."4 9 For
example, in one encounter in the middle of the trial, Judge Medina
remarked on one defense attorney's actions: "There was an instance
when you deliberately lied to me when they were passing these press
releases. You said that they were not and you were caught red-
handed."410 When the attorney denied he had lied to the court, Judge
Medina responded: "You did it.... I can see from your belligerent
manner if you thought you could, you might physically come up to the
bench and physically attack me. I know your manner, and it doesn't
frighten me in the slightest degree."41 Comments such as this, coming
from an individual of generally high esteem, must have affected the
jurors' view of the defendants.
409. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 15 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
Sacher involved the Dennis attorneys' appeal from summary contempt convictions and
sanctions imposed by Judge Medina immediately after the verdict. See id. at 3-5.
Judge Medina's contempt certificate confirms Justice Hugo L. Black's summary of his
views:
Before the trial had progressed very far ... I was reluctantly forced to the
conclusion that the acts and statements to which I am about to refer were the
result of an agreement between these defendants, deliberately entered into in
a cold and calculating manner, to do and say these things for the purpose of:
(1) causing such delay and confusion as to make it impossible to go on with
the trial; (2) provoking incidents which they intended would result in a
mistrial; and (3) impairing my health so that the trial could not continue.
United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 app. at 430 (2d Cir. 1950) (appendix to majority
opinion) (reprinting Judge Medina's contempt certificate).
The Supreme Court upheld the convictions in a five to three decision that reflected
the justices' deep division regarding their propriety in light of Judge Medina's personal
involvement in the case. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 11-14. An appendix to Justice Felix
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion sets forth portions of the record reflecting exchanges
between the trial judge and defense attorneys. See id. app. at 42-89 (appendix to
opinion of Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
410. Sacher, 343 U.S. app. at 80 (appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). The incident referred to involved the prosecution's accusation that an
individual involved with the defense was passing out leaflets to press representatives in
the courtroom. See id. (appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Sacher, 182
F.2d at 438-39. The attorney, Harry Sacher, denied this accusation, but Judge Medina
believed he was lying about his knowledge of this incident. Sacher, 343 U.S. app. at
80-81 (appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Second Circuit reversed
Sacher's contempt conviction on these grounds because it found there was no evidence
Sacher "attempt[ed] to mislead the court." Sacher, 182 F.2d at 424-25.
411. Sacher, 343 U.S. app. at 81 (appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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Judge Medina's own recollections of the trial confirm that he
increasingly viewed the defense attorneys and their supporters as
adversaries trying to break his will. Recounting his interaction with
supporters of the defendants, he noted:
[Tihe first thing that put me wise to what was coming was one
day I got down [to the courthouse]... and there was a
delegation waiting to see me. A delegation of workers from
some place in Ohio. And there was another delegation right
behind the first one....
I said, "Now, look here, you just can't do this. This is
America. What would you think if I let some rich man or
some political leader come in and tell me what to do with a
case?" . . . Well, my goodness, you could hardly get them
out. Each one blah, blah, blahed, each one putting in his two
cents worth, and as soon as I got them out there was another
delegation. I tell you, these delegations of workers,
delegations of veterans, delegations of purple-hearted veterans,
delegations of housewives-they came ... from everywhere-
and they were on my neck there for three or four days .... I
thought I was there representing America, and I didn't want
Americans to be doing this sort of thing .... Then for the first
time I realized the blue chips were down; that here was a force
much greater than anything I had suspected; and that they were
trying to knock me out and break up that trial.4
12
As the trial progressed, Judge Medina began to view the defendants,
their attorneys, and other supporters in an even more sinister light,
believing they willed him to commit suicide:
I guess the first thing they tried on me-remember how
Forrestal jumped out of that window in the hospital? Well,
about a month after that the pickets down in that little park in
front of the courthouse began carrying some new signs, and
they read: "Medina will fall like Forrestal." Well, that sounds
funny. But they followed it up: telephone messages, "Jump.
Jump. You've got to jump," letters, postal cards. Well, do
you know, it was the only thing that really worked on me. ...
412. JUDGE HAROLD R. MEDINA, THE ANATOMY OF FREEDOM 4-5 (C. Wailer
Barrett ed., 1959).
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I tell you, it was years before I got over what they did to
me during that period of about a month or six weeks on that
particular "jumping out the window." ... I tell you the men
who thought this up were demons. They were positively
demons. And if you remember how many times in Russian
history people have jumped out windows-you remember
Masaryk in Czechoslovakia?... I used to think they pushed
the people out the window. But they don't need to do that.
When they get working on you the way they know how to do,
you jump out by yourself-you don't need to be pushed." 3
Judge Medina's reaction to the defendants and those related to them
is consistent with the formation of prejudiced attitudes. He clearly saw
himself opposed to them-both as an American pursuing justice and
personally, with respect to his health and well-being. His comments
further suggest that he saw the defendants and those associated with
them as a nearly super human force aimed at impeding the trial and
destroying his life. This conception is consistent with the formation of
negative stereotypes (for example, exacerbation of differences and
tendency to see out-group members as homogenous and extreme) and
out-group hostility (for example, threat to American values and
attribution of hostile intent). These beliefs, often reflected in his
comments at trial, must have affected the jurors who, like many
Americans, were likely predisposed to such psychological phenomena.
B. Judge Hand and the Second Circuit Opinion
One might expect Judge Hand to have been less swayed by the
popular image of the CPUSA than Judge Medina or the Dennis jurors.
In contrast to the trial judge and jurors, Judge Hand had a position on
the court of appeals that distanced him from personal interactions with
the CPUSA that might have colored his perceptions of them.
414
413. Id. at 11-12. In another conversation, Judge Medina "explained that
whenever he looked at the spectators during the trial, he consciously forced himself to
keep his eyes moving so that he would not let himself be placed in a trance by the
hypnotists that the party might have placed in the courtroom." SCHRECKER, supra note
26, at 198 n.*.
414. As in other federal appeals, three judges heard the case. This discussion
focuses on Judge Hand because he authored the majority opinion. The other judges'
vision of the CPUSA is, however, consistent with the psychological phenomena
discussed here. Judge Thomas Swan, for example, "considered the CPUSA [to be] an
obvious 'danger to our form of government.'" BELKNAP, supra note 11, at 126 (quoted
source omitted). Judge Chase also apparently had "no doubts at all about the propriety
of the necessary rulings." Id.
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Furthermore, he was an avowed critic of McCarthyism, believing it to
be an "[ifnquisition, detecting heresy wherever non-conformity
appears."4"5 Nevertheless, the popular image appears to have captured
his thinking, eventually coloring his perception of the defendants and
their conduct.
This is most obviously true with respect to skewed risk assessment.
Like Judge Medina, the Dennis jurors, and much of the rest of the
country, Hand apparently embraced the view of the CPUSA as a
"dreaded" threat. Accepting the prosecution's version of the
evidence,4 6 Judge Hand characterized the CPUSA as
a highly articulated, well contrived, far spread organization,
numbering thousands of adherents, rigidly and ruthlessly
disciplined, many of whom are infused with a passionate
Utopian faith that is to redeem mankind .... The violent
capture of all existing governments is one article of the creed
of that faith, which abjures the possibility of success by lawful
means.
4 17
World events involving communist aggression, of which Judge Hand
was obviously aware because he took judicial notice of them,4 " further
magnified the threat and cemented the notion that the CPUSA was a
threat to the existence of the United States.
Judge Hand's version and application of the clear and present
danger test also reflects biased risk assessment. Judge Hand's version
of that test is consistent with an individual's tendency to overestimate the
likelihood of dreaded threats or to demand action regardless of the low
likelihood of an event. By reading the imminence requirement out of
the test, and requiring only that the threatened event be probable at some
point in time,419 Judge Hand's version of the test made it easier to
convict the defendants. Accordingly, one can consider alteration of that
test as evidence that he succumbed to skewed risk assessment.
Judge Hand's apparent belief in the likelihood of attempted
overthrow bolsters that conclusion. While Judge Hand recognized that
"discussion and publicity" may weaken the effect of speech over time,
rendering it ineffective "when the moment may come" for action,4'0 that
415. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 578-79
(1994) (internal quotations omitted).
416. Judge Hand rejected the defendants' objections to Judge Medina's decisions
to admit and exclude certain testimony, to Judge Medina's alleged misconduct and bias,
and to the jury selection process. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 224-34.
417. Id. at 212.
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fact was true only "in ordinary times and for less redoubtable
combinations," than the CPUSA.42' "[W]e shall be silly dupes," Judge
Hand noted, "if we forget that again and again in the past thirty years,
[preparations like those allegedly undertaken by the CPUSA] in other
countries have aided to supplant existing governments, when the time
was ripe."'22 Given that the CPUSA was a beast of a different sort, he
concluded that "one could [not] ask for a more probable danger, unless
[one] must wait till the actual eve of hostilities."423
There is less evidence that prejudice swayed Judge Hand's
decision. This is not surprising in light of Judge Hand's reputation as a
sophisticated jurist in the liberal tradition who disliked McCarthyism's
effect on civil liberties. 4' Such a person likely would not consciously
adhere or give vent to prejudiced attitudes. Furthermore, Judge Hand's
version of the clear and present danger test (that is, "whether the gravity
of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifie[d] [an] invasion of
free speech" rights42 ) would have restrained his inquiry, forcing him to
couch his analysis in risk assessment terms due to the test's formula-like
nature.
Psychologists have found, however, that prejudice need not be an
overt expression of antagonism but rather can indirectly manifest itself.
For example, researchers who study race relations in the United States
have found that traditional, aversive racism, which involves overtly
hostile attitudes toward another racial group, has "become unacceptable
in the mainstream of American society" and "has been replaced by
symbolic racism, which does not express racist sentiments in an overtly
obvious and recognizable manner."" Symbolic racism tends to emerge
as
a blend of antiblack affect and the kind of traditional American
moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic. Symbolic
racism represents a form of resistance to change in the racial
status quo based on moral feelings that blacks violate such
traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance,




424. See GUNTHER, supra note 415, at 579-80.
425. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212.
426. DUCKrrT, supra note 289, at 19.
427. Kinder & Sears, supra note 345, at 416 (citations omitted).
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Such indirect expression of prejudice could operate in other contexts as
well, including among liberals forced to deal with anticommunist
sentiment in the late 1940s and early 1950s.42
In light of Judge Hand's apparent dedication to civil liberties, and
his thoughtful and humble nature, he would likely not have held or
expressed an overtly prejudiced attitude toward a group whose appeal
was before him. His liberal nature, however, could have produced a
more indirect prejudice reflected in the notion that the CPUSA violated
traditional American values.429  There is some support for this
conclusion in Judge Hand's Dennis opinion and other sources. For
example, Gerald Gunther's biography of Judge Hand notes that he
believed the Stalin regime to be a significant threat to the United
States. °  Judge Hand's passage taking judicial notice of the Soviet
Union's world aggression reflected this sentiment:
By far the most powerful of all the European nations had been
a convert to Communism for over thirty years; its leaders were
the most devoted and potent proponents of the
faith .... Moreover in most of West Europe there were
important political Communist factions, always agitating to
increase their power; and the defendants were acting in close
concert with the movement .... Any border fray, any
diplomatic incident, any difference in construction of the
modus vivendi-such as the Berlin blockade... might prove a
spark in the tinder-box, and lead to war.43" '
428. Liberals who previously supported communist causes and denounced
persecution of domestic communists largely deserted them as anticommunist sentiment
mounted. See SCHRECKER, supra note 26, at 81-84. Many such groups rationalized
their behavior as based upon a realization that the CPUSA supported antidemocratic
regimes. In 1939, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
"reaffirmed its traditional commitment to defending the rights of all unpopular groups."
Id. at 83. Within a year, the organization abandoned this statement and adopted a
platform that "declared it 'inappropriate' for officers of the ACLU to belong to 'any
political organization which supports totalitarian dictatorship in any country.'" Id. at
84. Changes of position such as this could simply reflect liberals' attempts to protect
themselves from the anticommunists' tendency to identify as "fellow travelers" any
organization sympathetic to the CPUSA's plight. With its focus on the CPUSA's
violation of traditional American democratic values, it is also consistent with indirect
prejudices similar to symbolic racism.
429. Cf. DUCKrrr, supra note 289, at 39-40 (recounting studies linking the
tendency of college students to gravitate toward symbolic racism over overt racism and
the "liberal atmosphere of most American campuses would have created significant
pressures for students to try and avoid creating the impression of being racist").
430. See GUNTHER, supra note 415, at 577.
431. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 213.
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Judge Hand further outlined European communists' denigration of the
United States:
We [have] become the object of invective upon invective; we
[are] continuously charged with aggressive designs against
other nations; our efforts to re-establish their economic
stability [are] repeatedly set down as a scheme to enslave
them; we [have] been singled out as the chief enemy of the
faith; we [are] the eventually doomed, but the still formidable,
protagonist of that decadent system which [communism] was to
supplant. 43
2
Judge Hand's perception of the worldwide communist movement as
hostile and threatening was bound to have affected his views of the
CPUSA, especially given his linkage of the two throughout the Dennis
opinion.
Judge Hand's view of Marxism-Leninism as a cloying ideology
requiring unthinking adherence would have further emphasized the
difference between communist tenets and his own beliefs, which tended
toward skepticism.433 In fact, Judge Hand called Marxism a "'Satanic
and false"' faith,4" suggesting just how much communism conflicted
with his beliefs. Judge Hand's opposition to McCarthyism's
inquisitorial tactics does not detract from this conclusion. Belief that the
government's tactics overreached and injured innocent victims is entirely
consistent with a belief that the CPUSA and its alliance with the Soviet
Union were dangerous. In fact, the plight of the anticommunist
campaign's innocent victims could have reinforced the difference
between them and the real evildoers, thus actually facilitating prejudice.
Judge Hand later attributed his Dennis opinion to the need to adhere
to Supreme Court precedent and his philosophy of judicial restraint:
"'[W]e had no alternative. Many is the time that I have declared valid a
law I should never have voted to pass.'" 435 While Judge Hand had long
believed that lower courts were bound by precedents, even those they
disliked,436 adherence to precedent and the need for judicial restraint do
not explain the passion with which Judge Hand's opinion described the
CPUSA and its alleged conspiracy with the Soviet Union. He could
have written a much drier opinion upholding the convictions. His
432. Id.
433. See GuNTHER, supra note 415, at 581-82.
434. Id. at 581 (quoting a letter from Judge Hand to Bernard Berenson).
435. Id. at 605 (quoting an April 3, 1953 letter from Judge Hand to Irving
Dilliard). Judge Hand was especially aware of Douds, which the Supreme Court
decided just before the Second Circuit heard the Dennis appeal.
436. See id. at 603-05.
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reliance on vivid depictions of the CPUSA and world events, however,
suggests a man who actually believed the picture he portrayed.437
Assuming that Judge Hand did not believe his portrayal of the
CPUSA, the popular image of that group may nevertheless have affected
his opinion. The anticommunist campaign brought powerful pressure to
bear on anyone who publicly dissented from that image. Judge Hand's
"fearful nature" 438 and "brooding lack of self-esteem," 439 potentially
made him easy prey to reputational influences that facilitate faulty threat
perception throughout society. His willingness to denounce Stalinism
while remaining silent about McCarthyism until much later" suggests,
at the very least, that Judge Hand was well aware of the pressures of the
anticommunist campaign. Consequently, reputational concerns might
have been as much or more of a factor in Judge Hand's Dennis opinion
as his judicial philosophy." Whether Judge Hand actually believed his
portrayal of the CPUSA or simply put forth such an image due to
societal pressure, his opinion surely assisted the anticommunist
campaign.
C. The Supreme Court Opinions
The psychological phenomena affecting the lower court judges
appear to have affected the Supreme Court justices voting to uphold the
Dennis convictions. Chief Justice Vinson's adoption of Judge Hand's
version of the clear and present danger test suggests the operation of
skewed risk assessment because it is consistent with research showing
that the "dreaded" nature of the harm often infects assessments of its
likelihood. Furthermore, Chief Justice Vinson's opinion is replete with
references suggesting that he viewed the CPUSA as a "dreaded" threat.
He described the CPUSA as a "highly disciplined organization, adept at
infiltration into strategic positions, use of aliases, and double-meaning
language" that was "rigidly controlled" by a program that was
437. See Wiecek, supra note 20, at 432 (noting that Judge Hand's description of
the CPUSA used "language, more appropriate to HUAC or Hoover, [which] suggest[ed]
how deeply committed American judges were to the ideological construct of
Communism").
438. GUNTHER, supra note 415, at 586.
439. Id. at 575.
440. See id. at 585-86.
441. As Professor Morton Horwitz has noted,
The real question ... is whether Hand's increased doubts about
judicial activism provide a satisfactory explanation independent of the subject
matter of those increased doubts....
' [W]hy are we not entitled to call what Gunther terms Hand's
"extreme" version of judicial restraint nothing other than judicial self-
abnegation in the face of McCarthyism?
Horwitz, supra note 16, at 720-21 (footnote omitted).
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"slavishly followed by the members of the Party."" 2 Having adopted
the popular image of the CPUSA, Chief Justice Vinson also believed it
posed a very real harm, characterizing it as posing an impending threat
of an "armed internal attack.""
3
Chief Justice Vinson's reliance on the "inflammable nature of
world conditions"4' to justify his conclusions also supports a conclusion
that skewed risk assessment affected his decision. Those conditions
were salient to Chief Justice Vinson. On the morning of the Dennis oral
arguments, newspapers carried dramatic stories of Chinese communists'
advances in the Korean War." 5 Not only did government attorneys
repeatedly refer to such events in their briefs and arguments, Chief
Justice Vinson "had been reading the newspapers, and reports of 'world
crisis after crisis' alarmed him. " 46 Similarly, Chief Justice Vinson's
personal brush with Soviet espionage while serving as U.S. Secretary of
the Treasury could have increased the popular image's salience." 7
As with Judges Hand and Medina before him, Chief Justice
Vinson's beliefs were likely based less on evidence regarding the
CPUSA than on the vividness of the popular image and its association
with Soviet aggression. There was no more evidence against the
CPUSA during the Supreme Court deliberations than there had been in
the lower proceedings. In other words, there was no evidence that the
CPUSA conspired to advocate overthrow of the government, much less
that the defendants conspired to overthrow it. Nevertheless, Chief
Justice Vinson's view regarding the nature of the threat was so firm that
he believed there was no need for discussion. At the justices'
conference regarding Dennis, Justice Douglas's notes indicate that there
was "[p]ractically no discussion. " "48 Other justices joining the plurality
also took Chief Justice Vinson's view. As Justice Douglas noted: "The
amazing thing about this conference... was the brief nature of the
discussion. Those wanting to affirm had their minds closed to argument
442. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 498; see also id. at 510-11 (describing the CPUSA as
.a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when
the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the time had come for action").
443. See id. at 509.
444. Id. at 511.
445. PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 380 (1999).
446. Id. at 380-81.
447. See JAMES E. ST. CLAIR & LINDA C. GUGIN, CHIEF JUSTICE FRED M.
VINSON OF KENTUCKY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 233 (2002). While he was the U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury, Chief Justice Vinson received a report authored by Hoover
arguing that "Harry Dexter White, then assistant secretary of the Treasury, was passing
'materials'... to... suspected Soviet agents." id.
448. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), at 278 (Del Dickson
ed., 2001) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE].
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or persuasion. The conference discussion was largely pro forna."" 9
Such behavior is consistent with the operation of the confirmation trap
and overconfidence biases that often accompany skewed risk assessment.
While Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion is couched in risk
assessment terms, it is also consistent with the operation of stereotypes
and prejudice. For example, there is evidence that Chief Justice Vinson
viewed the CPUSA as threatening more because of its nature as a group
than because it posed a real threat of overthrow. To illustrate, Chief
Justice Vinson emphatically rejected the argument that convictions for
conspiracy to advocate overthrow of the government violated the First
Amendment, noting that "[i]t is the existence of the conspiracy which
creates the danger."' In other words, the CPUSA's advocacy of
Marxist-Leninist doctrine was dangerous in and of itself although
admittedly there was no evidence that the defendants had taken concrete
steps to overthrow the government or that such an attempt was
imminent. Hostility toward a group because of its beliefs is consistent
with psychological theories positing that prejudice results from
perceived threats to one's values.4"'
There is other, indirect evidence lending support to this argument.
"A government man at heart," Chief Justice Vinson apparently never
fully disassociated his interests from his former employer.452 He
remained a close advisor of President Truman's even after his
appointment to the Supreme Court.453  A man so aligned with
government interests, especially with a president who called the Dennis
defendants "traitors" on the eve of trial,4" likely would have seen the
CPUSA's adherence to communist tenets as threatening. Chief Justice
Vinson's belief that order must be secured above all else455 could have
exacerbated this perception as it would have emphasized an "us versus
449. Id. at 279. Justices Sherman Minton and Stanley Reed voted to confirm
without discussion while Justice Harold Burton noted that "[w]e can take judicial
knowledge of the danger." Id. at 278-79. There is also independent evidence that
Justice Minton believed that the CPUSA was a "serious national threat." SABIN, supra
note 16, at 81.
450. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 511.
451. Justice Black apparently thought that Chief Justice Vinson's
characterizations were overblown and based upon superstition and prejudice. His
margin comments regarding Chief Justice Vinson's draft opinions were caustic and
vicious. He wrote things such as "Bad men! To jail with them!"; "Good semantic
emotionalism and ghost conjuring!"; and "The goblin'll get you" in response to Chief
Justice Vinson's characterizations of the CPUSA. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUOo BLACK: A
BIOGRAPHY 403 (1994) (internal quotations omitted).
452. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 448, at 101.
453. See ST. CLAm & GUGIN, supra note 447, at 190-91.
454. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
455. ST. CLAIR & GUGIN, supra note 447, at 232 (describing as one of Chief
Justice Vinson's "most cherished beliefs" the notion "that order must be secured for
freedom to exist").
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them" mentality. In this case, "us" was a government trying to
preserve American values and beliefs while "them" was a group openly
critical of the American form of government and capitalism. With such
group opposition established, it would hardly be surprising for Chief
Justice Vinson to uphold the convictions of the CPUSA, even absent
evidence of wrongdoing.
Justice Jackson's concurrence similarly evidences the operation of
biased threat perception in his assessment of the CPUSA's convictions.
Like other judges, Justice Jackson succumbed to the popular image of
the CPUSA, describing it in perhaps the most vivid terms of all the
Dennis opinions. He described domestic communists as "selected,
dedicated, indoctrinated, and rigidly disciplined members.... [They]
are, or may be, secreted in strategic posts in transportation,
communications, industry, government, and especially in labor unions"
and have "no scruples against sabotage, terrorism, assassination, or mob
disorder."45 6 Such a group was made more sinister because it wanted to
gain power not by outright violence but by fooling Americans regarding
its legitimacy as a political party.457 Referring to the 1948 coup in
Czechoslovakia, Justice Jackson noted that communists "[p]retending to
be but another political party, [were] eventually ... conceded
participation in government, where [they] entrenched reliable members
chiefly in control of police and information services," which ultimately
allowed them to take over the Czech government in a "bloodless"
coup.458 Although Justice Jackson acknowledged that "[tihe United
States, fortunately, has experienced Communism only in its preparatory
stages," the communist threat in general was sufficient to render the
CPUSA a "nation-wide conspiracy" willing to engage in the tactics
Justice Jackson had described.45 9
Justice Jackson's opinion could have resulted from either skewed
risk assessment or prejudice. His vision of communism comports with
the concept of a "dreaded" threat, one that was obviously salient,
especially given his focus on the communist coup in Czechoslovakia.
Justice Jackson's rejection of the clear and present danger test in Dennis
further supports this thesis. Justice Jackson argued that, in the case of
furtive preparations, the test would allow the government to act only
when "it would ... be too late.""6 He thus believed that the CPUSA's
status as a conspiracy was sufficient to uphold the defendants'
convictions."' In fact, Justice Jackson apparently viewed the CPUSA's
456. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 564 (Jackson, J., concurring).
457. See id. at 565-66 (Jackson, J., concurring).
458. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
459. Id. at 568-69 (Jackson, J., concurring).
460. Id. at 570 (Jackson, J., concurring).
461. See id. at 572 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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activities as "inherently dangerous."2 Such reasoning suggests that the
perceived magnitude of the threat posed by the CPUSA, although
unsupported by direct evidence, dominated Justice Jackson's assessment
regarding the need for action.
Justice Jackson's previous experience at the Nuremburg trials,
which caused him to "look[] on potential dictatorial groups with far less
tolerance than he had [previously] displayed,"" 3 suggests that Justice
Jackson's vision of the CPUSA may have also resulted from prejudice.
As a result of those experiences, Justice Jackson could have looked upon
the CPUSA as a group posing a threat to American values. Ironically,
Justice Jackson expressed concern that the Dennis defendants would be
unable to obtain a fair trial because they were "'the current phobia in
Washington.""' Nevertheless, his focus on the CPUSA as a group led
him to "set[] aside his feelings" and affirm the defendants'
convictions. 5 Such a focus on group dangerousness is consistent with
the operation of prejudice.
Justice Frankfurter, like Judge Hand, couched his concurrence in
terms of judicial restraint, a philosophy with which he was long
associated. 4 "Free-speech cases," he wrote, "are not an exception to
the principle that we are not legislators .... How best to reconcile
competing interests is the business of legislatures, and the balance they
strike is a judgment not to be displaced by ours, but to be respected
unless outside the pale of fair judgment." 7 Because the legislature had
concluded "after due deliberation" that the Smith Act was necessary,
Justice Frankfurter concluded the Court should defer to its decision. 468
Although couched in terms of judicial restraint, Justice
Frankfurter's opinion nevertheless invoked the popular image of the
CPUSA. Unlike Chief Justice Vinson, Justice Frankfurter
acknowledged that the trial had not "established [as] fact that the
Communist Party in this country is of significant size, well-organized,
462. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 448, at 279.
463. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER
STONE AND VINSON, 1941-1953, at 172 (1997).
464. See HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 192 (1996)
(quoting a draft of Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Dennis). Justice Jackson
believed that this fear "'cast a shadow on the jury box, [with] everybody looking over
their shoulder to see who [was] watching.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Justice
Jackson's notes).
465. Id. at 193.
466. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND His TIMES 168 (1982)
("The correct judicial posture ... ought to be one of deference to the legislature's
judgment, unless that choice 'passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a
merely arbitrary fiat.'") (quoting Justice Frankfurter).
467. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 539-40 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of
the judgment).
468. Id. at 550-51 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of the judgment).
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well-disciplined, [and] conditioned [enough] to embark on unlawful
activity when given the command." 9  He argued, however, that "in
determining whether application of the statute to the defendants is within
the constitutional powers of Congress, we are not limited to the facts
found by the jury."'47 After referencing Soviet aggression in Europe,
the size of the CPUSA, its organization, recent espionage events in the
United States and Canada, communists in political and labor
organizations, and Hoover's HUAC testimony, he concluded that
"Congress was not barred by the Constitution from believing that
indifference to such experience would be an exercise not of freedom but
of irresponsibility." 47 As with the other judges involved in the case,
Justice Frankfurter's reference to recent but unrelated events is
consistent with the psychological phenomena that skew threat
perception.
One can plausibly argue that Justice Frankfurter's discussion simply
reflects the kinds of incidents Congress and the government considered
when passing the Smith Act and undertaking prosecution, rather than
reflect his personal views. There is evidence, however, that Justice
Frankfurter believed that CPUSA leaders posed a danger to the United
States. For example, in a note to Justice Frank Murphy during the
Court's deliberations in Schneiderman,' he wrote:
"[The Soviet Government, after the last war, expected a
Bolshevist Revolution throughout the world.... [A]fter a
little while, the Soviet Government fashioned the Comintern-
the Third International-as the instrument of the political
export business of the Soviet and the Communist Party. In
each country there was a branch office of this international
export business of the Soviet Government. And those who
were running the branch business in the various countries
were, in fact, political instruments of the Soviet regime. Of
course, many, many people who became Communists in the
United States were perfectly devoted and loyal Americans, but
found in Communism a practical expression of their hopes for
a better society. But the active managers of the Communist
Party ... were knowing and eager instruments of their foreign
masters, the Comintern, and the Comintern was, as I have
said, the instrument of the Soviet Government."
473
469. Id. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of the judgment).
470. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of the judgment).
471. Id. at 547-48 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of the judgment).
472. 320 U.S. 118.
473. Wiecek, supra note 20, at 430 (first omission in original) (quoting Justice
Frankfurter's note to Justice Frank Murphy).
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Based upon this characterization, Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the
Schneiderman majority, which found that membership in the CPUSA
was an insufficient basis for denaturalization.' 4  Furthermore, Justice
Frankfurter joined (and presumably agreed with) Chief Justice Harlan
Fiske Stone's Schneiderman dissent, which described the CPUSA in a
manner consistent with the popular image.""
Similarly, in response to the Dennis defendants' request to delay
oral argument, reportedly to allow a new lawyer to participate, Justice
Frankfurter warned his colleagues that they "were dealing with
'extremely sophisticated tacticians' who were concerned not merely with
legal issues but were 'engaged in propaganda for extraneous ends." 476
Such behavior supports the argument that Justice Frankfurter embraced
the popular image of the CPUSA projected by the anticommunist
campaign even though he was very much opposed to that campaign's
tactics. Some historians looking back on his opinion have concluded
that "Frankfurter's opinion in Dennis, read in the light of history,
smacks more of judicial abdication of responsibility than measured
deference and restraint.'
Although the Vinson, Jackson, and Frankfurter opinions are
consistent with biased threat perception, one can argue that the justices
voting to uphold the Dennis convictions did so primarily for strategic
reasons. That is, faced with such overwhelmingly negative sentiment
regarding the defendants, the justices may have decided to uphold their
convictions to preserve their political capital with the president,
Congress, and the public. Judge Richard Posner, for example, has
argued that the fear of domestic communists, though exaggerated, "was
474. 320 U.S. at 157-59.
475. See id. at 170-97 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
476. ST. CLAIR & GUGIN, supra note 447, at 238 (quoting a Justice Frankfurter
memorandum circulated to other Court members). Justice Frankfurter was apparently
referencing incidents in which the CPUSA attempted to gain "public sympathy by
'educating the masses' about the potential threat to constitutional freedom posed by the
government's prosecutions." Id. (quoting a Justice Frankfurter memorandum circulated
to other Court members).
477. E.g., UROFSKY, supra note 463, at 172; see also HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP
J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HuGo BLACK, WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AND AMERICA'S
CONSTrTIONAL REVOLUTION 146 (1992) (arguing that Justice Frankfurter's judicial
deference "meant, as it had during the earlier Red Scare, that the Court neglected to
pose substantive questions or acquiesced in" intrusive government actions against
communists). But see IRONS, supra note 445, at 382 (maintaining that Justice
Frankfurter had doubts about the appropriateness of the defendants' convictions).
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a brute fact that judges who wanted to preserve their power had to
consider." 478
That judges engage in strategic reasoning is beyond question, and it
is reasonable to assume that such reasoning may have occurred in
Dennis. But, that assumption does not detract from the thesis of this
Article. Many factors influence judicial decision-making. Both the
desire to preserve political capital and skewed threat perception could
have affected the Dennis justices. To the extent that existing fear of
communists was "a brute fact" of which the justices had to take note,
for example, the popular image of the CPUSA at least influenced the
justices' otherwise political decision, suggesting that the justices were
subject to reputational influences causing them to conform to dominant
opinion even if they disagreed with it. The vivid nature of the justices'
opinions, however, suggests more than simple conformity and supports
a conclusion that they may have held beliefs in line with much of
society.
V. LEGAL TESTS AND THE DENNIS PHENOMENA
A. Clear and Present Danger and the Facilitation of Psychological
Biases
History has not been kind to Dennis. Most scholars agree that the
Dennis courts got it wrong-that is, they allowed the government to
punish the defendants because of their ideas rather than the danger they
actually posed to the nation's security. This Article's review of history
and psychology further suggests, however, that the Dennis courts not
only reached the wrong decision, but also that they may never have had
a fighting chance of reaching the right one. In light of the social and
psychological forces operating at the time, the clear and present danger
test was an ill-suited vehicle for determining the defendants' guilt.
Indeed, that test may have facilitated the very biases and prejudices that
skewed the courts' vision of the defendants' dangerousness.
The amorphous balancing required in the clear and present danger
test made it particularly susceptible to the skewing effects of
psychological phenomena such as the availability heuristic, confirmation
trap bias, overconfidence bias, and the dreaded nature of the predicted
event. Even in its most protective form, the test does little more than
restate a generalized definition of risk analysis requiring courts to assess
the likelihood that speech will cause a particular event. Such a test is no
guard against overestimation of an event's probability, especially one
478. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment
Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 741 (2002); see also KALVEN, JR., supra note 10, at
190-91 (claiming that "political exigencies" motivated the Dennis Court).
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that supposedly involved violent overthrow of the government, an evil
that "was as great as could be imagined." 479  In fact, given what
psychologists know about human nature, one could have predicted that
some of the Dennis judges would overreact to the alleged dangerousness
of the CPUSA when applying the clear and present danger test.480
Other aspects of that test ensured that its application doomed the
Dennis defendants. The test's lack of specific intent, causation, and
evidentiary requirements, for example, allowed the Dennis courts to
focus on the wrong harm and magnify the CPUSA's potential threat
beyond reason. While the defendants were charged with conspiring to
advocate overthrow of the government, at the proceedings' conclusion,
almost everyone viewed their alleged conspiracy as involving actual
attempted overthrow of the government. What the judges and juries
should have viewed as a relatively minimal harm-all of the courts
concluded that advocacy of ideas did not present a punishable harm
under the clear and present danger test-had mutated into a catastrophic
one.
This mutation resulted from the courts' reading of the government's
evidence-Marxist-Leninist literature, the bulk of which alone could not
have presented a clear and present danger of advocacy of overthrow,
much less actual overthrow, of the government. The trial court's
allowance of testimony interpreting that literature and CPUSA practices
in a more sinister light, however, shifted focus away from the
conspiracy to advocate charge and placed it squarely on the popular
image's view of the CPUSA as a part of a worldwide conspiracy of
Soviet aggression. The Dennis judges and jurors thus inferred a
worldwide conspiracy to overthrow the government from the
government's literary evidence and descriptions of the CPUSA.
Nothing in the clear and present danger test could guard against this
occurrence. The simple requirement that the danger be "clear" or
"extremely serious" does not focus the inquiry regarding the nature of
the harm or the defendant's intent to cause it. Nor does it compel
judges to require evidence of a particular type or weight. If anything,
these vague terms encourage prosecutors to characterize harm in a way
likely to galvanize fear and trigger operation of various psychological
biases.
479. Douglas Laycock, The Clear and Present Danger Test, 25 J. Sup. CT.
HisT. 161, 177 (2000).
480. See GUNTHER, supra note 415, at 602 (noting that the clear and present
danger test's reliance on "prophecy of the future" invited the courts' reliance on judicial
notice and made the test "vulnerable to... wide-ranging inquiries"); Paul Horwitz,
Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First
Anendm.nent, 76 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 41 (2003) (noting that the Dennis Court "failed to
understand that... its fears.., would be predictably overstated").
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The test's checkered past also may have facilitated biases.
Although courts had applied the test strictly, requiring an extremely high
degree of imminence and a serious harm in the years preceding Dennis,
the test had an inconsistent history, which included a far more lenient
version in its early years and its abandonment altogether at other
times."' That meandering path led Judge Hand to view the test not as a
rigid rule, but as "a way to describe a penumbra of occasions, even the
outskirts of which are indefinable, but within which, as is so often the
case, the courts must find their way as they can. "82 The Dennis judges
thus felt free to redefine or abandon the strict version of the test in order
to uphold the defendants' convictions.
These same aspects of the clear and present danger test may have
also facilitated the operation of prejudice and stereotypes in Dennis.
The test's nebulous reference to "serious" harm could have allowed the
Dennis jury and judges to convict the defendants and uphold their
convictions based upon their perceptions of the CPUSA's threatening
nature rather than the act with which defendants were charged-
conspiracy to advocate overthrow. In the case of domestic communists,
such threat perception could have resulted from a conflict of beliefs or
clash of cultural values. This was especially true in light of the literary
evidence, testimony interpreting it in a sinister light, and judges'
willingness to take notice of world events, all of which cast the
defendants as puppets of an aggressive and hostile foreign nation. The
clear and present danger test lacked the causation and evidentiary
requirements necessary to prevent the kinds of inferences that an
individual subject to stereotypes and prejudice might draw to convince
themselves that the defendants' beliefs posed a threat deserving of
punishment.
The test's historically inconsistent application also could have
facilitated the operation of prejudice. The judges' ability to manipulate
the clear and present danger test without actually having to say that they
were deviating from it provided them with comfort that the Dennis
defendants received a fair trial as opposed to a political one.483 This
manipulation allowed the judges to avoid asking hard questions about
their motivations in upholding convictions based on a remote and
speculative harm. Furthermore, the self-congratulatory notion that the
American justice system had worked "better" than a totalitarian
communist regime emphasized the differences between Americans (with
481. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
482. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212.
483. See KALVEN, JR., supra note 10, at 195 (commenting that allegations that
Dennis was a political trial may have prompted the Court to engage in "at least the
ceremony of painstakingly reconciling the Government's anti-Communist strategy with
the traditions of free speech and political tolerance").
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whom the judges surely identified) and communists, which could have
contributed to the operation of prejudiced attitudes.4s
Perhaps intuitively understanding these flaws, the Supreme Court
eventually moved away from the clear and present danger test, adopting
approaches that more effectively guarded against the psychological
phenomena discussed above. The Court began this process during the
waning years of the Cold War in another conspiracy case, Yates v.
United States. 4 5 Yates, like Dennis, involved convictions of fourteen
additional leaders of the CPUSA for conspiracy to advocate.4 The
government's case in Yates proceeded along much the same lines as
Dennis, including its reliance on the same literary evidence and
testimony.4s8 Indeed, the charges and evidence in both cases were so
similar that Justice Thomas Clark characterized the Yates defendants as
"engaged in [the same] conspiracy with the defendants in Dennis" and
as having "served in the same army." 4s
Unlike Dennis, however, the Yates Court reversed the defendants'
convictions.489  Justice John M. Harlan, writing for the majority,
interpreted the Smith Act as prohibiting only incitement of violence and
not "advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract
principle," and concluded that the lower court's jury instructions did not
adequately make that distinction.4' Turning to the evidence supporting
the charges against the defendants, he also found it insufficient to sustain
the convictions:
Instances of speech that could be considered to amount to
"advocacy of action" are so few and far between as to be
almost completely overshadowed by the hundreds of instances
in the record in which overthrow, if mentioned at all, occurs in
the course of doctrinal disputation so remote from action as to
be almost wholly lacking in probative value. Vague references
to "revolutionary" or "militant" action of an unspecified
character, which are found in the evidence, might in addition
484. That Americans indulged in such self-congratulation is evident from the
many letters Judge Medina received lauding him for his fair conduct of the trial. See
JUDGE MEDINA SPEAKS 299-303 (Maxine Boord Virtue ed., 1954) (describing these
letters); see also SABIN, supra note 16, at 53-54 (discussing public sentiment about the
fairness of the Dennis trial).
485. 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled in part by Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1 (1978).
486. Id. at 300-02.
487. Id. at 329-33.
488. Id. at 344-45 (Clark, J., dissenting).
489. Id. at 327.
490. Id. at 318, 324-27.
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be given too great weight by the jury in the absence of more
precise instructions ...
... [Wihen it comes to Party advocacy or teaching in
the sense of a call to forcible action at some future time we
cannot but regard this record as strikingly deficient. At best
this voluminous record shows but a half dozen or so scattered
incidents which, even under the loosest standards, could be
deemed to show such advocacy. Most of these were not
connected with any of the petitioners, or occurred many years
before the period covered by the indictment.
491
As a consequence of Justice Harlan's interpretations, his opinion, though
not overruling Dennis, substantially limited its viability, doing so
without ever mentioning the clear and present danger test.
In stark contrast to Dennis, Justice Harlan's approach reflects
analysis free of the skewing effects associated with the psychological
phenomena discussed above. By narrowly defining the punishable harm
as "incitement to action,"' Justice Harlan firmly placed the focus on a
particular, identified harm, rather than on a generalized "extremely
serious" harm. Such focus is more likely to prevent the conflation of
harm that occurred in Dennis-that is, the merger of conspiracy to
advocate overthrow with conspiracy to overthrow. Furthermore, Justice
Harlan's attention to the nature of the evidence, his critical examination
of causal links between that evidence and the incitement charge, and his
refusal to take judicial notice of the evils of communism4  further curbs
the ability to draw unreasonable and unsupported inferences from
generalized evidence regarding a group's "threatening" nature. Finally,
his concern that vague references to amorphous harms such as
"militant" and "revolutionary" action might skew the jury's decision-
making shows a clear understanding of human frailty and the need for
an aggressively critical approach to the government's evidence.
While Justice Harlan's actions deprived Dennis of its vitality, Yates
did not completely undo the harm wrought by Dennis. By dealing with
491. Id. at 327, 329-30.
492. See KALVEN, JR., supra note 10, at 214; Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand
and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27
STAN. L. REv. 719, 753 (1975).
493. See Yates, 354 U.S. at 303.
494. Id. at 330 ("[IUt is upon the evidence in the record that the petitioners must
be judged in this case."). Justice Douglas's dissent in Dennis also evidences freedom
from skewing effects, especially in his discussion of the absence of evidence supporting
the defendants' convictions. See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
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Dennis indirectly, Justice Harlan left Dennis and its version of the clear
and present danger test available for later application. In Brandenburg
v. Ohio,495 however, the Court formally adopted a standard providing
many of the same protections as Justice Harlan's approach. In
Brandenburg, the Court made clear that the government could not
punish mere abstract teaching of the moral necessity of illegal action;
rather, the First Amendment permits punishment of speech only when it
"is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action."496 By narrowly defining the
harm as incitement of "imminent lawless action," Brandenburg, like
Yates, carefully limits the threat that can be considered, requiring that it
be both imminent and the result of an incitement. Accordingly, it makes
the harm inquiry more objective and less likely to be subject to skewing
effects ." The requirement that the defendants' speech be "directed"
and "likely" to cause "imminent" harm imposes strict intent and
causation requirements, forces judges and jurors to assess the evidence
carefully, is more likely to prevent unwarranted inferences, and makes it
less likely that judges and jurors will overestimate the likelihood of
harm.
498
Ultimately, Brandenburg's concrete definition of harm and
imposition of causation requirements makes evasion more difficult and
forces jurists to take a sober second look at their thought processes
before coming to a conclusion.499 None of this, of course, guarantees
that courts will refrain from manipulating the Brandenburg standard in
the same way that they manipulated the more malleable clear and
495. 395 U.s 444 (1969).
496. Id. at 447.
497. See Horwitz, supra note 480, at 45 ("It is simply more difficult to conduct
a distorted analysis of risk when, by demanding imminence, the test will generally
require a jury to balance its passionate assessment of risk with the actual
outcome .... "); Frederick M. Lawrence, The Collision of Rights in Violence-
Conducive Speech, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1333, 1347 (1998) ("The evaluation of harm is
made more objective when it looks to specific instances of imminent harm rather than to
those that are general instances of potential long-range harm.").
498. See Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes Through the Lens of Schauer: The
Abrams Dissent, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1343, 1358-59 (1997) (describing
Brandenburg as imposing strict causation requirements designed to guard against the
punishment of ideas); Laycock, supra note 479, at 180-81 (locating Brandenburg's
principal strength in its use of the term "imminent" to modify both the danger and the
incitement element); Bernard Schwarz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger
or Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 209, 240 (noting that
Brandenburg's requirement of express advocacy of imminent law violation which must
be likely to occur makes it "more difficult to show the required nexus between given
expression and imminent lawless action").
499. Horwitz, supra note 480, at 47 (noting that Brandenburg's "testness"
makes it more "difficult to evade"); Laycock, supra note 479, at 181 (stating that "[tihe
genius of Brandenburg is [its] belts and suspenders" approach to protecting speech).
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present danger test. As Professor David Rabban has noted, "substantial
doubts can be raised as to whether any constitutional standard, however
protective its language, can protect free speech in times of crisis. " '
But Brandenburg's specific criteria are difficult to evade and thus have
"enormous potential.""' That is all that we can ask of jurisprudential
tools, at least in the context of battling unconscious skewing effects.
B. The Supreme Court's Modem Approach: Tiers of Scrutiny
In light of Brandenburg, it may be tempting to dismiss Dennis as an
historical artifact. After all, Brandenburg has successfully limited many
governmental attempts to regulate speech short of incitement, and the
clear and present danger test in its earlier iterations is positively
moribund. For all of Brandenburg's positive contributions, however,
there is reason to be concerned regarding future cases involving skewing
effects similar to those found in Dennis.
Brandenburg's analytical approach applies only in situations
involving incitement to illegal action, a narrow category of speech cases
representing a small portion of the Court's jurisprudence. More
commonly, the modem Court resolves cases involving regulations of
political speech by applying its multitiered system of review. Thus, the
Court applies variations of "means-end" scrutiny depending on the kind
of regulation at issue. It reserves the most stringent review, strict
scrutiny, for content-based regulations (that is, those that regulate
because of what is said), asking whether the regulation is necessary to
meet a compelling state interest.i It applies intermediate scrutiny to
content-neutral regulations (that is, those that regulate without regard to
the expression's message), asking whether they are "'narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest, and ... leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.'"" There
exist serious questions as to whether these balancing tests can protect
against skewing effects in times of crisis. 4 Much about them suggests
that they cannot.
500. David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine,
50 U. CI. L. REv. 1205, 1352 (1983).
501. Id. at 1353.
502. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992). For a
general discussion of the Court's content discrimination jurisprudence, see Christina E.
Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 159, 173-74 (1997).
503. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
504. Many scholars describe the Court's use of tiers of scrutiny as a balancing
approach. Professor Daniel Solove, for example, has noted:
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We know, for example, that strict scrutiny is intended to be
extremely protective-"'strict' in theory [but] fatal in fact."05° Indeed,
this scrutiny is so protective of speech that the Supreme Court deems
content-based regulations as "presumptively invalid."' But, what is it
about the strict scrutiny test that compels that result? While we know
that the government's interest in promoting a content-based regulation
must be "compelling," nothing in the test defines the parameters of that
term. We assume that it must be a more important interest than
"significant," the term used to describe governmental interests in the
more forgiving intermediate scrutiny test, but that relative comparison
does little to elucidate the ultimate criteria used to judge whether an
interest is "compelling." Furthermore, the Court's jurisprudence has
assiduously avoided a rigorous analysis of the relative and ultimate
strengths of government ends,' instead contenting itself to strike down
most content-based laws because the means used were unnecessary to
promote the government's interests." 8
Despite the Court's reliance on the tailoring portions of strict
scrutiny, this aspect of the test does not compel the Court to apply
The most common form of balancing occurs through levels of judicial
scrutiny. Each level of judicial scrutiny shares the same basic structure.
First, the government interest must meet a threshold of
importance .... Second, the means of the law must be connected or
tailored in some way to the governmental interest (the law's purpose or
"end") .... The importance of the governmental interest and the tailoring
of the means are the predicate to the government's exercise of power.
Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of
Rights, 84 IOWA L. REv. 941, 954 (1999) (footnote omitted); see also Richard H.
Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law,
45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 711-12 (1994) (characterizing the Court's constitutional tests as
balancing approaches).
505. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
506. R.A.V., 505 U.s. at 382.
507. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 977 (1987); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional
Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 308 (1997); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling
Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional
Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REv. 917, 932-37 (1988); Hans A. Linde, Who Must Know
What, When, and How: The Systemic Incoherence of "Interest" Scrutiny, in PUBLIC
VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219, 220-22 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993).
508. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395-96; Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121-23 (1991); Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100 (1972). But see Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (noting that a university's interest in excluding a student group
from school facilities was not sufficiently compelling to support a content-based
restriction on speech). For an illuminating discussion of the Court's tendency in
constitutional review to focus on the tailoring aspects of strict scrutiny rather than
governmental interests, see Bhagwat, supra note 507, at 308 & n.32, 321.
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stringent review. While the notion that a law must be "necessary" to
effectuate the government's interest ostensibly limits unreasonably broad
and draconian government action by forcing judges to review carefully
other regulatory options, the term is subject to interpretation. Does the
Court mean "necessary" in the dictionary sense of "indispensable"' or
in an alternative sense, such as a law is necessary when available
alternatives would significantly impair the government's interests?1 0
Furthermore, although the Court's tiers of scrutiny are closely entwined
with empirical assessments regarding the government's proof of harm
and necessity of action,' nothing in the strict scrutiny test indicates the
nature or amount of evidence required to satisfy a court that the law is
"necessary" in any sense of the term. Absent something more to guide
the Court, means scrutiny can be quite "manipulable. "
1 2
Consequently, although we know that the application of strict
scrutiny means that the Court likely will strike down a restriction on
speech, we arrive at that conclusion not because of the test's careful
formulation, but because of background understandings regarding its
application."' Such background understandings may work well in
normal times, but their unspoken nature may lead courts to abandon or
manipulate them in times of crisis.5"4 After all, prior to Dennis, the
509. See 10 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 275-76 (2d ed. 1989), available
at http://dictionary.oed.com/.
510. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 398-400 (1999)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the "weak" and
.strong" senses of the term "necessary").
511. See Solove, supra note 504, at 943, 953-55; Timothy Zick, Constitutional
Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REv. 115
(2003).
512. Bhagwat, supra note 507, at 322; Gunther, supra note 505, at 33-36; see
also Zick, supra note 511, at 207-08 (discussing the Court's inconsistent application of
evidentiary assessments within and among various levels of scrutiny).
513. In addition to our understanding that strict scrutiny is essentially "fatal,"
Professor Kathleen Sullivan has noted that much of the work of strict scrutiny is done in
the initial decision to categorize a regulation of speech-that is, the decision that a rule is
content-based triggers strict scrutiny and the presumption that the government loses.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. Rav. 22, 60 (1992). Thus the categorization, rather than
the application of the test itself, is determinative. Id. Eugene Volokh has also noted
that the strict scrutiny test itself is not the source of our understanding regarding its
rigidly protective nature. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible
Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2417, 2447 (1996).
Rather, history and principles developed outside of that context inform the Court's
application. Id.
514. It is not entirely clear whether our background understanding of the rigidity
of strict scrutiny continues to be true. Several scholars have noted that the line between
rigid categorization and application of levels of scrutiny is blurring as the Court adds
levels of scrutiny and moves toward a more flexible balancing approach. See, e.g.,
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30
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clear and present danger test was subject to a similar background
understanding, which did not prevent the Court from manipulating the
test. 
515
Furthermore, absent such understandings, the actual terms of the
strict scrutiny test do little more than state a generalized form of risk
analysis. The notion that an interest must be "compelling," for
example, essentially collapses traditional def'mitions of risk assessment
into a single word-that is, an interest is "compelling" if it is serious
and likely to occur. In fact, the term "compelling" is potentially less
helpful than the phrase "clear and present danger" because its risk
assessment aspects are unspoken. As a consequence, not only does
strict scrutiny lack Brandenburg's concrete standards guarding against
the possible operation of psychological biases, it lacks even the minimal
explicit statement of risk assessment in the clear and present danger test.
To allow all of the heavy lifting of risk assessment to be done below the
surface, based upon a series of unarticulated assumptions, is dangerous.
The possibility that the specter of a national security crisis will skew a
judge's application of strict scrutiny is substantial.
Korematsu v. United States,"1 6 in which the Court upheld the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II after applying
strict scrutiny, stands as a lasting testament to the judiciary's ability to
manipulate that test in times of crisis. While few people would disagree
with the conclusion that the government's interest in preventing
espionage and sabotage was compelling, there was little, if any,
evidence in Korematsu that Japanese Americans engaged in such
activities.51 7 Despite this reasonably obvious fact, the Court barely
scrutinized the government's evidence, instead holding that "'we cannot
reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of
Congress'" that the exclusion order was necessary.5 s In Korematsu,
CONN. L. REv. 961, 964-65 (1998); Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY
L.J. 481, 514-15 (2002); Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that
Are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79
IND. L.J. 801, 853 (2004); Toni M. Massaro, Constitutional Law as "Normal Science",
21 CONST. COMMENT. 101 (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript on file with author). Some
of the justices, most prominently Justice Stephen Breyer, have explicitly argued for
application of a more flexible balancing test in free speech cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 217 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring in
judgment); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
741 (1996).
515. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
516. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
517. See Wells, supra note 3, at 912-13 (discussing evidence pertaining to
Japanese American disloyalty in Korematsu).
518. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 99 (1943)).
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then, strict scrutiny was barely scrutiny at all, much less the "fatal in
fact" version that we have come to know. 9
If strict scrutiny may be susceptible to skewing effects or
manipulation in times of crisis, intermediate scrutiny is likely to be even
more so. As with strict scrutiny, the terms used in intermediate scrutiny
to describe the nature of the government's ends ("significant") and
means ("narrowly tailored"), and the requirement of "ample alternatives
for communication" are not self-defining.52  Furthermore, strict
scrutiny at least comes with a background understanding that it is
difficult to satisfy. As a true balancing test, intermediate scrutiny leaves
judges to gauge interests and means with no guideposts at all. 2 Not
surprisingly, the courts' applications of that test have been "remarkably
inconsistent," even in normal times. 22  One can easily envision
problems with its application during times of crisis.
In fact, recent cases involving protestors suggest that intermediate
scrutiny provides insufficient guidance for courts attempting to assess
free speech concerns in light of national security interests. In Coalition
to Protest the Democratic National Convention v. City of Boston,23 a
federal district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction barring the
government's use of a demonstration zone near the 2004 Democratic
National Convention,' 2 a decision upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit.5" The zone was more than an area simply
cordoned off from public traffic. Rather, located under an abandoned
elevated railway track that was itself wrapped in razor wire, the zone
was surrounded by two rows of concrete barriers topped by eight-foot
chain link fences with two layers of mesh roofing to prevent thrown
objects and liquids."2  In effect, individuals and groups wanting to
protest at or near the convention were to be shunted to a location that the
district court labeled a "grim, mean, and oppressive space" reminiscent
519. See Solove, supra note 504, at 998-1000 (associating Korematsu with
judicial deference despite the application of strict scrutiny). For criticism of the Court's
decision in Korematsu, see Grossman, supra note 7; and Rostow, supra note 7.
520. Scholars have noted, for example, that the Court's refusal to examine
closely the government's interest occurs with intermediate as well as strict scrutiny.
See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 507, at 307-08; Solove, supra note 504, at 960-66.
521. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the
New Mass Media, and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REv. 141, 166-
70 (1995); Sullivan, supra note 513, at 60-61; Christina E. Wells, Beyond Campaign
Finance: The First Amendment Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, 66 Mo. L. Rav. 141, 162-64 (2001).
522. Wells, supra note 521, at 162-64.
523. 327 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub. nom Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v.
City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
524. Id. at 64, 76-78.
525. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 15.
526. Coalition to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
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of "an internment camp," the design of which was "an offense to the
spirit of the First Amendment."' Nevertheless, the judge concluded
that the government satisfied the requirements of intermediate
scrutiny .52
The government raised security concerns generally, and national
security concerns particularly, with regard to the need for such a
zone.529 It further argued that modifications to the zone, such as
allowing literature to be passed through chutes in the fabric mesh-
would unreasonably endanger convention delegates 3.5' At first glance,
of course, the government's interests satisfy the requirement of a
"significant" government interest.53' But, the government's evidence
regarding the possible threat to security essentially consisted of evidence
of "past experience at comparable events" rather than specific proof
regarding potential problems at the 2004 convention. 32 One ought to be
concerned regarding the creation of such a draconian space for free
expression-one likely to detract from the protestors' attempts to
communicate with the convention delegates-based upon remote and
speculative evidence unrelated to the event at hand. Nevertheless, the
district court concluded that such evidence "adequately support[ed] each
of the security precautions ... as reasonable."5 33 The appellate court
agreed, finding that "[o]n this hastily assembled record, the quantum of
'threat' evidence was sufficient to allow the trier to weigh it in the
balance" and that the "security measures undertaken by the City, though
extreme, were nonetheless narrowly tailored." 534  In other words, the
magnitude of the possible threat in this case justified a more deferential
approach to the government's tailoring of the free speech zone.
To their credit, the opinions evidence unease regarding the zone
and its potential effect on free expression. Nevertheless, there is reason
527. Id. at 67, 74, 76.
528. See id. at 76.
529. See id. at 70-71, 77.
530. See id. at 75-76.
531. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 12 ("[There can be no doubting the
substantial government interest in the maintenance of security at political conventions.").
532. Coalition to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75. The district court judge
requested "specific intelligence concerning security threats during the DNC." Id. at 75
n.2. The government indicated that such intelligence existed but refused to disclose it to
the plaintiffs' counsel. Id. The judge reviewed the evidence ex parte, but in light of the
plaintiffs' objections, did not consider it when assessing the appropriateness of the
demonstration zones. Id. Whether the judge could adequately disregard such evidence
once presented is a legitimate question raising significant due process concerns.
Nevertheless, this Article assumes, as the reviewing court assumed, see Bl(a)ck Tea
Soc'y, 378 F.2d at 13-14, that the only evidence relevant to the district court's
assessment of the security threat involved past events.
533. Coalition to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
534. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 14.
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to be concerned that, despite the courts' thoughtfulness, the intermediate
scrutiny test unreasonably weighted the balance against free speech
concerns. The specter of national security and the September 1 th
attacks loomed throughout the opinions and apparently affected both
courts' willingness to question the government's actions. The district
court noted that the convention was the first to occur since the
September lth attacks.5 5 The First Circuit hinted that the outcome
might have been different had the case been decided in "less tumultuous
times."" Similarly, Judge Kermit Lipez, concurring in the First
Circuit's decision, noted:
Inevitably, the events of 9/11 and the constant reminders in the
popular media of security alerts color perceptions of the risks
around us, including the perceptions of judges. The risks of
violence and the dire consequences of that violence seem more
probable and more substantial than they were before 9/11.
When judges are asked to assess these risks in the First
Amendment balance, we must candidly acknowledge that they
may weigh more than they once did. 37
If ever there was evidence that a salient and catastrophic threat might
affect judicial application of the Court's modern tests, this is surely it.
The courts' unwillingness to interfere with the zone despite the
truncated nature of the proceedings further suggests that intermediate
scrutiny is not up to the task of adequately balancing the policy concerns
at stake during a time of crisis. Both the district and appellate courts
admitted that their decisions were hurried and based upon an incomplete
record, thus hampering their analysis of the issue.53 Such factors
typically weigh more heavily in favor of protecting speech rights, as
"[t]here is a significant danger that courts under time pressure and
forced to speculate regarding potential harm based upon inadequate
evidence will allow 'groundless fears to figure in the rationale for
suppression,' thus distorting the decision-making process. " 39 Yet, the
courts essentially used the truncated nature of the proceeding to justify
535. Coalition to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
536. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 15 n.5.
537. Id. at 19 (Lipez, J., concurring).
538. See id. at 16; Coalition to Protest, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
539. Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against
Expression, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 65 (2000) (quoting Vincent Blasi, Toward a
Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 49 (1981)); see
also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Martin H. Redish, The Proper
Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REv. 53
(1984).
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the opposite presumption-that is, the hurried nature and the security
issues at stake made them hesitate to overrule the government's concerns
and apply a deferential form of intermediate scrutiny.
None of this is to say that the opinions obviously reached the wrong
result or that the individual judges necessarily responded to fear. The
amorphous balancing and unspoken empirical assumptions associated
with intermediate scrutiny, however, could not provide the judges with
an adequate tool to analyze the problems about which they were
concerned. Rather, the opinions are reminiscent of Dennis in their
balancing and tailoring of interests. With other protest decisions sure to
involve national security interests' and a government apparently willing
to exploit that interest to get what it wants, m it is unreasonable to leave
such decisions to the good will of concerned judges.
C. Some Thoughts on Possible Solutions
What can be done about the flaws in the Court's modem
jurisprudence, which so closely parallel those of the clear and present
danger test? One could conclude from the apparent, continuing failure
of the Court's jurisprudence in guarding against fear and prejudice that
nothing can guard against such effects, because judges who do not want
to jeopardize the nation will find a way to rule in favor of the
government. Given this sad fact, the Court's jurisprudence cannot, and
perhaps should not, attempt to craft standards designed to prevent judges
from deferring to government assessments of potential threat. Chief
Justice William Rehnquist has suggested as much in his book, All the
Laws but One, which involved a lengthy review of prominent cases
involving civil liberties' infringements during wartime. 542 Judge Posner
540. See, e.g., United for Peace & Justice v. City of New York, 323 F.3d 175
(2d Cir. 2003); Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Stauber v. City of New York, Nos. 03 Civ. 9162-9164 (RWS), 2004
WL 1593870 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004); United for Peace & Justice v. City of New
York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
541. During the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City, for
example, government officials justified surveillance activities and strict regulation of
protest activity with reference to certain protestors, who were described as "particularly
troublesome, even dangerous anarchists who infiltrate other groups of demonstrators and
then try to provoke violence." Nightline Vote 2004 (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 31,
2004), available at 2004 WL 63018012. For the most part, such violence did not
materialize. Id. Such characterizations are eerily reminiscent of the anticommunist
campaign's characterization of domestic communists.
542. See REHNQUIST, supra note 6, at 221 (concluding that courts are
"reluctan[t] ... to decide a case against the government on an issue of national security
during a war"). Chief Justice William Rehnquist characterized his conclusion as
descriptive rather than normative. That is, he claimed simply to describe what courts
have and likely will do during wartime. See id. at 224. Nevertheless, he apparently
also accepted this phenomenon as the best course of action as evidenced by his rather
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similarly argues that "[t]he greater the threat that some activity poses to
the nation's safety, the stronger will seem-and will be-the grounds for
seeking to repress that activity at some cost to liberty. ""
In contrast, Professor Vincent Blasi, also recognizing human frailty
in the face of fear, takes the opposite tack. Rather than arguing for
deference, Blasi views our tendency to exaggerate threats in times of
crisis as a reason to craft rigidly protective constitutional standards."
Thus, he argues that courts should develop standards during normal
times "that are relatively immune from the pressure of urgency by virtue
of their formality, rigidity, built-in delays, or strong internal
dynamics." 5"  We should avoid balancing tests like the clear and present
danger test, as they cannot withstand the pathologies that occur in times
of stress.-6
While each of the above approaches rightly recognizes the influence
of human nature in adjudication, both suffer from flaws suggesting that
they are inappropriate jurisprudential tools. An approach deferring to
executive action, such as that of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Judge
Posner, ignores that "government [officials] can confound 'reason' in
remarkably extensive ways." 5"  History suggests that government
officials who are not required to account for or justify their decisions"
can make remarkably bad ones. 9 As I have argued elsewhere, rigorous
judicial review may be a necessary aspect of holding such officials
accountable and improving their decision-making."5s Consequently, a
jurisprudential approach that completely insulates government decision-
making will often facilitate arbitrary and ill-advised government
lengthy defense of the Koremnatsu Court's deference. See id. at 203-11; see also Eric L.
Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CI. L. REV. 1395, 1405-09 (1999) (reviewing
REHNQUIST, supra note 6) (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of the desirability
of judicial deference in times of crisis).
543. POSNER, supra note 6, at 296.
544. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 468 (1985).
545. Id.
546. Id. at 473, 483.
547. Massaro, supra note 514 (manuscript at 126).
548. For a general discussion of the psychological research on the relationship
between accountability and decision-making, see Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock,
Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999).
549. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY
DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 9, 144, 176-77, 242-59 (2d ed. 1982); Wells, supra note 3, at
908-21, 929-35.
550. Wells, supra note 3, at 935-49. For a comparison of the relative merits of
congressional versus judicial oversight as methods of accountability pertaining to
executive decision-making, see Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity,
and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486 (2002)
[hereinafter Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing]; and Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of
Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2001).
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decisions resulting from the biases discussed earlier. Leaving such
unfettered discretion to executive officials is further antithetical to
fundamental First Amendment principles, which historically have
viewed such discretion as closely intertwined with censorship.551
Blasi's proposal, on the other hand, although prompted by a desire
to protect First Amendment values, may actually fail to do so. While
resorting to a rigidly protective, nonbalancing resolution of free speech
issues is superficially attractive, especially in light of the failures of
previous balancing approaches,"' methodologies that eschew balancing
may backfire. As Professor Martin Redish has noted:
Issues of first amendment protection often entail difficult and
controversial comparative value analyses and rough predictions
as to future events. As a result, by denying the existence of
complex interest-balancing, the court does not avoid use of a
balancing process; rather, it merely transforms the process into
an unstated, and therefore likely unthinking and less refined
balancing. 53
As this Article has noted, the likely result of such hidden balancing is
less protection of speech rather than more. Furthermore, to the extent
that Blasi's proposal is designed to protect judicial capital, it may also
fail as the Court's "unwillingness to consider the imminence and
severity of the harm to which that speech might lead" could "undermine
[its] legitimacy.
. 551. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750
(1988); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938); see also Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. Ray. 413, 459-63
(1996) (discussing the Court's antipathy toward unbounded government discretion).
552. Professor Vincent Blasi is by no means the only person to eschew
balancing as workable methodology in free speech cases. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Laurent B. Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
553. Martin H. Redish, The Role of Pathology in First Amendment Theory: A
Skeptical Examination, 38 CASE W. RES. L. Rnv. 618, 629 (1988).
554. Id. at 630. As Professor George Christie has also noted:
The litigants in any given case are entitled to feel that their case is being
taken seriously by a court that will decide the case on the basis of proofs and
arguments put forward by the parties and not on the basis of some
preconceived idea of what is good for the country, or the world, or the
universe, or on the basis of some prudential strategy of judicial
decisionmaking.
George C. Christie, Why the First Amendment Should Not Be Interpreted from the
Pathological Perspective: A Response to Professor Blasi, 1986 DuIa L.J. 683, 694.
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Although Rehnquist, Posner, and Blasi propose different solutions,
their proposals do share a commonality-their distrust of judges' ability
or willingness to apply existing jurisprudential tools leads them to take
all-or-nothing approaches that eschew any form of balancing. None of
them seems willing to consider, however, that balancing, if
appropriately guided, could avoid some of the problems with past and
existing doctrine.5 5  The real problem with the Court's tests is not
necessarily that they balance. Rather, it is that they attempt to balance
and make predictions based upon unspoken assumptions and ill-formed
empirical assessments. Consequently, psychological biases can skew
that balancing, resulting in poorly reasoned and ill-formed decisions.
Thus, the simplest remedy to the Court's past mistakes may not be
to avoid balancing, but simply to make the Court's balancing better.
What follows are some preliminary thoughts regarding how this can be
done. Those thoughts take the form of a list of questions that a court
should explicitly incorporate into its jurisprudence when determining
whether the government's regulation of speech can be justified in light
of the government's stated interest. Specifically, these questions are
designed to elucidate the nature and quality of the evidence that the
government presents in support of its actions. In effect, they make
explicit the empirical assessments that are often implicit-or if
acknowledged, are generally unguided-in the Court's opinions.
Before listing these questions, a caveat as to what these questions
are not is appropriate. They do not represent a complete and
overarching framework of free speech jurisprudence. They do not
address, for example, issues pertaining to content-neutrality (or lack
thereof),5 56 the government's purpose, 57 the nature of the person or
institution subject to the government's action,558 or the capacity in which
the government acts. 5" Nor does this list suggest how the Court should
change its existing standards-that is, whether it should abandon strict
scrutiny or merely supplement it. Whether and how such issues should
555. See Rabban, supra note 500, at 1353 (noting that "It]he Supreme Court's
failure to protect free speech during prior periods of crisis [is attributable] to the
weaknesses of inherited legal standards" and that stricter and more refined tests such as
the one used in Brandenburg may avoid such problems).
556. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of
Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REv.
49 (2000); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN. L. REv. 113 (1981); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
557. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 507; Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's
Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001).
558. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Comment:
Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1998).
559. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAiNS: DEMOCRACY,
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995).
2172005:115
HeinOnline  -- 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 217 2005
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
affect free speech jurisprudence are undoubtedly important, but they are
beyond the scope of this Article.
Instead, this Article proffers this list of questions based upon the
assumption that the Court's current trend toward balancing and
empirical assessments is an integral aspect of its approach in free speech
cases-one that is likely to remain part of its jurisprudence for some
time." If true, we would do well to refine that balancing by using
questions that actually get at what it is we care about in the balancing
process-that is, an identification of interests involved and an assessment
of the government's evidence regarding the need to regulate. Even
here, however, this list of questions is preliminary. It assumes a
situation similar to one that arose in Dennis (that is, where the
government regulates speech because of its communicative effect during
a national security crisis) and I acknowledge that the list would need
further refinement to account for situations involving other reasons for
regulating (such as protest situations in noncrisis times).
With that final caveat in mind, however, examples of the kinds of
questions that the Court should explicitly incorporate into its
jurisprudence when trying to determine whether the government has
satisfactorily shown a need to restrict speech might include:
" What is the specific harm allegedly resulting from the
speech or what is the specific government interest in
restricting speech (including a careful look at the criminal
charge, if applicable)?56'
" Does the government have direct evidence of a causal link
between the speech at issue and the government's interest in
regulating or is it indirect evidence (for example, evidence
relying on general past occurrences unrelated to the
speakers before the court)?
" What is the imminence of the stated harm or alleged result
of the speech?
" What is the speaker's intent to cause the harm or result
alleged?
" Does the government have direct evidence of the speaker's
intent (that is, words or written material directly stating the
560. See generally Zick, supra note 511.
561. I acknowledge that the Court may also need to identify a hierarchy of
government interests or purposes as part of its assessment of the restriction's
constitutionality as such purposes may affect the Court's approach, especially if they are
considered to be illegitimate. For a discussion regarding government purposes in the
free speech context, see Wells, supra note 539, at 44-52. I do not discuss that issue
here because most agree that national security concerns-those most often raised in times
of crisis-are legitimate and of the highest order.
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speaker's intent) or indirect (that is, intent inferred from the
speaker's other words, associations, or actions)?
" To the extent that groups or multiple entities are involved,
how much of the evidence is directly related to the specific
speakers before the court as opposed to others? How much
of the evidence regarding those speakers before the court
involves all or most of them rather than a small portion of
them?
" Does the evidence before the court logically support a
conclusion other than the one for which it is proffered by
the government?
* Are there reasons, other than those stated, for which the
government could desire to restrict the speech at issue-for
example, is the group or speaker before the court socially
or politically unpopular? Has it historically been so?
As should be reasonably obvious from this list, these questions bear
a striking resemblance to the Brandenburg Court's adaptation of the
clear and present danger test. They thus focus courts' attention on
identifying the actual interest at stake and the relationship between its
impairment and the speaker's expression. The questions are more
global, however, to account for the fact that incitement, the specific
issue in Brandenburg, is not the only government interest about which a
court might be concerned. Further, the questions inspire the Court to
inquire more specifically regarding the evidence presented than in
Brandenburg.562 Thus, they inquire as to the directness of the evidence
as it relates to causation by or attribution to the speaker and require the
Court to seek alternative arguments and explanations regarding the
government's evidence.
In order to ensure that judges and jurors do not unduly suppress
speech, courts should further require certain answers to these questions
prior to upholding restrictions on expression. Thus, speech should be
restricted only when it is clear that it will cause serious and imminent
harm, the speaker intends this result, and there is no other plausible
explanation for the speaker's behavior. By requiring all such factors to
562. Despite the Brandenburg test's advantages over previous tests, some
commentators have noted that it nevertheless raises questions as to some of its
requirements. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 184-86 (1984) (noting ambiguity in the "imminence" and "incitement"
requirements); Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion? The Brandenburg Test and Speech that
Encourages or Facilitates Criminal Acts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1, 15 (2002) (arguing
that the decision is unclear as to whether the speaker must have a subjective intent to
incite imminent lawless action and whether the words spoken must explicitly urge an
unlawful act). These questions, in addition to focusing courts on empirical issues, more
specifically identify issues regarding intent, advocacy, and the like.
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be present, this approach is far more objective and the questions far
more difficult to evade than the Court's current tiers of scrutiny
approach. Furthermore, when combined with specific questions
regarding the nature and weight of the evidence as it relates to groups
and individuals, the Court's inquiry becomes even more focused on
actual wrongdoing rather than stereotypes or vivid images of possible
negative outcomes resulting from a group's behavior.
Psychological evidence suggests that these kinds of questions are
more likely to result in reasoned judicial decision-making than the
Court's current approach. Specifically, such questions-when explicitly
dealt with in opinions-force courts to account for their decisions, which
should improve their decision-making. On a general level, this
phenomenon of "accountability" simply refers to the need for one
person to answer to another.563 From a psychological perspective,
accountability involves "the implicit or explicit expectation that one may
be called on to justify one's beliefs, feelings, and actions to others" and
"also usually implies that people who do not provide a satisfactory
justification for their [own] actions will suffer negative
consequences ... [while] people who do provide compelling
justifications will experience positive consequences." 51
Psychologists know that accountability can improve judgment and
decision-making. 565  Although accountability does not alleviate all
decision-making errors or biases,5"6 it can attenuate many of the errors
563. See Wells, supra note 3, at 936 n.183.
564. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 548, at 255. By serving as a constraint on
behavior, "[a]ccountability is a critical norm-enforcement mechanism-the social
psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social
systems on the other." Philip E. Tetlock, Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and
Prosecutors: Exploring the Empirical Implications of Deviant Functionalist Metaphors,
in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 582, 583 (Thomas
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
565. This improvement comes about because people who are held accountable
want to avoid embarrassment in front of their audience. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra
note 548, at 263; Itamar Simonson & Peter Nye, The Effect of Accountability on
Susceptibility to Decision Errors, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 416, 441 (1992). To avoid this embarrassment people are motivated to
prepare themselves by engaging in an effortful and self-critical search for
reasons to justify their actions. This search leads participants to (a) survey a
wider range of conceivably relevant cues; (b) pay greater attention to the
cues they use; (c) anticipate counter arguments, weigh their merits relatively
impartially, and factor those that pass some threshold of plausibility into
their overall opinion or assessment of the situation; and (d) gain greater
awareness of their cognitive processes by regularly monitoring the cues that
are allowed to influence judgment and choice.
Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 548, at 263 (citations omitted).
566. Research shows that accountability can improve some aspects of decision-
making, have no effect on others, and exacerbate some biases. For a general discussion,
see Tetlock, supra note 564, at 590-92.
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and biases apparently involved in the Dennis decisions. Thus, research
shows that accountability can cause decision-makers to be more self-
critical, more willing to consider alternative points of view, more
willing to anticipate possible objections to proposed courses of action,
and more willing to consider the possibility that they are wrong.567
Accountability can also attenuate biases related to the availability
heuristic ' and the overconfidence bias.569 Finally, while accountability
can exacerbate individuals' tendency to seek out confirmatory evidence
to the exclusion of disconfirmatory evidence, explicit instructions to
consider alternatives urge individuals to correct for this bias. 7
How can the questions above improve judicial decision-making with
regard to accountability? Explicit incorporation of such questions
requires courts resolving free speech disputes to put their reasoning
process on the record in a much more detailed manner than with current
standards, such as strict and intermediate scrutiny, which purport to
bring mathematical precision and openness to the decision-making
process, but which actually leave courts with great discretion to
manipulate outcomes." With that reasoning on the record, judges know
that they must deal with potential criticism-from judges who review
their decisions, from peers who may also partake in those decisions if at
an appellate level, and from public and scholarly audiences who will
review and critique the decisions.' Consequently, they should be
567. Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and Complexity of Thought, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 74, 81 (1983); Tetlock, supra note 564, at 590; Philip
E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability:
Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 632, 639-
40(1989).
568. See Diederik A. Stapel et al., The Impact of Accuracy Motivation on
Interpretation, Comparison, and Correction Processes: Accuracy X Knowledge
Accessibility Effects, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 878, 891-92 (1998); Erik P.
Thompson et al., Accuracy Motivation Attenuates Covert Priming: The Systematic
Reprocessing of Social Information, 66 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 474, 484
(1994).
569. See Philip E. Tetlock & Jae U Kim, Accountability and Judgment Processes
in a Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 700, 706-07
(1987).
570. See David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., Overestimating Causality: Attributional
Effects of Confirmatory Processing, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 892, 894-99
(1993).
571. See Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165,
202-03 (1985) ("Despite their superficial precision, neither the content nor the shape of
modem formulae communicates clarity and onstraint .... In combination with the
mechanical tone of formulaic opinions, the palpable range of choice inherent in the
formulae communicates, not objectivity, but power without responsibility.") (footnote
omitted).
572. To improve decision-making, accountability must satisfy certain
prerequisites. A thorough discussion of these prerequisites in the context of holding
judges accountable likely needs greater exploration and is beyond the scope of this
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spurred to reason thoroughly through their opinions and carefully justify
their ultimate outcomes. Furthermore, many of the questions above-
for example, those requiring courts to seek out alternative explanations
of the government's case-are designed to spur courts into critical self-
evaluation of their decisions. Research shows that, independent of
accountability effects, such questions can usefully counter some of the
biases that might have caused the skewed decision-making that occurred
in Dennis.5
73
Reliance on these questions is no guarantee that courts ruling on
civil liberties issues involving national security will reach outcomes
more favorable to those liberties than did the Dennis courts. Judges
may still fall prey to fear and prejudice or they may simply make the
strategic determination that they do not wish to involve themselves in
these matters. However, if courts reach those decisions after having
explicitly considered the questions listed above, they will have been
forced to take a sober second look at their reasoning processes and to
justify specifically their reasons for the infringement. Such a process is
far more intellectually honest than an approach that pretends to
acknowledge the courts' role in protecting liberties, but that actually
defers to the government's claims of necessity. Such candor allows us
better to debate the wisdom of the Court's decisions, whether they are a
result of the balancing described above or a strategic decision such as
invocation of the political question doctrine to avoid judicial resolution
of civil liberties questions during wartime.574
VI. CONCLUSION
Dennis is an extreme example of judicial capitulation to fear and
prejudice, but it hardly stands alone in history. 575 The frequency with
which courts have faced national security threats and the current post-
Article. For discussions that begin that exploration in other contexts involving judicial
review, see Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, supra note 550; and Wells, supra note 3, at
940-46.
573. See, e.g., PILous, supra note 280, at 227-29 (discussing studies showing
that "various judgment biases can be reduced by considering the possibility of alternative
outcomes or answers"); Koriat et al., supra note 365, at 116-17 (noting that requiring
decision-makers to generate reasons opposing their course of action decreases
overconfidence).
574. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to
Professors Epstein and Wells, 69 Mo. L. Rnv. 959, 970 (2004) (arguing that in some
instances the courts should invoke the political question doctrine in cases involving
conflicts between civil liberties and war powers).
575. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Effect of War on the Supreme Court, 80
N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript on file with author) (discussing an
empirical study of civil liberties cases from 1941 to the present, which found that
justices frequently defer to government claims of necessity during crisis periods).
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September lth atmosphere suggests that courts may again find
themselves in the difficult position of balancing free speech and national
security. Given their existing tools, judges may not be up to that task.
We need not abandon those tools in order to improve judges'
performance in this area. Rather, simple refinement of the manner in
which courts approach the balancing tests and empirical assessments that
are such a foundational aspect of their jurisprudence may improve their
decision-making, especially during times of crisis. This Article takes a
first step toward such refinement although much more admittedly
remains to be done. This first step, however, is an important one as it
begins to unpack what is unspoken in the Supreme Court's tests and
allows us to begin a discussion regarding those aspects of the Court's
decision-making that hover beneath the surface of its jurisprudence.
576. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National
Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REv.
675, 695-702 (2004) (discussing recent court decisions in which the courts deferred to
executive claims of national security).
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